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"The door flew open and X, alias 'Baldy', fell out on the road. We 
pulled up at once, and then he said 'Did anybody fallout?' or 'Who 
fell out?' I don't exactly remember the words. When told that 
Baldy fell out, he said 'Did Baldy fallout? Poor Baldy!'" 
(William James, 'The 
Principles of Psychology', 
1890) 
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ABSTRACT 
It is the aim of this thesis to consider two accounts of 
1st-person utterances that are often mistakenly conflated - viz. 
that involving the 'no-reference' view of 'I", and that of the 
non-assertoric thesis of avowals. The first account says that in a 
large range of (roughly) 'psychological' uses, 'I' is not a 
referring expression; the second, that avowals of 1st-personal 
'immediate' experience are primarily 'expressive' and not genuine 
assertions. 
The two views are expressions of what I term 'Trojanism'. 
This viewpoint constitutes one side of a 'Homeric Opposition in the 
Metaphysics of Experience', and has been endorsed by Wittgenstein 
throughout his writings; it has received recent expression in 
Professor Anscombe's article 'The First Person'. I explore the 
ideas of these writers in some depth, and consider to what extent 
they stand up to criticism by such notable 'Greek' contenders as 
P.F. Strawson and Gareth Evans. 
I first give neutral accounts of the key-concepts on which 
subsequent arguments are based. These are the immunity to error 
through misidentification (IEM) of certain 1st-person utterances, 
the guaranteed reference of 'I', avowal, and the Generality Const-
raint. I consider the close relation of Trojanism to solipsism and 
behaviourism, and then assess the effectiveness of two arguments for 
that viewpoint - Anscombe's Tank Argument and the argument from IEM. 
Though each is appealing, neither is decisive; to assess Trojanism 
properly we need to look at the non-assertoric thesis of avowals, 
which alone affords the prospect of a resolution of the really 
intractable problems of the self generated by Cartesianism. 
In the course of the latter assessment I consider the 
different varieties of avowal, broadening the discussion beyond the 
over-used example 'I am in pain'. I explore Wittgenstein's notion 
of 'expression', and discuss how this notion may help to explain the 
authority a subject possesses on his mental states as expressed in 
avowals. My conclusion is that an expressive account of avowals can 
v 
provide a satisfactory counter to the Cartesian account of authority 
without our needing recOurse to a non-assertoric or even to a non-
cognitive thesis. 
Discussion of self-consciousness is implicit in discussion of 
the Homeric Opposition, but there is in addition a short chapter on 
the concept itself. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is an account of a 'Homeric Opposition in the 
Metaphysics of Experience' intended to rival the Homeric struggle in 
the/philosophy of languag~/outlined by Strawson in his article 
'Meaning and Truth' ([1971] p. 172). Whether this is an apt 
description, or whether a more exact parallel would be with the 
mock-heroic skirmish of Alexander Pope's 'The Rape of the Lock', is 
a question for the reader to decide. Perhaps the 'Greek' and 
'Trojan' terminology eventually became something of an encumbrance; 
I am so used to it, it is hard for me to judge. The initial 
characterisation of these opposed viewpoints was in terms of their 
(Trojan) endorsement or (Greek) rejection of the proposal that 'I' 
is, in a large class of uses, not a referring expression, and the 
self no object. This characterisation still has validity - but as 
explained in Chapters 2.1 and 4, things turn out not to be so 
simple. 
The provocation for this work on the self came in the first 
place from Professor Anscombe's article 'The First Person' [1975]. 
This article constitutes probably the most convincing presentation 
of the Trojan viewpoint, despite its unclarity about some of the 
key-concepts in the area. As an expression of the opposed 
viewpoint, the chapter entitled 'Self-Identification' in Gareth 
Evans' The Varieties of Reference [1982] is unrivalled. It is the 
most profound discussion of self-consciousness I have encountered. 
Underpinning each discussion, but interpreted or responded to 
differently, are the ideas on the self expressed by Wittgenstein 
from the period of the Notebooks for the Tractatus to that of the 
Investigations. It is a major part of the present undertaking to 
attempt to clarify the frequently cryptic and frustrating remarks in 
question. 
Non-philosophers at least will be sceptical whether an 
investigation of the semantics of the little word 'I' will yield a 
lot in the way of understanding of Self-Consciousness. Of course, 
the present investigation is one almost entirely within Philosophy 
and not Psychology. And the ramifications of the discussion of the 
xi 
Homeric Opposition has resulted in the treatment of Self-Conscious-
ness per se, even in its philosophical sense, being limited to a 
rather short Chapter 3. However, the few explicit connections with 
psychology that are made would I hope help to illustrate what I 
believe to be true - that at the end of the road of austere 
philosophical analysis lies a greater understanding of ourselves. 
CHAPTER 
ONE 
2 
In this first chapter I aim to give, as far as possible, 
neutral accounts of the key-concepts to be employed in the arguments 
of subsequent chapters. Neutral, that is, as between Greek and 
Trojan viewpoints. These concepts are Immunity to Error through 
Misidentification (IEM) of certain 1st-person utterances, Avowal -
and, less importantly, Guaranteed Reference (of 'I') and the 
Generality Constraint. The idea is that there are facts of all 
these matters which can be argued on by both sides in the Homeric 
Opposition. Disagreement arises from the differing interpretations 
placed on these facts. Hopefully the reader will bear with the 
technical analysis involved, in the assurance that it will be put to 
good use later. 
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1.1) Immunity to Error through Misidentification (IEM) (I) 
(i) The literary background 
The truism that certain 1st-person utterances are immune to 
error through misidentification of the subject (a phenomenon 
referred to henceforth by the abbreviation IEM ) was first noticed 
by Wittgenstein in the Blue Book. In a passage much-quoted in the 
annals of self-consciousness, he writes: 
There are two different cases in the use of the word 'I' (or 
'my') which I might call the 'use as object' and 'the use as 
subject'. Examples of the first kind of use are these: "My arm 
is broken", "I have grown six inches", "I have a bump on my 
forehead", "The wind blows my hair about". Examples of the 
second kind are: "I see so-and-so", "I hear so-and-so", "I try 
to lift my arm", "I think it will rain", "I have toothache". 
One can point to the difference between these two categories by 
saying: The cases of the first category involve the recognition 
of a particular person, and there is in these cases the 
possibility of an error or as I should rather put it: The 
possibility of an error has been provided for [but] it is as 
impossible that in making the statement "I have toothache", I 
should have mistaken another person for myself, as it is to moan 
with pain by mistake, having mistaken someone else for me 
(BB pp. 66-7). 
It is the task of the first section of this chapter to refine the 
principle of IEM as a preliminary to the more substantially 
argumentative work of Chapters 2 and 3 in which this principle 
figures. The aim is to produce a characterisation neutral as 
between the Greek and Trojan viewpoints, and it is worth pointing 
out initially that Wittgenstein's Trojan sympathies are apparent in 
the passage above in the 'use as object' / 'use as subject' termin-
ology. ('Use as subject' means 'as subject alone' - there is to be 
no object in such uses.) Also, the use of 'I have toothache' as an 
example of IEM is not helpful, since it is one of the sub-class of 
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IEM-utterances known as avowals, and hence mistaken conflation of 
IEM and avowal is invited (see pp. 18-21). 
What happens when the IEM principle is ignored may be 
illustrated by two famous literary examples in philosophy. The 
first is the melancholy death-bed scene in Dickens' Hard Times, 
where Mrs. Gradgrind is by now drifting away: 
'Are you in pain, dear mother?' 
'I think there's a pain somewhere in the room', said Mrs. 
Gradgrind, 'but I couldn't positively say that I have got it.' 
After this strange speech, she lay silent for some time. 
(Book II, Chapter 9) 
On a lighter note there is from William James the remarkable 
adventure of one 'Baldy', quoted by Anscombe in her [1975] 
(pp. 64-65). In a footnote to his discussion of the feeling of 
absence of self, James writes: 
In half-stunned states self-consciousness may lapse. A friend 
writes me: "We were driving back from ---- in a wagonette. The 
door flew open and X, alias 'Baldy', fell out on the road. We 
pulled up at once, and then he said 'Did anybody fallout?' or 
'Who fell out?' - I don't exactly remember the words. When told 
that Baldy fell out, he said 'Did Baldy fallout? Poor 
Baldy!'" ([1890] Vol. I p. 273n). 
Since the adventures of Baldy form a leitmotif throughout our 
discussion of IEM, it is important to diagnose his 'error' correctly 
from the outset. In fact we must, for present purposes, suppress 
one interpretation which would be philosophically uninteresting. 
For it is possible that the trauma has induced in Baldy a general 
amnesia - if his question was, in fact, 'Did anybody fallout?' And 
he does indeed seem to have forgotten that his name is Baldy, hence 
his final 3rd-person utterance; though it is an unexplained feature 
of the incident that he seems to have been told 'Baldy fell out' and 
not 'You fell out'. It is only on a second interpretation that he 
commits the 'Baldy-type error' that is of philosophical interest. 
If indeed he did ask 'Who fell out?', then James has some justifi-
cation in his diagnosis of a 'lapse of self-consciousness'. This 
5 
question is a manifestation not of some bizarre kind of amnesia, but 
rather of a kind of ignorance or doubt, like that of Mrs. Gradgrind, 
for which there is no real logical provision. 
(ii) Argument to 'no-reference' view of 'I'; neutral 
characterisation of IEM 
The relation between IEM and self-consciousness is a topic for 
Chapter 3. Of more immediate concern is the idea that the phenom-
enon of IEM is a ground for the 'no-reference' view of 'I'. The 
move here is from the impossibility of misidentifying the object 
that I am (or from the absence of criteria for its identification) 
to the conclusion that there is no identification of such an object 
either - that there is in fact no object and 'I' does not refer. 
Writers who are firmly opposed to the 'no-reference' view see it as 
important to explain why, on their account, this move is illicit. 
Strawson attempts to explain why 'I' can be used without criteria of 
subject-identity and yet refer to a subject because even in such 
uses, there are links with 3rd-person criteria ([1966] p. 165). 
Shoemaker writes: 'the absence of [the] possibility [of misidentif-
ication] is one of the main sources of the mistaken opinion 
that one cannot be an object to oneself, which in turn is a source 
of the view that "I" does not refer'. He believes that the source 
of this mistake is the idea that there can be no other kind of model 
for the self-awareness that grounds IEM-judgements than the percept-
ual model, and that since this is a preposterous account, there is 
(so it would appear) no self-awareness here at all ([1968] 
pp. 561ff.). Finally, Evans locates the supposed error in an 
equivocation between identification in the sense in which it 
involves criteria of recognition etc., and in the sense in which it 
involves no more than object-direction in thought ([1982] p. 218). 
How the argument from IEM to 'no-reference' fares in the face 
of such criticism will be discussed in the next chapter. What is 
required first is a quite neutral characterisation of the important 
phenomenon of IEM. In the course of this characterisation, IEM will 
be distinguished first from the 'guaranteed reference' of 'I', and 
then from the phenomenon of avowal. Now, the first thing to note is 
that it is not brought out in Wittgenstein's account, and is denied 
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or imperfectly understood in the accounts of Strawson and Shoemaker 
respectively, that IEM can apply to cases of 'physical' as well as 
'mental' self-ascription (Strawson [1966] pp. 164-5, Shoemaker 
[1968] p. 557). (Shoemaker actually concedes that IEM can obtain in 
physical self-ascription, but only derivatively; e.g. 'I am facing a 
table' has IEM only in virtue of 'There is a table in my field of 
vision' being IEM.) This fact would be less likely to be ignored or 
denied if a further feature of IEM were noted: that it is partic-
ular tokens of 1st-person sentences that display IEM, and not 
sentence-types (to use the Strawsonian terminology). The principle 
of IEM has to do with the grounds for particular assertions and not 
merely with their propositional content. An initial character-
isation is as follows: 
(IEM ) On certain occasions of use of 'I fell out of the 
1 
carriage' etc., the utterance is immune to error through 
misidentification of someone else as the subject. 
Now, let us analyse lst- and 3rd-person ascriptions in the following 
way: 
Fa (3x)(Fx & x a) 
'Fx' is the predication component of the sentence, and 'x = a' the 
identification component (following the terminology of Evans in his 
[1982]). So we would informally analyse the sentence 'I am now 
undergoing intellectual discomfort' as follows: 
(Predication component): Someone is now undergoing intellectual 
discomfort. 
(Identification component): That someone is myself. 
This analysis suggests the following: 
(IEM ) On certain occasions of use of 'I fell out of the 
2 
carriage' etc., any source of error must lie in the 
predication component. 
A further reformulation is required in order to focus on the idea 
that a certain sort of doubt is impossible, and to make clear that 
7 
the IEM and non-IEM uses are distinguished by grounds: 
(IEM ) When based on a certain type of ground, the assertion 
3 
of 'I fell out of the carriage' is IEM iff the ground is 
such that: 
a doubt about the assertion must enjoin the thought that 
there's no reason to believe that anyone fell out. 
(iii) Baldy's error 
We can now state Baldy's error a little more precisely than 
Anscombe does ( OPe cit. pp. 64-65). To the non-philosophic eye, it 
might appear that the character of Baldy's knowledge of the mishap 
is the same as that of one of his fellow passengers in the 
wagonette, a Mr. Ballard, a deaf-mute with a penchant for rural 
rides (James [1890] pp. 266-9 and Wittgenstein PI 342). In his 
semi-autobiographical work "A Queer Memory Phenomenon" and other 
Recollections, Ballard writes: 
I was engaged in one of my well-known reveries on the topic of 
cosmology and the Divine Providence when I was aroused by the 
carriage jolting. The door was flung open and a figure 
disappeared from view. The wagonette was carrying a full load 
that afternoon including some persons to whom I had not been 
introduced, and I could not positively identify the poor fellow. 
There was a frightful commotion with people shouting but of 
course I could hear nothing. My dog 'Russell' began to simulate 
pain, as he is wont to do on such occasions. Mrs. Pennyman was 
quite distressed but managed to intimate to me that the fellow 
who had fallen from the carriage was X, alias 'Baldy'. 
Both Baldy and Mr. Ballard (before the moment of intimation) are 
aware that someone fell out of the carriage (or so we are tempted to 
say with Baldy). The content of thei~ knowledge is the predication 
component alone of 'Baldy fell out of the carriage' / 'I fell out of 
the carriage', viz. 'Someone fell out of the carriage'. Their 
attitude to the thought 'Baldy was that someone' (or additionally, 
in the case of Baldy, 'I was that someone') will be agnostic. Of 
course, with Mr. Ballard, this is logically quite permissible. 
8 
There is ££ ground for this 3rd-person assertion such that, when 
based on that ground, the assertion exhibits IEM. But there is, in 
the case of Baldy, an implicit IEM-utterance the identification 
component of which he is doubting - nonsensically. To put this more 
satisfactorily requires a corollary of (IEM ): 
3 
(IEM ) When based on a certain type of ground (one which 
4 
includes a ground satisfying (IEM )), X's knowledge 
3 
that someone fell out of the carriage, when it is true 
that he himself fell out, is such that: 
X knows that someone fell out 
X knows that he himself ('I'-reflexive) is that 
1 
person. 
When I say that the ground includes that satisfying (IEM ), I 
3 
mean that it consists in the latter plus the rule for inferring 
'Someone fell out' from 'I fell out'. What is so perplexing about 
Baldy's case is that his knowledge that someone fell out of the 
carriage has to be grounded derivatively on knowledge of something 
of which he appears ignorant - that he himself fell out. This 
intolerable state of affairs compels us to say that we can give no 
account of Baldy's knowledge of the incident, but that he certainly 
does not have knowledge he appeared to have. 
It is not always the case that, when it is true that X has 
fallen out of the carriage, his knowledge that someone fell out has 
to be grounded in this way. It is by analogy with these other cases 
that it may appear possible to us that Baldy knows, and knows only, 
what he appears to know. The events I now relate went unrecorded by 
William James; they occurred after the publication of his Principles 
of Psychology and pertain to that period when X alias 'Baldy' had 
achieved some notoriety as a psychiatric case-study. I quote from 
the inordinately lengthy serialisation of his Adventures in the 
Baltimore Oriole [1895]: 
I awoke in hospital with no recollection of why I was there, nor 
indeed of past events in my life at all, except for a curious 
1 
For explanation of the 'I'-reflexive, see p. 60 
f d /·' sense 0 e]a VUe 
9 
I had been found wandering around the 
nearby village unable even to say what my name was. On the 
second day in the hospital I overheard one of the nurses saying 
that there had been a strange discovery in the next village. A 
horse had been found wandering in a field, harnessed to a 
wagonette. Its driver must have fallen out but was nowhere to 
be found. I thought no more of this incident until later that. 
day a nurse came up and presented me with a much-thumbed copy of 
William James' Principles of Psychology, on the inside cover of 
which was written 'Ex libris X alias "Baldy"'. 'Is this 
familiar to you?' she asked. 'It was found in an empty 
wagonette which a riderless horse was dragging across a field 
near Jamesville'. It then struck me in a blinding flash: 'f 
am Baldy! It was I who fell out of the wagonette!' And the 
details of my past life came flooding back in all their 
multifarious richness •••• 
The philosophical point is clear despite the regrettably tedious and 
banal prose style which the writer adopts. The kind of ground 
afforded by testimony for the assertion 'Someone fell out' is such 
that the subsequent discovery 'f am that someone' is possible. 
Here knowledge of 'I fell out' can be grounded derivatively on 
knowledge of 'Someone fell out'; in the earlier example, the 
derivation must be the reverse. In the later adventure, 'I fell out 
of the wagonette' is a non-IEM use. 
How in general might the grounds for IEM- and non-IEM utter-
ances be distinguished? McGinn, in his [1983] pp. 51-2, states, 
without arguing for it, that each IEM-utterance is grounded in 
awareness of what I refer to as an avowable-state (viz. a mental 
state of the sort that can be expressed by means of an avowal, that 
avowal affording evidence for its obtaining which given certain 
conditions is decisive). This is a tempting idea which would serve 
to provide a clear account of that which so far has been presented 
solely by illustration: viz. the way some grounds generate IEM-, and 
others non-IEM, utterances. I postpone offering an account of this 
idea until after the neutral characterisation of avowals. 
10 
1.2) IEM and Guaranteed Reference 
(i) Anscombe's conflation 
There is a third phenomenon associated with the 1st-person 
which is distinct from IEM and avowal and which, like IEM, is 
involved in an argument to the 'no-reference' view. This is the 
'guaranteed reference' of 'I', which figures in Anscombe's Tank 
Argument and which needs to be separated from IEM. There are 
various features that go under this name. In the formulations that 
follow I refer, for the sake of economy, to only two of these - the 
ideas that in using 'I', one cannot fail to refer to anything, and 
that one cannot fail to refer to that to which one intends to refer. 
(Other phenomena that could be mentioned in addition include that of 
'no unnoticed substitution' - that in using 'I', one refers to the 
1 
same object on every occasion of use.) Anscombe notices these 
two features but seems to confuse the second with IEM: 
We saw that the 'A'-user would not be immune to mistaken 
identification of someone else as 'A'. Will it also be so 
2 
with 'I'? 
The suggestion seems absurd ••• if 'I' is a 'referring 
expression' at all, it has both kinds of guaranteed reference. 
The object an 'I'-user means by it must exist so long as he is 
using 'I', nor can he take the wrong object to be the object he 
means by 'I'. (The bishop may take the lady's knee for his, but 
could he take the lady herself to be himself?) ([1975] p. 123). 
1 
See pp. 87-90. 
2 
'A' is a term used by Anscombe and functioning as a 
self-referential device which is not expressive of self-
consciousness (see pp. 136-39). 
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Now it is necessary to defer explicit discussion of the 
proviso 'If "I" is a referring expression', to deal briefly with 
this confusion. We have seen that the 'suggestion' that some 
1st-person utterances are not immune to error through misidentif-
ication is not 'absurd', but correct. In these uses, 'I' does 
resemble 'A'. 
An example of a non-IEM 1st-person judgement might be the 
following: Gentle John and other heavyweights are being weighed on 
weighing machines, but for no good reason someone has wired up meter 
A to machine C, B to D etc. Gentle John says 'I weigh 25 stone'. 
But his judgement is false because it is Wee Willie who weighs 25 
stone, Gentle John in fact clocking in at a mere 23 stone. We then 
tell Gentle John that someone has tampered with the weighing 
machines, and that some of the meters are in fact connected to the 
wrong machines. It then makes sense for the gentle giant to say: 
'Someone weighs 25 stone, but is it myself who weighs 25 stone? 
Maybe it's Wee Willie, or Fat George •••• , So, in the terminology 
of (IEM ), the assertion is doubted due to doubt about the RHS -
2 
the identification component. A similar example could be construct-
ed from the further adventure of Baldy, if it turned out that it was 
not Baldy who had fallen out of the wagonette. But in all such 
cases the possibility of error due to misidentification requires 
that the speaker refers to himself. If 'I' is a referring 
expression.) And he must always refer to himself when he compre-
hendingly uses 'I', if the IEM / non-IEM categorisation of 'I'-uses 
is to be exhaustive. For if there wasn't this guaranteed reference 
in the second sense (viz. that the speaker refers to that to which 
he intends to refer, himself), there would be a third category of 
'mutant' IEM-utterances. In these cases, I could not misidentify 
someone else as myself, because I would not be making any claims 
about myself at all, and so could not make that kind of mistake. 
But this is all so much nonsense. 
To return to the quotation from Anscornbe, then, Peacocke (in 
his [1983] p. 151) is clearly right to say that not only can the 
bishop take the lady's knee for his, but he can also take the lady 
herself to be himself - if he saw a woman dressed as a bishop in a 
mirror, for instance. He might then say 'How splendid I look!' 
which would be erroneous (or at least ill-grounded) through 
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misidentification. (It is a non-IEM utterance.) What Anscombe 
should be saying is not that mistaken identification is impossible 
in the 1st-person, but that mistaken reference is. (Perhaps it is 
strange to talk of identifying or misidentifying oneself in a 
mirror, but I think the idea is clear.) 
(ii) Formulation of 'guaranteed reference' 
How should the 'guaranteed reference' of 'I' be formulated, 
then? It will be recalled that at this stage an account that is 
neutral between the Greek and Trojan views is required, but the 
account of the phenomenon so far has not been careful enough in this 
regard. Anscombe points us in the right direction. She adduces 
various features of the use of 'I' which support the following 
contention: If 'I' refers, it has guaranteed reference. Our 
mistake, she claims, is to treat these features as if they 
established directly that 'I' has guaranteed reference; but they 
establish only the conditional (and, given the incoherence of 
'guaranteed reference' we must negate the antecedent, she claims). 
The features are those that comprise the idea that there is no 
sense, in the case of 'I', to the supposition of mistaken reference. 
Now it is difficult to describe these features without presupposing 
that one does in fact use a referring expression 'I' - a problem for 
Anscombe! The features require care in their presentation. 
Unfortunately this care is not bestowed by Anscombe. She writes: 
Getting hold of the wrong object is excluded, and that makes us 
think that getting hold of the right object is guaranteed. But 
the reason is that there is no getting hold of an object at all. 
( ibid. p. 59). 
But if we can say categorically that getting hold of the wrong 
object is excluded, we can also say that getting hold of g£ object 
is excluded; incompatible with the Anscombe diagnosis that there is 
no getting hold of an object at all! No, what we need is some 
such formulation to govern the principal features as the following: 
(G ) In using 'I' one cannot be said both to attempt an act 
1 
of reference and yet either fail to refer to anything, or 
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fail to refer to that to which one intends to refer. 
Though further refinement is required to limit the uses of 'I' under 
consideration to those which are comprehending and serious: 
(G ) In using 'I' one cannot be said both to (i) intend to 
2 
refer in that way which if 'I' is a referring expression, 
constitutes serious, comprehending use, and (ii) fail to 
refer to anything, or fail to refer to that to which one 
intends to refer. 
This tortuous way of putting things means that, as an alternative to 
(i) and (ii), perhaps no act of reference is involved in the use of 
'I', and its serious, comprehending use is characterised in some 
other way than it is in (i). The characterisation is thus a neutral 
one (by dint of a certain artificiality!). It is claimed that if 
'I' refers, it has guaranteed reference; but the possibility is left 
open that it does not refer. (Our characterisation of IEM makes no 
claim about whether or not 'I' refers. Further, there is no need 
with IEM for a clause about serious and comprehending use, since 
this is implied by a characterisation in terms of an assertion with 
a certain ground - see p. 7.) 
The question arises whether 'guaranteed reference' is a 
feature of other referring terms apart from 'I'i or whether it may 
not in any case be an empty, purely formal feature (in contrast to 
IEM). The latter in fact seems to be the case. (I shall avoid 
complication at this point by assuming 'I' does refer; the reader 
may guess the tedium of continuing in the previous neutral vein, 
whilst being assured that it could be done.) For guaranteed 
reference, in common with 'no unnoticed substitution' (see below 
pp. 87-90), is generated by one's way of describing the situation. 
There is a condition on the use of 'I' for it to exhibit guaranteed 
reference: that the use be comprehending. With this in mind, let us 
look at the two aspects of guaranteed reference specified by 
Anscombe: 
(1) The object the 'I'-user intends to refer to must exist; 
(2) The intended and the actual referents must coincide. 
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Now, what must the speaker comprehend about 'I'? For a start, that 
an 'I'-user refers to himself. The referent therefore must exist 
for a comprehending 'I'-utterance to be possible. The speaker must 
also comprehend that an 'I'-user intends to refer to himself. So if 
the use of 'I' is comprehending, the intended and actual referents 
will coincide. Built into our description of the use of 'I' as 
comprehending, will lie the Anscombian 'guaranteed reference'. 
(iii) Status of the phenomenon 
Is guaranteed reference shared with proper names? I see a 
figure, which I take to be Bernard playing football at the other end 
of the beach. I say 'Bernard is playing football'. But it turns 
out on closer inspection to be someone else. Now a different 
(though familiar) example. I see someone's reflection in a shop 
window. I say, on the basis of this, 'My hair is blowing in the 
wind' (maybe, like Oliver Sacks' 'Disembodied Lady', my proprio-
1 
ceptive sense is impaired). But the reflection turns out to be 
of someone else. In each example, the semantic reference is clear -
it is to Bernard, and to myself respectively (this is why the 
statements are false). The speaker's reference is perhaps not so 
clear. Presumably it is to the person playing football, and to the 
person reflected in the window, respectively. But there may be some 
temptation to say that since the speaker intends to refer to 
himself, in the second case, it is he who is the speaker's referent 
too - but the very same consideration could be adduced in favour of 
regarding Bernard as the speaker's referent in the other case. 
The afore-mentioned considerations indicate that the 
guaranteed reference of 'I' is not a very interesting phenom-
2 
enon. In non-IEM cases, there is no greater reason to assert a 
necessary coincidence of speaker's and semantic reference than in 
the case of proper names. And there is as much reason to claim that 
1 
See his [1985] pp. 42-52. 
2 
Guaranteed reference nonetheless has a role to play in 
the Tank Argument (Ch. 2.4). This fact points to an 
unresolved tension. 
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intended and actual referents coincide in the case of proper names, 
as in the case of III: further, this coincidence appears to be a 
product of the requirement of comprehending use. There is of course 
a divergence between the behaviour of proper names and of IEM uses 
of III; but it would be simply confusing to call this guaranteed 
reference of III, since it is a guarantee about correct 
identification that marks the difference. 
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1.3) Avowal 
(i) A neutral characterisation 
Avowals, in the technical sense in which the term is used, are 
a sub-class of 1st-person, present-tense psychological utterances 
which, when uttered comprehendingly and sincerely, have the property 
of guaranteeing the truth of the corresponding 3rd-person ascript-
ion. Examples would include 'I'm angry', 'It hurts!', 'I am very 
excited', 'I am in pain' (of course), 'I'm hot', 'I'm miserable', 'I 
feel rather cheerful', etc. These, at least, are what are later 
termed 'paradigm' avowals (of sensation, certain moods and feelings, 
etc.); complications, postponed till Chapter 4, arise with avowals 
of propositional attitude, perceptual experience etc. Crispin 
Wright has suggested five salient features of avowals which form the 
basis for the following neutral account of the phenomenon. These 
are intended simply as 'salient features'; it may be that they are 
not independent one of another, but for present purposes it is 
sufficient that they are neutral between the Greek and Trojan 
viewpoints. 'I am in pain' here figures as a 'typical' avowal: 
(i) There are no grounds for the utterance. 
(ii) No misidentification of a subject is possible. 
(iii) My very utterance of 'I am in pain' is a criterion for the 
correctness of 'He is in pain' said of myself by another. 
(iv) When X, comprehendingly and without intending to deceive, 
utters 'I am in pain', the truth of 'He is in pain' said of 
X is guaranteed. Furthermore, except where there is 
independent evidence that the utterance is not made 
comprehendingly, when X utters 'I am in pain', the extent of 
my confidence in the truth of 'X is in pain' is exactly 
proportional to that of my confidence in the truth of 'X 
comprehendingly and without intending to deceive avowed "I 
am in pain"'. 
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(v) 'I doubt whether I am in pain' has no use. 
These features I term the Famous Five. (A modified version of the 
Five as they pertain to the more 'complicated' cases - 'qualified' 
avowals - is presented on p. 161.) 
care has been taken in the characterisation to give an account 
of avowal acceptable to both sides of the Homeric Opposition. 
Comment on the sense, if any, in which avowals involve identif-
ication of a subject, is avoided by referring to the impossibility 
of misidentification. Talk of the 'truth' or 'correctness' of an 
avowal is eschewed. Instead of saying that an avowal expresses 
logically infallible knowledge for the subject (a notion regarded 
with disfavour by Trojans), the matter is formulated in terms of the 
senselessness of doubt. Feature (iv) (second part) expresses the 
fact that if the speaker is taken to understand what he is saying 
then evidence for or against the non-deceiving nature of his 
utterance is simultaneously evidence for or against the truth of the 
corresponding 3rd-person ascription. This relation holds because 
there is no room for an 'honest mistake' by the speaker - the 
possibility of non-deceiving but mistaken utterance is ruled out 
(hence Feature (v». So evidence against the speaker's intention to 
deceive rises and falls with that for the 3rd-person ascription (if 
we assume a comprehending speaker). Take the regrettably widespread 
phenomenon of Schadenfreude (pleasure in the misfortunes of others). 
Unfortunate X relates his recent misadventure to envious Y, who 
fails to suppress completely his wicked smile of satisfaction. 'I'm 
not sure you're not rather pleased at what has happened', X com-
plains. 'My dear fellow, I could not be more distressed at your 
misfortune', protests Y. The obvious point is that there will be no 
evidence that Y is pleased, that will not also be evidence that his 
disavowal was insincere. (This is to take it that Y's utterance is, 
in our technical sense, an 'avowal', and that Y's wickedness is not 
sustained by any self-delusion of virtue. To talk of self-
deception, or at least of self-ignorance, in such cases, is to admit 
the possibility of one's being honestly mistaken in the self-
ascriptive application of the very same predicate which on other 
occasions of use figures in self-ascriptions about which doubt is 
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inappropriate. The connection with truth which is present in the 
case of deception is absent in the case of lack of understanding, so 
that there is the possibility of the kind of 'independent' evidence 
referred to in Feature (iv) in the latter case but not the former. 
This evidence sustains the charge e.g. 'XiS avowal was not a 
comprehending one' whilst not cornrniting one to e.g. 'X was not in 
pain'. Thus the following improbable kind of counter-example is 
possible. Roberto, a known Spanish monoglot, drops a heavy weight 
on his foot, by strange coincidence he utters the words 'I am in 
pain', which he has heard on a 'Let's speak English!' tape, and 
hops around clutching his foot. Here, I can be completely confident 
that Roberto is in pain, whilst having no confidence that his was a 
1 
comprehending avowal. Obviously it is the presence of 
non-linguistic behavioural criteria which makes such divergent 
ascription possible, and which grounds any belief that the speaker 
intends to deceive. Finally, strictly speaking we should use the 
inelegant locution 'without intending to deceive', instead of 
'sincerely', because it is possible that sincere intentions will 
have no role to play in a non-assertoric thesis - if, for instance, 
avowals are assimilated to purely expressive behaviour. In the 
latter case, the fact that an avowal is not intended to deceive will 
not imply that it was uttered with sincere intention, since the 
avowal may not be an intentional action at all. 
(ii) The relationship of IEM and avowal 
What is the correct relationship between the phenomena of IEM 
and avowal? I wrote at the beginning of my discussion of the former 
that Wittgenstein's illustration of IEM invited confusion between 
the two phenomena. And there has indeed been mistaken conflation of 
avowal and IEM - beginning I think with Descartes himself! In the 
Second Meditation, he famously asks 'What then am I?' He expands on 
the famous answer - the res cogitans is a being that doubts, 
I 
Let us say we ask him in Spanish for the meaning of the 
English sentence 'I am in pain' and he looks blank and 
uncomprehending. 
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understands, asserts ••• etc. (Anscombe and Geach ed. [1970] 
p. 70): 
These are a good many properties - if only they all belong to 
me. But how can they fail to? Am I not the very person who is 
now 'doubting' almost everything; who understands something •••• 
[etc.] 
His emphasis suggests (correctly) that self-ascriptions of these 
psychological properties are IEM. But later in the same paragraph, 
after denying that any circumstance could alter this immunity to 
error, he elides the phenomenon with that of avowal: 
I am now seeing light, hearing a noise, feeling heat. 
These objects are unreal, for I am asleep; but at least I seem 
to see, to hear, to be warmed ••• ( ibid. p. 71). 
This is a conflation, because although 'I am now seeing light' might 
be falsified by the later discovery that I had been dreaming, it 
could not be mistaken because it was someone else and not I who was 
seeing light. 
But then Descartes was writing before the advent of the excep-
tionally precise and accurate philosophical tools of the modern age. 
How surprising then that the conflation continues to be made! 
Anscombe, at least, is quite innocent on this score. She writes: 
The 'I'-thoughts I've been discussing [and alleging to involve a 
non-referential use of 'I'] have ••• not [been those] of 
Descartes [viz. those expressed in avowals, roughly] ••• the 
propositions that were most difficult for him are most easy for 
me ••• ([1975] p. 63). 
That is, Anscombe is clear that the 'I'-thoughts in which she has 
been interested are not 'incorrigible self-ascriptions of immediate 
experience' or some such category. But one should not be too 
generous towards her, since as we have seen on pp. 10-12, she is far 
from clear just what IEM is! Hacker, though, comments on a 
possible ambiguity in Wittgenstein's account of 'I' both in the Blue 
Book (as we have already noted) and in the Investigations; an 
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ambiguity between a 'no-reference' view of 'I' and a non-assertoric 
account of avowals. However, just prior to this point in his 
discussion, he seems to have conflated the allegedly non-referring 
'I'-as-subject use, which is correlative with IEM, and the use of 
'I' in avowals. He writes: 
it is as a result of the peculiar features of sentences in 
which 'I' is used as subject - i.e. avowals - that we are led to 
think that there is a form of empirical knowledge that is non-
evidential or immediate ([1972] p. 262). 
The mistake here lies in the implication that 'I' is used 'as 
subject' alone only in avowals, whereas as Hacker himself notes 
later on, '''I'' is used without identification or recognition of a 
person in a very much wider range of cases than avowals' ( ibid. 
1 
p. 270). That is, IEM is apparent in avowals, but not only 
there; the class of IEM-utterances is wider than, not merely 
co-extensive with, the class of avowals. 
Holtzmann and Leich make the same mistaken conflation when, in 
the curious introduction to their [1981], they write: 
The 'subjective' use (of 'I') is not based on observation and 
it simply expresses how things are with the speaker ••• It is 
this use which fails to be referential. But there is another 
use of 'I' as well, the 'objective' one: this use is based on 
observation ••• ([1981] p. 12). 
They go on to say, in a footnote, that 'a similar duality of use is 
presumably discernible, in Wittgenstein's view, in "joy", "pain", 
" means p by S"', where the 'objective' use will involve mastery 
of 'referential relations', or at least knowledge of the 
contribution of the respective expressions to the truth-conditions 
of sentences in which they occur. But these comments arise from a 
failure to distinguish between judgement not based on identification 
1 
The mistaken conflation is less apparent in the much-
revised second edition (see [1986] p. 281); see also Hamilton 
([1987] forthcoming). 
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( inter alia, IEM judgements), and judgement not based on 
observation inter alia, avowals - if they are judgements at 
1 
all). The 'duality of use' of 'I' will then, on some versions 
of the 'no-reference' account, imply a similar duality in the use of 
those predicates that figure in both IEM- and non-IEM-judgements. 
But unless we think that sentence-tokens of the very same type can 
feature both as avowals and as non-avowals, we will not see how the 
terms in Holtzmann and Leich's list have dual uses. 'Pain' 
certainly has no observational use in the 1st-person and it is 
doubtful that 'joy' does. Of course, there may well be a duality in 
the use of these predicates between the 1st-person ( all 1st-person 
uses) and the 3rd-person; but this has nothing to do with 
'I'-as-object / subject and IEM. 
The conflation I have been discussing is of some dialectical 
significance. In the Philosophische Bemerkungen, Wittgenstein notes 
how the use of 'I' is 'one of the most misleading representational 
techniques in our language ••• particularly when it is used in 
representing immediate experience' ([1975] p. 88). Despite the 
elusive quality of his thought on this subject, it is possible to 
argue that Wittgenstein, in his later work, came to see that the 
'no-reference' view of 'I' is a blunt instrument for resolving the 
problem of 'immediate experience' and alighted instead on the 
non-assertoric thesis of avowals. It might be said that there are 
three problem-areas associated with the 1st-person. They are, in 
descending order of generality: guaranteed reference, IEM and 
avowal. They are related but separate, and it is well to keep them 
so. 
The phenomena of IEM and avowal are not identical, then. What 
is the correct relationship between them? As I suggested in the 
account of IEM, it seems that the evidential (or perhaps better, the 
justificatory) basis for an IEM-judgement can be seen as what was 
termed an avowable-state. This idea is used as the starting-point 
for a Greek explanation of IEM in Chapter 2 (pp. 107-8 below). But 
though it looks correct, more needs to be said by way of refinement 
1 
If they are not, a simple alteration in terminology is 
required here. 
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than is necessary for the purposes of our dialectic. Briefly the 
difficulty is this. Any ~-IEM judgement may be 'based on' 
awareness of an avowable-state. Testimony, for instance, will cause 
some auditory or visual state of the subject which at a certain 
level of description will be avowable. We need to show how, in the 
case of IEM-judgements, this connection is in some way 'direct' and 
'internal'. The directness comes out in the fact that in the IEM 
case the connection must not be mediated by the experience of 
someone other than the subject. But this is a necessary condition 
only; since it is satisfied also in the non-IEM case of Gentle John 
(p. 11 above). (Though perhaps sufficient too, if we consider only 
IEM-judgements and non-IEM tokens of the same type, rather than 
non-IEM-tokens which can never figure also as IEM-tokens). The 
internal aspect comes out in the fact that one can never (normally) 
have the experience reported by an IEM-judgement without being in a 
position to make some germane avowal. 
Much work needs to be done to provide a satisfactory 
characterisation here; and since, as I said, it is not strictly 
necessary for the purposes of our dialectic, it will be left undone. 
The notion of IEM itself now awaits further refinement. 
23 
1.4) IEM (II) 
(i) Avowals are IEM 
More work is required on the characterisation of IEM, for two 
reasons. First, it is not readily apparent how the more limited 
class of avowals, which at first sight are IEM-utterances par 
excellence, can be accommodated within (IEM). Second, it can 
3 
be argued that demonstratives display IEM as characterised in 
(IEM ), and there are dialectical reasons for settling this 
3 
matter. (If demonstratives display IEM, any argument to the 'no-
reference' view based on IEM will have the implausible implication 
that demonstratives do not refer either - see p. 94.) 
To deal with avowals first. It is not possible to apply the 
test (IEM ) to avowals. Even if one assumes, contrary to the 
3 
purely expressive variant of the non-assertoric thesis, that avowals 
are structured and thus do have the identification and predication 
components, it still makes no sense to doubt the former component. 
It is the hallmark of IEM-utterances, as characterised in 
(IEM ), that a doubt about whether, say, it was I who fell out 
3 
of the carriage, means there's no reason for believing that anyone 
fell out. But the eventuality which this test presupposes can never 
arise in the case of avowals. There are, unlike with the IEM-
utterances we have been considering, no tokens of the type, say, 'I 
feel cold', where one could doubt whether it is I who feel cold. In 
the case of avowals, doubt, whether about the identification or 
predication component or about the complete utterance, is excluded. 
Clearly, however, avowals are immune to error through 
misidentification of the subject. To accommodate this fact, we can 
make a move so well-tried in previous discussion that it is by now 
almost second nature! It is the kind of move made in e.g. 'that 
doubt is impossible does not imply there is infallible knowledge', 
but here it is in reverse. Instead of formulating IEM in terms of 
the consequence of a certain kind of doubt, we can do so in terms of 
the impossibility of a certain kind of justification: 
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(IEM ) An assertion is IEM iff it is nonsensical to suppose 
5 
that one may justify it in the following way: 
By putting the case separately for 'Someone is F' and for 
'I am that someone', combining the cases and thus 
obtaining a justification for asserting 'I am F'. 
On this basis avowals can be accommodated within the class of 
IEM-utterances. 
(ii) Are demonstrative judgements IEM? 
Now to move on to the question of IEM and demonstratives. Of 
the two issues raised, this is by far the more significant. In 
bringing out how 'I' and the demonstratives differ in the way in 
which they display IEM, something not captured in earlier formul-
ations, the motivation for the 'no-reference' view is more sharply 
delineated. For consider the following example. A French polit-
ician (Wittgenstein PI 336) is observing the progress of Baldy's 
wagonette at the moment at which the misadventure strikes. 'Mon 
Dieu!' he exclaims, 'What is this! That man has just fallen out 
of the carriage!' The question of whether these words were 
uttered in the order in which they were thought need not detain us 
here. More important is whether 'That man has just fallen out of 
the carriage!' exhibits IEM. On the formulations we have tried so 
far, we must say it does. In the terms of the more intuitive 
defeasibility formulation (IEM ), a doubt about the truth of the 
3 
assertion must enjoin the thought that there's no reason to believe 
that anyone fell out. I cannot cease to believe that it was that 
man (the object of demonstration) who fell out, whilst still having 
reason to believe that someone fell out. 
But the behaviour of the demonstrative expression 'that man', 
and that of 'I' in the original example, do differ in this connect-
ion. A new, more restricted formulation will serve to bring this 
out. First I will couch it in terms of defeasibility, which is 
clearer but unfortunately cannot accommodate avowals (as we have 
discussed above): 
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(IEM ) When based on a certain type of ground, the 
6 
assertion of 'Fa' is IEM iff the ground is such that: 
The emergence of doubt about the assertion must enjoin 
the thought that there is no reason to believe that 
anyone or anything was F. 
This amendment of (IEM ) brings out the fact that in the case of 
3 
'I', no misidentification over time is possible. If an utterance 'I 
am F' is IEM, then this immunity will be preserved for any subsequ-
ent transformation 'I was F' made on identical grounds. If any 
doubt emerges, this doubt must infect the predication component, if 
the statement is IEM. If I say 'I was F' (or 'I will be F') then, 
in the IEM cases, I cannot be wrong about who was (or will be) F. 
This point is of considerable significance. For a range of 
1st-person utterances, it seems there is reference to a subject 
which we cannot fail to identify correctly over time - a persisting 
subject, statements about which are immune to error through 
misidentification. This is a feature which, as Straws on would say, 
'gives one pause'. It is a remarkable phenomenon and one which 
arouses the suspicions of those who, like Anscombe, come to espouse 
Trojanism. 
This aspect of IEM has no analogue in the case of demonstrat-
ives, it seems. The disanalogy can be demonstrated by posing a 
dilemma. Consider the assertion 'That man has just fallen out of 
the carriage', uttered at time t • 
1 
At time t , either the 
2 
same assertion can be made, or it cannot. If it cannot, then it 
will fail the test (IEM ) for IEM. A small refinement of that 
6 
test is required to bring out the presupposition involved in this 
failure: 
(IEM ) When based on a certain type of ground, the assertion 
7 
of 'Fa' is IEM iff the assertion and the ground are such 
that: 
(i) the same assertion can be made at a subsequent time; 
(ii) any emergence of doubt about the assertion by that 
time will enjoin the thought that there's no reason 
to believe that anyone or anything is F - provided 
of course, that no independent grounds for believing 
the latter have emerged. 
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(I have used the more intuitive defeasibility formulation here; a 
simple but tedious emendation along the lines of (IEM ) would 
5 
serve to accommodate avowals.) If the same assertion can be made, 
then its exhibition of IEM will be empty; and the thought involved, 
dubiously demonstrative. For it seems that if co-reference, 
presupposed by but not identical with IEM, is to be guaranteed at 
all, it must be by means of a device conferring IEM in a transpar-
ently tautological way. For instance, by means of an attributive: 
'the man we then referred to when we said "that man has just fallen 
outn,. (Only if such a device is used in the subsequent assertion 
can it be certain that we are talking of the same person; and only 
when we are talking of the same person is there the possibility of 
IEM.) In any case, it is at best questionable that there is refer-
ence in the latter case at all, and thus whether a demonstrative 
thought is 'repeatable' at a later time. 
For further illustration, suppose that I come upon someone in 
a hospital bed whom I take to be the victim of yesterday's accident 
(viz. Baldy); and it is in fact Baldy. I say 'That man fell out of 
the carriage yesterday'. I say this because I remember his appear-
ance. Baldy overhears my remark and comments, quite unnecessarily, 
'Yes, I did fallout and not very pleasant it was I can tell you'. 
He says this because he remembers falling out and is no longer 
subject to the aberrant self-consciousness (if such it was) which, 
as we know, catapulted him to fame (or notoriety) in the psychiatric 
world. Now, in the case of both utterances, mine and Baldy's, there 
is in fact no error in identification. But the grounds of the 
former do not bestow IEM on the utterance, whereas in the latter 
they do. That this guarantee is present in the one case and not in 
the other, is brought out if we consider what happens when each 
speaker is given, as it happens, spurious grounds for doubting the 
identity of the victim. If I am told 'No, that man was not the one 
who fell out' and I believe it, I do not thereby lose my grounds for 
believing that someone fell out. Whereas in the 1st-person case 
1 
these grounds are lost - for the utterance is IEM. 
1 
For some further discussion of this issue, see pp. 92-94. 
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1.5) The Generality Constraint 
OUr final 'key-concept' requiring a neutral interpretation is 
the Generality Constraint, a feature of language-use which furnishes 
the ground for a Greek line of argument. The term is Evans', but 
the idea and the use to which he puts it are anticipated by Strawson 
in his Individuals. It is by means of the application of one 
dimension of the Constraint that Strawson hopes to refute the 'two 
dualisms' of Cartesianism and the no-ownership theory. His 'way 
with Cartesianism' involves the following claim: 
••• it is a necessary condition of one's ascribing states of 
consciousness, experiences, to oneself, in the way one does that 
one should also ascribe them, or be prepared to ascribe them, to 
others ••• ([1959] p. 99). 
'The main point ••• is a purely logical one', Strawson writes: 
••• the idea of a predicate is correlative with that of a range 
of distinguishable individuals of which the predicate can be 
significantly, though not necessarily truly, affirmed. ibid. 
p. 99n). 
Strawson is here drawing attention to one of the complex of abilit-
ies which underlies a subject's comprehending self-ascription; that 
conceptual ability manifested in the predication of a psychological 
property of members of a class of individuals to which one belongs. 
In our pursuit of the essential claim we shall next turn to Evans, 
whose primary concern is with the nature of thought rather than 
language. 
The Generality Constraint is introduced by Evans as the 'one 
fundamental constraint that must be observed in all our reflections' 
on the nature of thought. (In these reflections 'we have little 
enough to go on', even while we admit this Constraint, he writes 
op. cit. p. 100).) Evans develops the Generality Constraint from 
a consideration of what it means to say that thoughts are struc-
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tured. He elucidates the case of thought by means of the case of 
language (which is in fact my primary concern, for reasons that will 
become apparent). Thoughts are structured in the sense that 
sentences are structured; understanding a sentence and entertaining 
a thought each involves a complex of abilities, not a single 
ability. What complexes of abilities are these? We may set aside 
for present purposes the abilities associated respectively with 
performing a particular kind of speech-act and with adopting a 
particular kind of propositional attitude. It may well be correct 
to view the attitude towards or the force attached to a proposit-
ional content as a further structural dimension of a thought or 
sentence, one which is subject to the Generality Constraint. Evans 
himself, in his criticism of Donnellan's analysis of belief, 
encourages this view ( ibid. p. 105). But the abilities we are 
presently concerned with relate to the internal structure of the 
propositional content. Evans' elucidation proceeds as follows: When 
we say that a subject's understanding of a sentence 'Fa' is the 
result of a complex of abilities, we speak (in the first instance) 
of his understanding of 'a', and his understanding of 'F', we commit 
ourselves to predictions about what other sentences the subject will 
understand, given further postulations about his understanding, and 
we commit ourselves to a common though incomplete explanation of his 
understanding of a range of different sentences. So, if he 
understands 'Fa', and he understands 'G', he will understand 'Ga'; 
and his understanding of 'Fa' and 'Ga' will be partially explained 
by his understanding of 'a'. Analogous commitments operate when we 
say that thoughts are structured, and that a subject's apprehension 
of the thought that a is F involves a complex of abilities, Evans 
continues. (I will not detain the reader by spelling out these 
commitments.) The essential point, he maintains, is that if a 
subject can entertain the thought that a is F, then, for every 
property G of which he has a conception, he must be able to enter-
tain the thought that a is G; and likewise for any object b of 
which he has a conception. But here our slight problem arises. The 
Generality Constraint is meant to form a basis for an anti-Trojan 
argument. But if the Constraint is presented as one operating on 
object-directed thought, it is open for the Trojan to reply at the 
outset that 'I'-thoughts are not object-directed - so they are 
ungoverned by any such principle. 
29 
Indeed it is hard to see how, when we describe the Generality 
Constraint as something pertaining to thought rather than to 
language, we can avoid this kind of ontological commitment. We can, 
it is true, employ a formulation involving the description of 
thoughts exclusively in terms of the utterances by which they may be 
expressed, e.g. 'the thought expressed by na is Fn,. But this will 
be just an indirect way of talking about language, rather than 
thought; and we may as well take the direct way. (The feeling that 
we can never avoid the above sort of ontological commitment in the 
case of thought, except in the preceding trivial way, derives from 
the idea that there is no room for a distinction between surface and 
deep structure in our discussion of thought. In the case of 
sentences, however, there is a deep structure which surface 
structure may belie and of which the ontological commitment may be 
controversial - as in the Homeric Opposition.) 
The querulous reader may now interject 'What is all this 
ndialecticaln nonsense~ Either the Generality Constraint, as 
formulated by Evans, obtains, or it does not obtain. Whether or not 
the constraints on the thought that a is F apply, cannot depend on 
what is required for the purpose of some so-called Homeric 
Opposition'. However, my concern is not with the truth or falsity 
of Evans' claim about the structure of thought, but rather with 
finding some connected claim that will furnish the basis for a 
powerful anti-Trojan argument. The formulation Evans proposes may 
well hold; however, unless some argument is offered for believing 
that 'I'-thoughts ~ object-directed, there is no reason to 
maintain that they are subject to the Constraint. But of course the 
object-direction of 'I'-thoughts is precisely what is at issue. So 
we should now turn to a different formulation to that of Evans, one 
which the Trojan would be hard put to deny, but which will result in 
some difficulties for him. 
This new 'linguistic' formulation of the Generality Constraint 
proceeds from a slightly diluted version of Strawson's original 
thought that the idea of a predicate is correlative with that of a 
range of individuals. It states that for any subject-term and for 
any predicate, a competent language-user must have the ability to 
apply a range of predicates to the subject-term, and a range of 
subject-terms to the predicate. (We need to keep things at the 
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linguistic level, and refer to subject-terms and not individuals, to 
avoid begging the question against the Trojan.) The justification 
for this claim could be the generality implied in the notion of an 
ability; something which can be exercised on a variety of occasions. 
1 
Understanding a concept or (in Evans' terminology) an Idea is 
essentially an ability that can be manifested only sententially, and 
in a range of sentences employing a range of different construct-
ions. (Whether this requirement is holistic or merely molecularist 
obviously depends on one's account of these sorts of theory of 
meaning.) 
We shall see in Chapter 2 how an anti-Trojan argument can be 
developed from the premiss of a Generality Constraint of this sort. 
This argument will also be separated from another offered by Evans 
in the same connection. 
1 
'Idea' stands to 'object' as 'concept' stands to 
'property' (see Evans ibid. p. 104). 
CHAPTER 
TWO 
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In Chapter 2 I first define Trojanism and relate it to 
better-known doctrines such as behaviourism and solipsism. I then 
build on the accounts of key-concepts in Chapter 1 to present 
arguments for and against the Trojan viewpoint. The Generality 
Constraint furnishes apparently anti-Trojan material (and is indeed 
claimed by Evans to do SOli but no convincing, straightforward 
refutation is constructed. However, a line of argument which 
develops some of the points Evans was making here and which may lead 
to Trojan difficulties, is indicated. Next, the concepts of 
guaranteed reference and IEM furnish the basis for arguments in 
favour of Trojanism, the former via consideration of the situation 
of a victim of Anscombe's sensory-deprivation tank. (That the 
former does so despite our analysis of the phenomenon in Chapter 1 
as 'empty' seems to indicate that there is some unresolved tension 
at this point.) After elimination of mistaken presentations and 
some often painstaking refinement, arguments emerge which are 
plausible though far from conclusive. Doubt is particularly cast on 
the assumptions behind the first argument (Anscombe's Tank 
Argument). The chapter concludes with the claim that 'no-reference' 
Trojanism cannot be assessed without assessing the more important 
Trojan claims about avowals, to be discussed in Chapter 4. 
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2.1) Historical Account and Definition of 'No-Reference' View -
Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Remarks' 
(i) What is Trojanism? 
The loci classici of the 'no-reference' view are to be found 
in the middle period works of Wittgenstein - but although the view 
surfaces with greatest explicitness in these works, Trojanism is a 
continuing thread from the Notebooks 1914-16 to the Philosophical 
Investigations. Clearly, the espousal of Trojanism by students of 
Wittgenstein such as Anscombe and Malcolm is no historical accident. 
It is in four works of or pertaining to the period 1929-33 
that Wittgenstein's Trojanism appears at its starkest - the 
Philosophical Remarks, Wittgenstein und der Weiner Kreis, 
'Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-33' by G.E. Moore, and Wittgen-
stein's Lectures, Cambridge 1932-5 ed. A. Ambrose. In these 
accounts, in contrast to the compressed and recondite presentation 
of the Tractatus, Trojanism moves into sharp and detailed focus 
against the background of the verificationist semantics of the 
Logical Positivist phase. In the Blue Book and Notes for Lectures 
of 1933-6, as the Tractarian and verificationist elements are on the 
wane, there is a movement towards the less explicit Trojanism of the 
later period. In his [1972], P.M.S. Hacker characterises the 
'metaphysics of experience' of the 1929-33 period as 'methodological 
solipsism', in contrast to the 'transcendental solipsism' of the 
Tractatus. From 1932-33, methodological solipsism is, he claims, 
abandoned in favour of the metaphysics of experience which came to 
1 
be expressed in the Private Language Argument. The question of 
how far the later philosophy is still essentially solipsistic is a 
piquant one however; it is addressed, and answered affirmatively, by 
David Bell in his unpublished paper 'Solipsism'. It would be less 
contentious to say that the later philosophy is still Trojan; the 
1 
The retractions in Hacker's revised edition [1986] do not 
essentially affect these claims. 
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nature of the relation between Trojanism and solipsism is explored 
in the next section. It is the aim in the present section to give 
an illustration, and as far as possible a definition of Trojanism; 
but no definition of Trojanism nor of solipsism quite allays the 
fear of the present writer that it is not possible really to know, 
of either of these strange doctrines (or its negation), what it 
means. In this respect, the Homeric Opposition conforms to the most 
refined canons of philosophical dialectic. 
Rallying against this negative mood, let us ask 'What then is 
Trojanism?' Clearly, we can say as a start that it must involve 
some form of opposition to the 'straightforward construal' of a 
range of 1st-person utterances (viz. IEM-utterances or the avowal 
sub-class of these). It sees these as functioning in a quite 
different way from the way 3rd-person utterances (and other 1st-
person utterances) function - an asymmetry denied by the 'straight-
forward construal' (which is the 'Greek' view). To characterise 
Trojanism in a less imprecise way, it is necessary to look at its 
historical role as, if you like, the 'obverse' of Cartesianism. Or, 
if that expression takes its affinity too far, then as a 'reaction' 
to Cartesianism. Trojanism takes the threat of a Cartesian 
viewpoint sufficiently seriously as to warrant a very radical 
response - which Greeks find unnecessary and in fact counter-
productive. Quite where the Cartesian threat is located, and the 
kind of radical response required, depends on the variety of 
Trojanism. The middle-period Wittgenstein located the danger in a 
referential account of 'I' for IEM-utterances, which he therefore 
denied. (An historical parallel to this, but one to be handled with 
care, would be Lichtenberg's reaction to the cogito of Descartes 
himself.) The later Wittgenstein came to place the emphasis more on 
the status of avowals, rejecting their 'straightforward construal' 
as assertoric (or rather, their construal as straightforwardly 
assertoric - see Chapter 4). 
It would be wrong, however, to be too dogmatic about the 
change in Wittgenstein's Trojanism - simply because of the (for the 
most part) highly suggestive nature of his treatment of the issue. 
Hacker writes that 'it is noteworthy that [the] distinction between 
the use of 'I' as subject and as object [in the Blue Book] does not 
reappear in the later writings' ([1986] p. 223n). But what we have 
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is really a change of emphasis rather than a rejection of 'no-
reference' Trojanism in favour of Trojanism about avowals. It is 
possible, however, in the light of the undoubted changes in Wittgen-
stein's philosophy of language, to characterise changes in his 
position on the 'no-reference' view per see The key notion which 
I will select in order to achieve this purpose is that of logical 
form. Crudely, before 1929 Wittgenstein was a realist about logical 
form. After 1933, he was not. 'Realism about logical form' I take 
to be the view that any sentence-type possesses a semantic deep 
structure which mirrors the articulation of the facts - whether 
these are the facts which constitute the world, which is the Tract-
arian view, or the facts about understanding located in the mind or 
brain of the language-user, which is the view a latter-day realist 
1 
such as Davidson seems to be compelled to accept. In his pre-
1929 Trojanism, therefore, and to a confused extent in that of 
1929-33, Wittgenstein is concerned to counter the Greek account of 
the logical form of 1st-person sentences with an alternative Trojan 
account which accepts the realist terms of that of the Greek. The 
debate here takes the form: 'Must the logical form of such 
sentences, in mirroring the facts, comprise a grammatical subject 
that is also an object, or not?' After 1933, the debate will take 
the form: 'Is there a logical form at all which mirrors the facts 
and thereby comprises a subject which is also an object?' Wittgen-
stein's position in the former debate is clear even if one regards 
the terms of that debate as quite unsatisfactory. That Wittgen-
stein's answer to the later question is 'no', is not incompatible 
with his continued espousal of the 'no-reference' view (which 
however becomes increasingly a relic of an anti-Cartesian response 
which the non-assertoric thesis of avowals renders outmoded - see 
p. 141). It is true that, realism over logical form superseded, 
1 
Davidson's programme involves investigation of the 
logical form a sentence-type must have if the speaker's 
understanding of it is to be satisfactorily explained. The 
laconic comment on what Davidson is compelled to accept is 
controversial (but peripheral to my concerns); the 
philosophical world has apparently failed to be struck by how 
bizarre and eccentric an enterprise the Davidsonic programme 
really is. 
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the point at issue in the first stage of the Homeric Opposition 
becomes less intuitive. But the case discussed under IEM, for 
instance, does not require realism over logical form - nor do any 
Trojan cases based on the 'epistemology of reference', as one might 
term it. 
It may be felt that some of the ideas in the preceding 
paragraph - notably that of 'logical form' - are elusive. The 
unease here is the same as that felt when the question 'What is 
reference, anyway?' is being asked. The intuitive grasp of the 
Homeric Opposition seems under threat, we are no longer clear what 
is at issue, nor indeed that there is any real issue. It would be 
preferable, at this point, rather than retreating to backgammon, to 
read on - and if the talk of logical form remains unilluminating, it 
may turn out not to be essential. 
(ii) The 'Philosophical Remarks' account 
The most extended first-hand statement of Wittgenstein's 
middle-period Trojanism occurs in the Philosophical Remarks, 
paras. 57-58. I will outline this discussion at length, since many 
of the characteristic aspects of Wittgenstein's Trojanism are 
present. 
The concentration on avowals among the range of 1st-person 
IEM-utterances, demonstrating, as discussed elsewhere, that 
equivocation in Wittgenstein's accounts between a Trojanism applying 
to avowals, and one applying to all IEM-utterances, is apparent from 
the outset: 
One of the most misleading representational techniques in our 
language is the use of the word 'I', particularly when it is 
used in representing immediate experience, as in 'I can see a 
red patch' ( ibid. p. 88). 
Wittgenstein goes on to suggest that if, in thought-experiment, we 
abandon this 'technique' in favour of one in which the 1st-personal 
pronoun is dispensed with, we will see that the earlier 
representation 'wasn't essential to the facts': 
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Not that the [new] representation would be in any sense more 
correct than the old one, but it would serve to show clearly 
what was logically essential in the representation ( ibid. ). 
This new notation might be termed the 'oriental-despot 
language game', since Wittgenstein brings out the 1st / 3rd person 
asymmetry which Trojanism takes so seriously by asking us to imagine 
( 
a despotic oriental state in which the despot is linguistically 
privileged, in the following way. When, as we would say, the despot 
(the 'centre' of the language-game) is in pain, he says 'There is 
pain'. When he observes that, as we say, one of the subjects is in 
pain, he says 'X is behaving as the centre behaves when there is 
pain'. Wittgenstein writes: 
It's evident that this way of speaking is equivalent to ours 
when it comes to questions of intelligibility and freedom from 
ambiguity ••• ( ibid. ) 
That is, 'I' can be eliminated from the language and a substitute 
way of talking supplied, without loss of the language's expressive 
power - or so Wittgenstein seems to assume. As we shall see, doubt 
is cast on this assumption by the charge that 3rd-person ascription 
is now behaviouristic - pp. 39-40. More seriously, the further we 
move from the sensation-paradigm to mental states such as thinking, 
the less straightforward it becomes to envisage the kind of 
behaviour that might be involved. It should be noted that 'the 
centre' refers to a body; the despot's 3rd-person ascriptions 
contain an indirect reference to the behaviour of this body, and his 
1st-person non-psychological ascriptions refer to it directly. 
It is not clear that the image of the despotic state (alluded 
to both at PR 58 and in Waismann [1979] p. 49) is helpful however. 
For as Wittgenstein says, 'this language could have anyone at all as 
its centre'. We could therefore envisage a situation in which each 
is the centre of his own language, is his own 'despot', ( ~ Bell 
ibid. p. 12); if that is the correct way to put it. What will 
interest us, then, is the comparison (i) between our language and an 
arbitrarily chosen member of this set of PR languages, and 
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(ii) between individual members of the set. 
With regard to the latter, Wittgenstein comments that the 
language with myself as the centre has a 'privileged status', but 
this is not something that can be described: 
The privileged status lies in the application, and if I describe 
the application, the privileged status again doesn't find 
expression, since the description depends on the language in 
which it is couched ( ibid. ). 
Clearly, the Tractarian distinction between saying and showing is in 
operation here. The idea seems to be that since, for any language 
with himself as centre which a speaker might adopt, its 'particular 
adequacy' for himself is presupposed by the very form of discourse 
used, it cannot be expressed in that language. And, Wittgenstein 
notes, 'in the terms of another language my language occupies no 
privileged status whatever'. It is not clear what these claims 
amount to, however. We can certainly say the kinds of things about 
the individual PR-languages that Wittgenstein has said in com-
paring our present egalitarian discourse with his inegalitarian 
proposal. Isn't it the case that the language with myself as centre 
is particularly adequate for me because only in that language is the 
non-referential nature of self-conscious self-ascription of IEM-
states (as we say) reflected at all? If I myself adopt the language 
which has Jones as centre, I may well, as Bell maintains ( ibid. 
p. 12) be able to say, when in pain, 'I am behaving as Jones / the 
centre behaves when there is pain', but this locution hardly serves 
to bring out the epistemic facts of the matter - as the 
inegalitarian way of speaking is meant to. 
What of the former comparison, between our language and an 
arbitrary PR language? Wittgenstein's claim is that the two 
notations are 'equivalent'; anything that can be said in one can be 
said in the other. The possibility that this might not be so is not 
examined. But this is just the question. The thought-experiment, 
presupposing as it does that the inegalitarian language is 'fact-
preserving' (in Bell's phrase, ibid. pp. 6ff.), is merely an illus-
tration of what Trojanism might involve, were it correct, and not an 
argument for that viewpoint. (Though if one found the picture 
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coherent, that fact might be persuasive.) 
(iii) The danger of 'covert behaviourism' 
We need now to return to the question of whether Wittgen-
stein's inegalitarian proposal is behaviouristic. In answering this 
question we may advert initially to that worthy piece of journalism, 
'Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-33' by G.E. Moore. Moore's despat-
ches as Foreign Correspondent for Mind in the Viennese thought-world 
are painstakingly assembled, and deal explicitly though laconically 
with the issue of behaviourism. He writes: 
He seemed quite definitely to reject the behaviourist view that 
"he has toothache" means only that "he" is behaving in a 
particular manner ••• Later on, he said that we conclude that 
another person has toothache from his behaviour, and that it is 
legitimate to conclude this on the analogy of the resemblance of 
his behaviour to the way in which we (I) behave when we (I) have 
toothache ([1955] p. 12). 
It is clear, also, from the reference to the 'controversy over 
behaviourism' in the PR itself (p. 94) that at this time, as well as 
more famously later on, Wittgenstein is concerned to escape the 
charge that he is a 'covert behaviourist'. 
Whether he ~ escape it is another matter. If it is behav-
iourism he is committed to, then clearly it is a kind of behaviour-
ism that avoids the problems with the 1st-person that make convent-
ional behaviourism so implausible. Bell ( ibid. p. 19) provides a 
defence of the view that it is not behaviourism at all; but it looks 
like he is batting on a sticky wicket. For let us suppose, as 
Wittgenstein intends, that our language and any arbitrary PR 
language have the same factual capacity. (Any fact that can be 
reported in one can be reported in another.) Let us suppose also 
(as seems natural) that the relation 'having the same factual 
capacity as' is transitive. Then any two PR languages, with 
different 'centres', will have the same factual capacity as each 
other. Which must entail that: 
'There is pain' 
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said in L makes the same statement as 
1 
·x is behaving as the centre behaves when there is pain' 
said in L of the subject which is in fact 'the centre' in 
2 
L . QED? On the face of it, yes - but one can't help feeling 
1 
that some further subtleties beyond the scope of the present 
discussion are called for in dealing with the vexed issue of behav-
iourism. Nonetheless, as things stand, a dilemma now opens for the 
Trojan which takes us neatly on to the next part of our discussion. 
It looks, in brief, as if the Trojan must endorse either behaviour-
ism or solipsism. Say he wishes to maintain • fact-preservation' 
between our language and the PR languages. Then he will have to 
deny the principle that if the utterances (the two quoted above, 
say) are to make the same statement, their constituent expressions 
must co-refer. For 'There is •••• and ·x •••• manifestly must not 
co-refer (on the Trojan account); yet they are to make the same 
statement. If the Trojan dislikes the behaviourist conclusion we 
have drawn, he will have to endorse the 'same statement, same 
reference' principle, forget about • fact-preservation' and endorse 
solipsism. The argument spelling this out will be presented on pp. 
44-45 below, after the varieties of solipsism have been discussed. 
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2.2) Solipsism and the 'No-Reference' View 
(i) Epistemological and metaphysical solipsism 
Nothing has so far been said of the extent to which Trojanism 
might be solipsistic. What, then, is the relation between the 
'no-reference' view and solipsism? First, we need to know what are 
the varieties of solipsism. A useful distinction at the outset, 
one stated explicitly by Nagel [1970] and Bell (unpublished 
article), is that between epistemological and metaphysical solip-
1 
sism. (Pears ([1975] p. 273) notes this distinction, and 
Hacker ([1972] p. 186) seems also to be aware of it.) In each 
version, the range of truths said to be knowable or expressions said 
to be intelligible, can vary with the degree of 'liberalisation' of 
the theory. Pears claims that one limit is that 'the privileged 
basis cannot include any things which would not be accessible in any 
direct way' ( ibid. p. 273). The opposite illiberal extreme is a 
'solipsism of the present moment'. 
I mention the latter dimension merely to set it aside, at 
least temporarily. For what we want is 'essential solipsism' -
which I take to be solipsism in its most attractive formi possibly 
'the truth in solipsism', but at least 'the plausibility in 
solipsism'. This I assume to be related to one side in the Homeric 
Opposition. 
For this purpose we need to invoke the more important initial 
distinction. For the solipsism which most authorities scorn or 
scoff at is epistemological solipsism. It is this of which Schopen-
hauer memorably writes: 
It can never, of course, be demonstrably refuted. Yet in 
philosophy it has never been used positively other than as a 
1 
He refers to 'linguistic', rather than 'metaphysical' 
solipsism. 
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sceptical sophism, i.e. as a pretence. As a serious conviction, 
on the other hand, it could only be found in the madhouse, and 
as such needs a cure not a refutation ••• (quoted in Bell ibid. 
I 
p. 2). 
This is the 'traditional attitude' to solipsism of which Bell 
writes; it is endorsed by F.S.C. Schiller, among others. ('The 
non-existence of solipsists by no means seems to me devoid of ••• 
significance ••• ' he sniffs.) But as Bell notes, this attitude had 
to be abandoned by those exposed to Wittgenstein's ideas in the 
1920s and '30s - 'in face of a growing realisation that there had 
been, perhaps even still was, a solipsist'. If this were a genuine 
realisation, though, the solipsist in question was a metaphysical 
2 
solipsist. 
What are these two kinds of solipsism? We can say this. 
'Epistemological solipsism' makes some claim about the grounds for 
the application of the sortal concept 'person'; a concept which can, 
with significance though not correctness, the epistemological 
solipsist will maintain, be applied by oneself to oneself and 
others. However, he would have us believe that, for each of us, 
there is insufficient evidence to warrant the belief that there are 
instances of 'person' other than oneself. E.g. 'pain', 'intellig-
ence' cannot with justification be applied to those I took to be 
persons like myself. So this is the form of the classical dispute 
over epistemological solipsism: 
1 
An interesting discussion of Schopenhauer on the self is 
to be found in C. Janaway [1984J. 
2 
At least one other possible solipsist has suffered 
philosophical neglect, however. Charles Mingus, the great 
jazz bass-player, composer and band-leader has gone on record 
as saying: 
I was born an extension of life itself - the whole 
outdoor scene, sky, moon, sun, universe, space, the whole 
scene is me ••• Charles Mingus. (Jazz Calendar 1985) 
Whether this is an affirmation of a philosophical view rather 
than a mere expression of the well-attested Mingus egomania is 
a moot point, however. 
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'Solipsist': 'The concept 'person', and its cognate, harmless 
and salutary companion 'self', is unified in 
sense, but disintegrates in application'. 
'Realist' 'No - it is unified in both ways. The grounds for 
applying 'person' etc., are good enough, because 
we can (shakily) 'infer' the existence of other 
persons, or, better, assert the existence of a 
primitive concept 'person' such that it cannot 
fail to apply to others'. 
Epistemological solipsism is, as Bell suggests, a form of sceptic-
ism; its propounder is sceptical about the unity of application of 
'person'. That is, the difference in quality of 1st- and 3rd-person 
grounds for the application of 'person', should lead one to be 
sceptical that there is a justified 3rd-person application. 
To this, there are two responses, at least. First, the 
classical Strawsonian response given by the realist. But second, a 
more profoundly sceptical response: scepticism over whether the 
concept 'person', etc. is 'sound'. Is it not rather that there is a 
duality in sense, and hence, if one likes, in application? It is 
this contention that is held in common by metaphysical solip-
sism and metaphysical solipsism (MSS and MSP). And it is 
S P 
plausible to hold that essential solipsism consists in just this 
view of the duality of sense between 1st-person (or rather, always, 
some 1st-person) utterances and 3rd-person utterances. It is very 
rough, but the idea is: 'I am in pain' and 'X is in pain', said of 
me, do not make the same statement. This, on the grounds that the 
subject-terms are not co-referential (MSS); or that the predicate-
terms are not (MSP). 
What is now required is a better formulation of metaphysical 
solipsism, and of its relation to epistemological solipsism, and of 
the nature of its scepticism: 
MSP No unified concept 'person' can be obtained such that the 
doubts or beliefs of the epistemological solipsist can be 
framed, on the ground that there is no range of predi-
cates distinctive of the concept and applicable to any of 
its alleged instances. 
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Object x and y fall under a common sortal only if there is a range 
of predicates applicable to x and y which is distinctive of that 
sortal. With Strawson, we took it that there is a range of 
predicates which can typically be applied to persons - viz. P-
predicates ('P' for 'Person', not 'Psychological'). This set 
includes any predicate applicable to a person but not to a material 
body; this will extend beyond the 'psychological', to e.g. posture, 
motion etc. ([1959] p. 104). But it turns out that there is no such 
range of predicates - rather, the sense of these expressions differs 
depending on whether they figure in 1st- or 3rd-person utterances. 
The nature of the different senses will obviously depend on the 
account we give of the epistemic asymmetry which generates them. 
MSS arrives at the same position via a different route: 
MSS No unified concept 'person' can be obtained such that the 
doubts or beliefs of the epistemological solipsist can be 
framed, on the grounds that 'I', in typical cases of 
purported psychological ascription at least, does not 
1 
refer, a fortiori to a person. 
The first clause, common to MSP and MSS, when suitably explicated in 
terms of 'duality of sense', gives us what I have termed 'essential 
solipsism'. It has been well said that metaphysical solipsism 
'transforms an epistemic asymmetry within a realist framework, into 
a semantic asymmetry within a verificationist framework' (C. 
Wright). The senses of 1st- and 3rd-person ascriptions are now 
distinct and given by the distinct methods of verification of each. 
(ii) The connection between Trojanism and solipsism 
We are now in a position to state a simple argument connecting 
solipsism with Trojanism. It is this. Let us assume (as seems 
uncontentious) that if two utterances make the same statement, their 
1 
This amounts to, or entails, Strawson's 'No-ownership' 
view of psychological states. 
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constituent expressions must co-refer. Now, consider again 'I am in 
pain' and 'X is in pain' said of me. If these two utterance-tokens 
make the same statement, any reference involved in one must be 
involved in the other. Ex hYpothesi, this is not so. So I alone 
can express the content of 'I am in pain'. Others have no way of 
saying, let alone knowing, what I express when I say 'I am in pain'. 
To say this is simply to claim that 'no-reference' implies 'dual 
sense', which itself implies or constitutes solipsism, as was 
previously indicated. Whether this conclusion is welcome to the 
Trojan (or rather, to which kind of Trojan it would be welcome), and 
what options he has if it isn't, is discussed below (pp. 50-51). 
(Though I continue now with a few psychological remarks about the 
connection.) 
The kind of solipsism Trojanism is, arguably, connected with 
is of course metaphysical solipsism. Many Trojans, including the 
most famous living one (Professor Anscombe), would probably want to 
resist the idea that they were solipsists at all; but that might be 
due to the justifiably poor reputation of epistemological solipsism 
and to the fact that metaphysical solipsism is often not regarded as 
solipsism at all. Epistemological solipsism is indeed a consequence 
of Cartesianism and its account of the 'privacy of experience'; so 
it is plausible to see in the varieties of solipsism an analogue of 
the dialectic discerned in the first section of the present chapter 
(p. 34). That is, just as Trojanism is a response or reaction to 
Cartesianism, so is metaphysical solipsism to epistemological 
solipsism. Given this, and our preceding account, it cannot be 
correct to suspect as Nagel does, that 'the epistemological version 
of solipsism ••• is ultimately dependent on the metaphysical 
version' ([1970] p. 104n). 
It is well to be cautious in our generalisations in an area 
notorious for its production of philosophical nonsense, however. 
Although metaphysical solipsism may be a reaction to epistemological 
solipsism, it is far from clear that it is a reaction of exactly the 
same kind as that of Trojanism to Cartesianism. Wittgenstein's 
discussion, recorded by Ambrose in her [1979], brings out some of 
the complexities in the matter. 
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(iii) Wittgenstein on 'what the solipsist wants' 
The distinction Wittgenstein is making looks very much like 
that already drawn between epistemological and metaphysical 
solipsism. He havers over whether the latter is solipsism at all -
as we shall see. But this is not a crucial matter, in fact. He 
says: 
The solipsist who says 'Only my experiences are real' is saying 
that it is inconceivable that experiences other than his own are 
real. This is absurd if taken to be a statement of fact ( ibid. 
p. 22). 
Likewise with the person we might term the realist: 
'Only my experiences are real' and 'Everyone's experiences are 
real' are equally nonsensical ( ibid. p. 23). 
This is a dialectic which occurs also in PI 402 - which we will come 
to. The sceptic and his opponent conduct a mistaken debate at the 
factual level. Wittgenstein wishes to undercut this by showing what 
the solipsist ought to be saying - presenting his statement as 'a 
grammatical proposition', 'the statement of a rule': 
The solipsist wishes to say, 'I should like to put, instead of 
the notation "I have real toothache", "There is toothache"'. 
What the solipsist wants is not a notation in which the ego has 
a monopoly, but one in which the ego vanishes ( ibid. p. 22). 
This is because in saying 'Only I have real toothache', '"I'" is no 
longer opposed to anything' ( ibid. p. 22). The view in which the 
ego vanishes is Trojanism, of course. And with the talk of the 
'grammatical proposition', and shortly afterwards of Ist- and 
3rd-person propositions being on a 'different level', it looks as if 
Wittgenstein's view also involves that transformation of an 
epistemic into a semantic asymmetry which is definitive of 
metaphysical solipsism. 
The factual/grammatical dichotomy of interpretation is of 
course a favourite one. A close analogy is with PI 247 ('Only you 
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can know if you had that intention'). The propositions in question 
are factually incorrect, or absurd - yet they can be used in 
explaining the meaning of 'toothache', or 'intention'. This is 
paradoxical; but in the 'intention' case, Wittgenstein locates the 
paradox by means of a gloss on 'know' ('And here "know" means that 
the expression of uncertainty is senseless'). In the latter, the 
paradox serves to bring out the incorrigibility of self-ascription 
of intention (in the standard cases at least); of course others can 
be said to know what my intention was, but not in the incorrigible 
way that I can. But what does 'Only I have real toothache' treated 
as a 'grammatical proposition', serve to bring out? Perhaps, as 
Wittgenstein later says, that 'I have toothache' and 'He has 
toothache' are 'on a different level' ( ibid. p. 23). There is a 
later treatment of the issue in the Investigations 
••• this is what disputes between Idealists, Solipsists and 
Realists look like. The one party attack the normal form of 
expression as if they were attacking a statement (Idealists, 
Solipsists); the other defend it as if they were stating facts 
recognised by every reasonable human being (PI 402). 
The protagonists here lock horns in a futile engagement at the 
factual level - as Bell comments, 'this is what the debate between 
sceptical solipsists and those with a Russellian "robust sense of 
reality" looks like' ( ibid. p. 17). Set against this description 
is the 'metaphysical solipsist' account of para. 403: 
If I were to reserve the word 'pain' solely for what I had 
hitherto called 'my pain', and others 'L.W.'s pain', I should do 
other people no injustice, so long as a notation were provided 
in which the loss of the word 'pain' in other connections were 
somehow supplied. Other people would still be pitied, treated 
by doctors and so on ••• 
But what should I gain from this new kind of account? 
Nothing. But after all neither does the solipsist want any 
practical advantage when he advances his view! 
Here, as in the Cambridge Lectures, it is unclear whether Wittgen-
stein thinks his proposal is solipsistic. His 'havering' over this 
question in these earlier Lectures is brought out when he says 
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'Getting into the solipsistic mood means not using the word "I" in 
describing a personal experience': 
Acceptance of such a change is tempting because the description 
of a sensation does not contain a reference to either a person 
or a sense organ ( ibid. p. 22). 
Tempting it may be, but he later seems to retract his point about 
'the solipsistic mood' (a nice expression!) when he says that 'the 
solipsist does not go through with a notation from which "I" or 
"real" is deleted' ( ibid. p. 23). The question really is one of 
'semantics' in the pejorative sense, however - the material issue is 
clear enough. 
From the preceding discussion it should be apparent that there 
are significant connections between, on the one hand, Cartesianism 
and epistemological solipsism, and on the other, Trojanism and 
metaphysical solipsism. Further, one may conclude that there is one 
variety of Trojanism which is metaphysically solipsistic - what 
variety this is will be discussed in the next section in the context 
of that argument against Trojanism derived from the Generality 
Constraint. 
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2.3) Arguments against Trojanism: from the Generality Constraint 
et ale 
(i) Militant and moderate Trojanism and the 'continuous ability' 
challenge 
Evans in his [1982] believes that the Generality Constraint 
implies a rejection of Trojanism (as we shall see). But what he 
gives as an argument turns out not to have anything essentially to 
do with the Constraint. However there is a different argument which 
does. We recall that the Constraint states that the subject must, 
inter alia, be able to apply a range of subject-terms to any given 
predicate - say, 'feels cheerful'. Now, when the subject applies a 
3rd-person pronoun to this predicate, and says of someone 'He is 
cheerful', the ability he manifests is clearly referential; he has 
the ability to use a referring expression. Indeed, his ability in 
using a range of subject-terms is referential - except, if the 
Trojan is correct, when it comes to the 1st-person pronouns. So the 
challenge to the Trojan is this: What is the explanation of this 
requirement, extending as it does to the 1st-person, if the ability 
in question is discontinuous between 1st- and 3rd-person contexts 
(i.e. is of a different character)? 
This challenge has a similar form to another, often mistakenly 
thought to constitute a refutation of Trojanism, and by which 
Anscombe has been decidedly untroubled (see Appendix: Elizabeth 
Anscombe und der Bangor Kreis, p. 240). The challenge in this 
latter case is the following: In 1st- and 3rd-person sentences, 
there are occasions on which 'I' on the one hand, and the subject's 
proper name or some description true of the subject on the other, 
are intersubstitutable salva veri tate (provided appropriate changes 
are made to verb inflections etc.). What is the explanation of such 
truth-value links between 1st- and 3rd-person sentences, if not the 
1 
co-reference of the terms in question? 
1 
lowe appreciation of this point to discussion with Ian 
Browne. 
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Now, it is important to bear in mind that neither the argument 
from a Generality Constraint, nor that from the existence of truth-
value links, constitutes by itself a refutation of Trojanism; each 
is, rather, a request for a story from the Trojan - and we may judge 
that his story-telling abilities are wanting. There is this 
disanalogy however: in the latter case the truth-value links and not 
the co-reference are the data, but in the former it is less clear 
what exactly the data are. This makes the anti-Trojan challenge 
weaker there, at first sight; for we are less sure exactly how far 
the requirement extends. 
Now, it was stated in the immediately preceding account of 
solipsism and the 'no-reference' view, that there is one variety of 
Trojanism that is metaphysically solipsistic. We shall now see how 
the different varieties of Trojanism imply different responses to 
the challenge from the Generality Constraint. First, the militant 
Trojan - the metaphysical solipsist. He maintains that the 
predicates in self- and other-ascriptions differ in meaning 
according to whether the subject-term is referring or non-referring 
(and thus a 'pseudo'-subject-term). Thus 'pain' in 'I am in pain' 
and in 'He is in pain' is not univocal; each kind of occurrence can 
and must be understood in isolation from its counterpart. In 
contrast, the moderate Trojan maintains that such concepts are 
univocal, even though 'I', as it figures in IEM and non-IEM 
ascriptions, is ambiguous, and that 3rd-person transforms of IEM 
1st-person ascriptions do in fact make the same statement. He is 
thus committed to dissolving the connection between identity of 
reference and identity of statement. If he did not do this he would 
be committed to solipsism (see the 'simple argument' on pp. 44-45 
above). If militant Trojanism is an expression of solipsism, then 
moderate Trojanism may perhaps be seen as an expression of Nagel's 
idea that there are subjective and objective points of view, neither 
of which is reducible to the other (see his [1970]). The 
distinction between the types of Trojanism in terms of whether or 
not certain concepts are univocal is over-simple, in fact, because 
there are ranges of expressions between the straightforwardly 
univocal and the straightforwardly ambiguous (between the cases of, 
say, 'scarlet', and 'bank' with its clear two senses). A more 
subtle presentation of the matter in the case of Trojanism would 
require comparisons between particular examples. In particular it 
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may be sufficient for the moderate Trojan to claim that the uses of 
e.g. 'pain' are just importantly analogous. 
The militant and moderate Trojan will respond differently to 
the Greek challenge. The first will say that there is no Generality 
Constraint extending across lst- and 3rd-person ascriptions. He 
will, however, put forward instead a highly diluted Constraint; and 
in so doing make a counter-attacking move in weather conditions 
which, as always, are favourable to the Trojan side. What I have in 
mind is this. 'I'-thoughts are, like thoughts about the weather, 
the militant will say, not subject to a Generality Constraint of the 
sort hitherto discussed - because the subject-term in e.g. 'I am 
unhappy' is merely apparently such, and is in fact akin to the first 
term in 'It is raining'. Both are alike non-referential. A speak-
er's ability to use these expressions is manifested, and his under-
standing of them tested, by means of variation in tense and pred-
icate alone - there is no dimension of generality akin to that of 
variation in subject-term for the genuinely referring expressions. 
So, to say, as Straws on would, that the predicates involved in 
self-ascription cannot be genuine unless affirmable of a range of 
subjects is as silly, the militant Trojan concludes, as saying that 
'is raining' cannot be a genuine predicate unless affirmable of a 
range of subjects besides 'it'. 
Thus much for the militant Trojan. (The weather, of course, 
is the Trojan's greatest ally. But also, almost his only ally. The 
Greek riposte to the above sally would be that whilst the generality 
claim about the weather is silly, that about 'I' is not - because of 
the truth-value links, in part, at least.) The moderate Trojan can 
also, if he wishes, avail himself merely of the highly diluted 
Constraint. But it would be more consistent of him to allow the 
extent of the Constraint across lst- and 3rd-person ascriptions, but 
deny that it requires explanation in terms of a continuous type of 
ability. And here we see really that the Greek challenge evapor-
ates. For why should the Trojan not be allowed to say this? It 
might be claimed, for instance, that a subject needs a grasp of 
'Someone is in pain' as well as 'I am in pain' and 'X is in pain', 
before he can be credited with an understanding of 'pain'. Yet the 
ability expressed in the use of the quantifier would clearly not be 
referential. The grasp of the 1st-person ascription might be more 
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basic than that of the quantified expression, it might perhaps be 
argued, yet surely it would be somewhat arbitrary to rule that the 
Generality Constraint did not extend to the latter. Whether or not 
this particular example is considered, the point remains that the 
requirement of a continuous type of ability is not a compelling one. 
The explanation of the conformity of 1st- and 3rd-person ascript-
ions alike to the Generality Constraint is simply that the subject 
must be able to apply the predicate to the whole range of approp-
riate subject-terms. That different kinds of ability are required 
in particular cases seems neither here nor there. 
(ii) Evans' argument: 1st-person undecidable prOpositions 
So much for the principal anti-Trojan argument derived from 
the Generality Constraint. Now for an argument connected in Evans' 
mind with the Generality Constraint. The former argument, or 
challenge rather, asked 'What is the explanation of the conformity 
of 1st-person ascriptions to the Generality Constraint, on the 
Trojan account?' Evans' argument seems to ask 'How can the Trojan 
allow that certain 1st-person ascriptions (undecidable ones) conform 
to it at all?' Evans' thoughts here are expressed in a very 
compressed way, and implied in his argument are claims about the 
'fundamental level of thought' about persons which are central to 
1 
The Varieties of Reference. Without going too far into the 
latter (which would not be a feasible enterprise in the present 
context) it is possible to indicate Evans' general line of thought 
and the confusions it involves. 
To begin at the end of his discussion. Evans states there 
that there is an opposition between the Generality Constraint and an 
'Idealist conception of the self' - a conception which if it were 
1 
He says that one's Idea of oneself involves a 'fundamen-
tal identification' of oneself as a person located on a 
'spatio-temporal map of the world'. Thus, he claims, '1'-
and 'here'-thoughts, self- and demonstrative identification, 
are inter-dependent ( ibid. p. 211). This the Trojan 
contests. 
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proposed 'would be the same as saying that "I" does not refer to 
anything' ( ibid. pp. 212 and 212n). He has earlier indicted 
various accounts on the charge of an Idealist violation of the 
Generality Constraint. He began in fact with the question 'What are 
our "I"-Ideas composed of?', and addressed accounts which are 
exhausted by the ingredients of action- and information-components. 
Such accounts leave something missing: 
[But] so long as we focus upon judgements which a person might 
make about himself on the basis of the relevant ways of gaining 
knowledge, the inadequacy may not strike us. A subject's 
knowledge of what it is for the thought 'I am in pain' to be 
true may appear to be exhausted by his capacity to decide, 
simply upon the basis of how he feels, whether or not it is true 
( ibid. p. 208). 
But not all entertainable 'I'-thoughts have a basis in ways of 
gaining self-knowledge: 
••• our view of ourselves is not Idealistic: we are perfectly 
capable of grasping propositions about ourselves which we are 
quite incapable of deciding, or even offering grounds for 
( ibid. p. 208). 
Evans then gives examples of 'I'-thoughts which are not directly 
decidable by the subject, but which, in order to be verified at all, 
require 3rd-person verification: 'I was breast-fed', 'I was unhappy 
on my 1st birthday', 'I tossed and turned in my sleep last night', 
'I shall be dragged unconscious through the streets of Chicago', 
[de jure] 'I shall die'. These are thoughts one can grasp; 'in 
other words', Evans concludes enigmatically, 'our thinking about 
ourselves conforms to the Generality Constraint'. (He goes on to 
say in a footnote that this thought is diametrically opposed to 
Wittgenstein's expressive account of 1st-person psychological 
utterances.) This conformity requires that the subject know the 
truth-conditions ofrI = 6' where & is a fundamental identification t t 
of a person, viz. an identification of a kind which could be avail-
able to someone other than oneself. Evans concludes by relating the 
preceding to the thought at the heart of his Generality Constraint: 
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Only if [one's 'I'-Idea includes knowledge of what it would be 
for an identity of this kind to be true] can one's general 
understanding of what it is for a person to satisfy the 
predicates '~is dead', '~is breast-fed' ••• etc. be coupled 
with one's Idea of oneself to yield an understanding of what it 
would be for oneself to satisfy these predicates ( ibid. 
p. 209). 
(iii) Trojan response and deficiencies 
So Evans is here linking the ability to grasp the 1st-person 
undecidable propositions with the ability to fundamentally identify 
oneself as a person among others. The notion of 'fundamental 
identification' is obviously a technical one, but a fairly rudiment-
ary grasp of the point will suffice for present purposes. Evans goes 
on to discuss accounts which deny that I can make any such identif-
ication - principally Nagel's in his [1970]. This is a fascinating 
topic - but one cannot discuss everything! The relevance of these 
issues here is to the question of anti-Trojan arguments based on the 
Generality Constraint as defined in Chapter 1. Now, at first sight 
there is no reason why the moderate Trojan, at least, should 
infringe any Generality Constraint through a denial that one can 
1 
grasp the undecidable propositions - since he need not make any 
such denial. It may indeed be the case that Idealism, construed as 
a doctrine which denies sense to propositions which are undecidable, 
implies that 'I' does not refer. But Trojanism need not imply 
Idealism; and though the Trojan owes us an account of the undecid-
able propositions Evans adduces, there is no reason to suppose he 
denies that one can grasp them. Perhaps Evans is making a mistake 
here in his characterisation of Idealism; certainly that well-known 
species of Idealism (if such it is) known as Anti-Realism does not 
deny sense to the undecidable, but simply claims that whatever gives 
meaning to undecidable propositions, it cannot be their ungraspable 
truth-conditions. It seems thus far that Evans has picked an 
unworthy opponent. 
1 
'Undecidable' here = '1st-person undecidable'. 
55 
Are the undecidable propositions problematic for the Trojan, 
then, even if he does not deny they can be grasped? What account 
will he offer of them? He will say that the significant point is 
that the undecidable propositions adduced by Evans are all non-IEM; 
so they will involve the referring use of 'I', applicable to a range 
of predicates from which 'pain', 'fell out of the carriage' (pred-
icated on an IEM basis) etc. are excluded. But this categorial 
restriction need involve no infringement of any weak Generality 
Constraint. Only when we strengthen the Constraint, and introduce 
the notion of fundamental identification, is there a violation -
unsurprisingly, as these are Greek ideas. This, at least, is how it 
appears. But Trojan deficiencies may be revealed when we consider 
whether it is required for the subject to have a fundamental 
identification of himself if he is to grasp the undecidable 
propositions. 
Let us summarise the discussion so far. Evans seems to be 
saying: 'Trojanism says that I cannot grasp the undecidable 
propositions, and thereby flouts the Generality Constraint'. The 
reply so far is: 'Trojanism doesn't want to deny that I can grasp 
these propositions, and wants to accept a weak Generality Con-
straint. Its account of the undecidable propositions does not flout 
the Generality Constraint'. The final instalment is: 'Trojanism may 
not be able to give a satisfactory account of the undecidable 
propositions, and fundamental flaws in the Trojan position may 
thereby be revealed. But this deficiency has nothing to do with the 
requirements of the Generality Constraint per set. 
Now, our final instalment is the following: It is not adequate 
to treat the undecidable propositions as merely a species of non-IEM 
proposition (though they are that) for the following reason. In 
order to grasp them, the Greek will contend, one needs to have a 
fundamental Idea of the self (laconically, one needs to view oneself 
as a person among persons). In the case of 1st-person decidable 
non-IEM propositions, it is not immediately clear that my method of 
verification is one others would use in verifying the appropriate 
3rd-person transformation. But in the case of the undecidable 
propositions, there is only the 3rd-personal method of verification 
- so for me to grasp what it would be for myself to satisfy the 
predicate 'was breast-fed' it is necessary for me to grasp what it 
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is for someone to satisfy the predicate. As Evans writes, 'one's 
general understanding of what it is for a person to satisfy the 
predicates [concerned] ••• [must] be coupled with one's Idea of 
oneself to yield an understanding of [the undecidable propo-
sitions]'. 
The Greek may continue his argument as follows: Not only do 
the undecidable propositions differ from the other non-IEM propos-
itions in requiring a fundamental Idea of the self - further, they 
are undoubtedly required for self-consciousness. For they do, in 
many cases, involve psychological, and not bodily self-predication, 
and so the favoured Trojan move for dealing with non-IEM propos-
itions (that they refer to a body), cannot succeed. Thus, in order 
to grasp a small but significant range of psychological judgements 
in the 1st-person (those which refer to a state in which conscious-
ness is absent), one must be able to view oneself as a person, an 
1 
element of the objective order. 
The first part of this final response looks very plausible -
which means that Evans was on to something with his original point 
about the undecidable propositions, although his presentation was 
unclear. The second part cannot really be assessed without going 
more fully into the conditions for self-consciousness, and the 
Trojan account thereof - which due to the quantity of material on 
other aspects of the Homeric Opposition, cannot now be discussed at 
the length it requires. 
1 
There are also decidable non-IEM self-ascriptions which 
are psychological - see Evans' example of where it makes sense 
to ask 'Someone is feeling a piece of cloth, but is it I?' 
( ibid. pp. 219-20). 
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2.4) Anscornbe's Tank Argument (I): The Self-Reference of 'I' 
(i) Introductory 
Anscornbe's [1975] has as its most beguiling justification for 
Trojanism that which I term the 'Tank Argument' (so-called because 
it involves imagining oneself to be in a 'sensory-deprivation' 
1 
tank). However, various considerations intended to undermine 
the idea that 'I' refers are introduced by Anscornbe. She begins by 
discussing the view that the role of 'I' is to effect self-refer-
ence. The notion of 'self-reference' is primarily a topic for 
Chapter 3, and the ideas presented here will be taken up at that 
point. However, a preliminary discussion seems in order since the 
dialectic of Anscornbe's article might then be more clearly under-
stood (if 'dialectic' is not too grandiose a term to use in this 
connection). 
Anscornbe does in fact introduce a structure for her arguments 
- though many of the latter are of interest outside of it. It can 
be divided into two parts: 
(i) We seem to need a sense to be specified for the quasi-name 
'I' ( ibid. p. 48); irrespective of which category of 
singular term it belongs to. But no account of its sense 
seems adequate. 
(ii) If we stick at the level of reference, it seems the 
reference of 'I' is especially guaranteed. But the idea of 
such a variety of reference leads to incoherence (the Tank 
Argument), so by reductio ad absurdum we may conclude that 
'I' does not refer. 
The first part may look as unpromising as its crudely Fregean 
1 And not to be confused with Winston Churchill's Tank 
Argument of 1915. 
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assumption: that there must be some descriptive formulation of the 
condition of application of any singular term 'm' that ensures its 
unique specification. (Confuted by Kripke, Evans [1973] et al.) It 
is in this part that the account of self-reference fits; but the 
account is indeed of independent interest. 
By 'self-reference', I mean the principle that in self-
conscious thought or utterance, the subject (the person who has the 
thought / makes the utterance) is identical with the object (the 
person the thought / utterance is about). It should not be confused 
- as it is by Nozick in his [1981] (see pp. 113-14) - with what I 
elsewhere term 'auto-reference', featuring in e.g. 'This sentence is 
in English'. Anscombe shows that to present 'I' merely as a device 
of self-reference is not sufficient to characterise its sense (or 
meaning), for the following reason: '"I" is the word each one uses 
in speaking of her/himself' will not distinguish the 1st-person 
pronoun from devices that can effect unwitting self-reference 
( ibid. p. 47); nor from 'A' (a self-referential term not expressive 
of self-consciousness - ibid. pp. 49-50 and see Ch. 3 pp. 136-39). 
An example of the former, elaborated from a work of Jane Austen, is 
the following: Suppose that before her sudden acquisition of self-
knowledge, Emma Woodhouse remarks 'The young lady who has won the 
tender affection of dear Mr. Knightley is fortunate indeed'. Emma 
in fact succeeds in referring to herself, but not in the appropriate 
self-conscious way, since she intends to refer and believes she has 
referred to her protege, Harriet Smith. Another example is that of 
Oedipus (see p. 113). (It is arguably a central aspect of dramatic 
irony that a character self-refers unwittingly because of imperfect 
self-knowledge.) 
(ii) Qualifying the self-reference principle 
If the initial account is qualified by 'knowingly and intent-
ionally' ( ibid. p. 47), is it possible to avoid insufficiency with-
out falling into circularity? If we say '''I'' is the word each one 
uses when s/he knowingly and intentionally speaks of her/himself', 
will the qualification serve to provide an account that distinguish-
es 'I' from 'A', but which does not include a form of the reflexive 
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pronoun 'her/himself' requiring explanation in terms of 
1 
'I'? 
(We are interested in any 'A'-like term, of course, like one's own 
name, or some definite description that is true of oneself. We want 
an account that rules out those cases of self-reference where the 
speaker doesn't realise he is referring to himself by means of such 
an expression. There need be no worry about cases where he does, 
e.g. in one speech by Othello; for there, 'Othello', when used 
instead of 'I', is expressive of self-consciousness.) 
Anscombe denies that the qualification 'knowingly and intent-
ionally' has this desired effect. She poses the dilemma implicit in 
the foregoing: either 'himself' or 'herself' is the ordinary 
('direct') reflexive, in which case the account is insufficient, or 
it is a special ('indirect') reflexive, in which case the account is 
circular. Take the former interpretation first: Doesn't Emma 
knowingly and intentionally refer to herself when she says 'The 
young lady who has won the tender affection of Mr. Knightley is 
fortunate indeed'? Anscombe considers the objection that since 
ascription of intention creates referentially opaque contexts, we 
might be right to say that X intends to refer to an object, spec-
ified under some description, which is in fact identical with her/ 
himself, whilst not intending to refer to her/himself (due to 
ignorance of the identity). But this is incorrect, she contends, if 
the reflexive pronoun is the ordinary one, since the use of that 
pronoun gives no indication of the 'conception' of the object 
possessed by the speaker. Emma does indeed, then, knowingly and 
intentionally refer to herself in the utterance cited, if the 
reflexive is the ordinary one. For the use of the ordinary reflex-
ive 'herself' carries no implication that the speaker self-consc-
iously self-refers - i.e. self-refers in that way incompatible with 
ignorance that one is self-referring. Thus, if 'her/himself' is the 
ordinary, direct reflexive, the 'knowingly and intentionally' pro-
viso will not be adequate to rule out unwitting self-reference. (The 
behaviour of the direct reflexive is well-illustrated in Altham's 
[1979] (p. 28), where he displays the following equivalence: 
1 This amounts to saying that the reflexive pronoun has 
only one sense, and that 'knowingly and intentionally' serves 
to qualify the self-reference as self-conscious. 
= 
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Reginald hurt himself [direct reflexive] falling downstairs 
Reginald hurt Reginald falling downstairs, 
and so on for any term co-referential with 'Reginald'.) 
Anscombe goes on to imply that if we want a reflexive pronoun 
which will specify the relevant conception of the object, that is, a 
self-conscious conception, we will have to treat the reflexive as a 
'special' one, viz. the 'indirect' reflexive. And this is what we 
would naturally do, I think; it must be conversationally implied by 
' ••• spoke of / referred to her/himself', a fortiori by' ... know-
ingly and intentionally referred to her/himself', that the reported 
speaker had the appropriate 1st-personal conception. But in this 
case, as Anscombe says, circularity is introduced; for it is 
definitive of the indirect reflexive, on Anscombe's interpretation, 
that it express the speaker's 1st-personal conception of her/ 
himself. Yet it is this that we are trying to explain. 
(iii) 'A'- and 'I'-reflexives; circularity 
The distinction between the two senses of 'her/himself' is not 
quite right, however, although Anscombe's essential point is sound. 
It is worth explaining why. It is because the '1st-personal' 
conversational implication of the indirect reflexive can be 
cancelled or discarded, as in e.g. 'Emma, without realising it, said 
that she herself was fortunate indeed'. 
The point is, that the reflexive of indirect speech is not on 
all occasions the 'special' reflexive that Anscombe wants. Let us 
call the latter, which implies the speaker's self-conscious 
conception, the 'I'-reflexive, and the 'ordinary' self-reflexive, 
which carries no such implication, the 'A'-reflexive (after 
Anscombe's distinction between 'I' and 'A'; 'A' also standing for 
'Audience' - see below). In the Emma example, 'herself' is the 
indirect but 'A'-reflexive. The 'A'-reflexive does only what 
Anscombe says the direct reflexive does. It specifies for the 
audience the object which the speaker referred to, but offers no 
conception under which the speaker thought of it, and under which 
some co-referential substitutions may fail. It is the defining 
characteristic of the 'A'-reflexive that it tells us that the 
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speaker referred to the object that s/he in fact is, without telling 
us whether or not s/he knew that s/he was identical with that 
object. 
Now our original question was, will the 'knowingly and intent-
ionally' qualification avoid both insufficiency and circularity? 
Anscombe's answer should be rephrased: Either the 'her/himself' will 
be the 'A'-reflexive (though indirect) in which case the account is 
insufficient. Or it will be the 'I'-reflexive (always indirect), in 
which case it is circular. Even the 'knowingly and intentionally' 
qualification will not guarantee that the reflexive is the 
'I'-reflexive. This is because an interpretation denying the 
conversational implication 'himself' = 'I'-reflexive is always 
possible, such that the following analysis is correct: 
Smith knowingly and intentionally referred to himself 
Smith referred to someone and that someone is himself 
This analysis is compatible with Smith's ignorance of the fact that 
he referred to himself ('I'-reflexive). The following analysis 
ensures that the reflexive is the 'I'-reflexive but at the price of 
circularity: 
Smith knowingly and intentionally referred to himself 
Smith referred to someone, knowing and intending that person 
to be himself. 
The circularity comes out when we ask 'What does Smith know and 
intend?' For the oratio recta formulation of his knowledge or 
intention must use the 1st-person. What he knows is: 'I am the 
person referred to'. 
The circularity thus consists in the fact that the subject's 
knowledge can be expressed only in terms of the 1st-person, when the 
reflexive is interpreted in such a way as to rule out ignorant or 
unintentional self-reference. The account of 'I' (that is, the 
1st-person) suggested by the foregoing is as follows: 
'I' is the word each one uses (a) to refer to some person, 
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(b) knowing and intending that person to be himself. 
Anscombe views accounts of 'I' which attempt to present it as 
a device of self-reference, as either insufficient or circular, 
therefore. Is she then entitled to dismiss the self-referential 
aspect? It has been nicely put by Evans, that the requirement that 
a self-conscious thought be self-consciously about the subject is 
not by itself an adequate basis for an analysis of self-conscious-
ness (because of circularity), but it is nonetheless a principle 
which must be respected ([1982J p. 259). Anscombe would reply that 
the 'self-reference principle' is indeed not an adequate basis for 
self-consciousness (as shown in the discussion of the indirect 
reflexive); and this for the very good reason, on the Trojan view, 
that it is false. There are thoughts which on this view are 
governed by some version of the principle: viz. those of the 'Emma' 
variety, and 'A'-thoughts. In such cases, the living human being 
which has the thought is identical to the object towards which the 
thought is directed. But this is to down-grade the principle, of 
course; for thoughts of the sort I attributed to Emma, are not, 
after all, very interesting, and 'A'-thoughts occur solely in 
thought-experiment. Thus for Anscombe there may be and indeed is a 
relation between the subject-term of the 'I'-thought or utterance 
and the living human being who is the thinker or speaker; but it is 
not that of object-direction or reference. Nor is there anything 
else to which the subject-term can stand in such a relation (see pp. 
79-80). '''I'' is the word each one uses when s/he knowingly and 
intentionally speaks of herself (or himself)' is correct only 
insofar as it does not imply the reference-relation; and is in any 
case circular. (A 'misleading platitude' therefore.) Assessment of 
these views awaits the denouement of part 1 of the Homeric 
Opposition. The independent issue of the self-reference principle 
and its alleged circularity are treated in Chapter 3. 
(iv) Discussion of non-self-conscious self-reference 
The next part of Anscombe's account is concerned with 
elucidation of the nature of self-consciousness - and as such is 
also discussed more fully in Chapter 3. However, it fits in with 
the preceding anti-Greek dialectic, in the following way. Anscombe 
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compares 'I' with a self-referential term 'A' which, unlike 'I', 
1 
does not express self-consciousness. Another 'misleading plat-
itude' is here undermined: that self-consciousness is consciousness 
of the object that one is. Again, the Evans-style objection is in 
order: the fact that consciousness of the object that one is can be 
possessed by non-self-conscious beings and is thus not an adequate 
basis for an analysis of self-consciousness, does not mean that it 
is not a necessary component of self-consciousness. For Anscombe, 
on the other hand, the inadequacies of such platitudes are a symptom 
of that which she intends to demonstrate: that 'I' is not a 
referring expression. The discussion of 'A' fits into this overall 
strategy in the following way: it shows that one 'trivial' explan-
ation of why 'I' is not colloquially a proper name (that it won't do 
the work of a personal proper name because everyone has it and uses 
it only to self-refer) will not do, and that there must be a deeper 
reason ('I' is not any kind of referring expression; it is not 
colloquially a proper name, nor is it a 'logically proper name' - a 
singular term). 
1 
'A'-users lack the capacity to make IEM-judgements; in 
their 'A'-utterances they 'mean to speak of a certain human 
being, one who falls under [their] observation in a rather 
special way'. (See below, pp. 136-39.) 
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2.5) Anscombe's Tank Argument (II): Presentation of the Argument 
(i) Prolegomenon 
We have by this point dealt with the self-referential proposal 
for the sense of 'I', and the amendment of it, which Anscombe makes 
in part (i) of her destructive account of 'I' (p. 57 above). She 
has a further proposal, and with it switches to the 'mode of 
presentation' formulation of Frege's notion of 'sense', but in fact 
thereafter employs a more limited, less contentious requirement: 
'the use of a name for an object is connected with a conception of 
that object' ( ibid. p. 51); a sortal term must be supplied for each 
putative proper name ibid. p. 52). This last is associated less 
with Frege's notion of sense, more with his insistence that a name 
must have associated with it a criterion of identity (see Dummett 
[1981] pp. 73-6). 
The new proposal is introduced thus: 
If things are, rather than having, selves, then a self is 
something, for example a human being, in a special aspect which 
he has as soon as he became a 'person'. 'I' will then be the 
name used by each one only for himself (this is a direct 
reflexive) and precisely in that aspect ( ibid. p. 51). 
When the aspect is explained, we may have that '"way of being given" 
of an object' which is associated with its name, Anscombe notes. 
But this proposal is nonsensical, she maintains. Her objections 
seem to be: 
1. One might refer to oneself in the wrong way, on this account 
- the old point about the inadequacy of the 'direct' (or as I 
must now put it, the 'A'-) reflexive. 
2. One might not refer to oneself at all: it would be a 
question what guaranteed one got hold of the right self 
( ibid. p. 51). 
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Now this reaction to the proposal may seem unduly vituperative. It 
seems harmless and salutary to link the meaning of 'self' with that 
of 'person', and to define them in terms of a special aspect a human 
being may have. But Anscombe is still after a non-circular account 
of 'I'; and the talk of aspects will not, when added to the bare 
self-referencial account employing the 'A'-reflexive, make that 
account adequate. It will not stand proxy for the circularity-
inducing requirement that the speaker self-consciously self-refer 
(or however we are to express this vertiginous thought). Neverthe-
less, once again the riposte to Anscombe is: insufficiency must not 
be equated with falsity. Will her second objection sustain the 
latter charge? As it stands, it is an objection to the unpromising 
idea that one has, rather than is, a self. But it can be developed 
into a criticism of the aspect account too; for that account leads 
to a transgression of the Doctrine of the Secure Conception of the 
~ (as I will call it). Such a conception is 'secure' only if it 
ensures that the reference of 'I' is guaranteed (in ways to be spec-
ified). It will be recalled that Anscombe uses the phrase 'concept-
ion of the object' in framing the sortal requirement (p. 64). The 
present doctrine thus amounts to the idea that whatever sortal term 
is placed in apposition to the quasi-name 'I', it must be such as to 
ensure 'guaranteed reference' for 'I'. The second objection to the 
aspect account then becomes: if I am trying to pick out a self by 
means of some expression, it is a possibility that I pick out the 
wrong one. But with 'I', the object I pick out by means of it must 
be identical with the object I intend to pick out. (And a fortiori, 
I cannot fail to pick out anything). 
This is to anticipate somewhat. For Anscombe's immediate and 
main concern is with the new proposal seen as an expression of 
'Cartesian Ego theory'; the self seen as an imponderable something 
one has, rather than something one is. This unpromising construal 
is not worth discussing. 
The final component of the first part of Anscombe's negative 
account of 'I' is the introduction of the notion of 'guaranteed 
reference', explored more fully in the second part. The Doctrine of 
the Secure Conception of the 'I' is implied in the following 
passage: 
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••• what conception can be suggested, other than that of 
thinking, the thinking of the 'I'-thought, which secures this 
guarantee against reference-failure? It may be very well to 
describe what selves are; but if I do not know that I am a self, 
then I cannot mean a self by 'I' ibid. p. 55). 
Now, what can it mean to talk of a 'conception' securing guaranteed 
reference? (I am not disputing that 'I' does have guaranteed refer-
ence in the sense stated on pp. 12-13). First we need an approp-
riate sortal from the 'conception' 'thinking', viz. undramatically, 
'thinking thing' ('I am a thinking thing' is equivalent to 'I am 
thinking'). Now, why will this sortal alone guarantee reference, 
where 'self' fails? 
(ii) The Tank Argument of the first part of Anscornbe's dialectic 
Anscornbe's answer is cryptic, making use of that component of 
the guaranteed reference of 'I' by which it is required that the 
referent of 'I' be really present to consciousness ( ibid. p. 55). 
But we can construct a defence of the view that 'thinking thing' is 
the only conception that will serve, from the Tank Argument, which 
is ostensibly an argument in part (ii) of the destructive account, 
at the level of reference. So far, particular accounts of the sense 
of 'I' have been discussed and found wanting by Anscornbe; now what 
is offered is a quite general argument to the conclusion that no 
coherent account of the sense of 'I' can be provided. I merely 
present the 'Tank Argument' now. A slightly extended version is 
offered in the course of discussion of part (ii) of Anscornbe's 
destructive account and the latter version contains all the 
difficulties of the following (plus a few more!) - these are 
idealisations of her compressed account: 
(1) If 'I' is a referring expression, then each serious and 
comprehending use of 'I' is guaranteed to have successful 
reference, where success consists in (a) referring to an 
object that (b) one intends to refer to (i.e. the object 
referred to fits one's conception of it). 
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(2) 'I' refers. 
so (3) 'I' has guaranteed reference. 
For the subject in a sensory deprivation tank (see Anscombe ibid. 
p. 58): 
(4) It is certain that the conditions for the successful 
reference of 'I' are met in the Tank. 
(5) It is not certain that the referent is embodied. 
so (6) That the referent is embodied is not one of the conditions 
for successful reference. 
so (7) It is no part of any (secure) conception of the referent 
that it be embodied (i.e. 'thinking thing' is the only 
sortal term that secures guaranteed reference). 
but (8) Such a conception is internally incoherent. 
so (9) We can attribute no sense to 'I' if we are to respect its 
guaranteed reference. 
Now just what is wrong with the conception 'thinking thing'? 
The problem is, that the guarantee that one refers to the object one 
intended to, is purchased at the cost of the impossibility of 
intending to refer to the same object that one has referred to, on a 
previous occasion. Anscombe comments that we have been driven to 
Descartes' notion of a res coqitans and writes: 
••• if 'I' is a referring expression, then Descartes was right 
about what the referent was. His position has, however, the 
intolerable difficulty of requiring an identification of the 
same referent in different 'I'-thoughts ••• ( ibid. p. 58). 
The reason why 'thinking thing' secures guaranteed reference is 
that, in contrast to the other sortal terms considered, it has no 
criteria of identity that could be misapplied; so there could be no 
question of intending to apply 'I', a name for a token of the type, 
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to the same object one has applied it to on a previous occasion, and 
failing. Thinking things cannot be the object of more than one act 
of reference each; their 'identity' persists only for the duration 
of the 'thought-episode', which is no time at all. For what 
possible criteria of identity could there be that would enable a 
'thinking thing' to be re-identified, if its only essential feature 
is the particular thought-content? 
In fact, it is worse than this. It is not clear that a 
'thinking thing' can be the unitary object even of one act of 
reference. Not only must 'I' refer to something the existence of 
which is instantaneous, but it might refer to several things on a 
particular occasion for all one knows. For 'thinking thing' has no 
criteria of individuation either. Anscombe writes: 
How do I know that 'I' is not ten thinkers thinking in unison? 
Or perhaps not quite succeeding. That might account for the 
confusion of thought which I sometimes feel ( ibid. p. 58). 
According to Anscombe, then, 'thinking thing' is a pseudo-
conception for a non-object. 
(iii) A fallacious false start 
I will now present the Tank Argument as it fits in to part 
(ii) of the destructive account. As presented, the argument relies 
on aspect (1) of guaranteed reference - the guaranteed existence of 
1 
the object meant by the 'I'-user. This argument is an extended 
version of that given on pp. 66-67. 
The Tank Argument, then, runs as follows: 
(1) If 'I' is a referring expression, then each serious and 
comprehending use of 'I' is guaranteed to have successful 
reference, where success consists in (a) referring to an 
object that (b) one intends to refer to (i.e. the object 
1 
See section on guaranteed reference, pp. 12-14. 
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referred to fits one's conception of it). 
(2) 'I' is a referring expression. 
so (3) Each serious and comprehending use of 'I' is guaranteed to 
have successful reference. 
Now for the subject in a sensory deprivation tank: 
(4) It is certain that the conditions for the successful 
reference of 'I' are met in the Tank (assuming it is 
plausible for the subject to have an epistemic attitude 
towards this technical truth). 
(5) It is not certain that the referent is embodied. 
so (6) That the referent is embodied is not one of the conditions 
for successful reference. 
so (7) It is no part of any (secure) conception of the referent 
that it be embodied ('thinking thing' is the only sortal 
term that secures guaranteed reference). 
but (8) Such a conception is internally incoherent. 
so ( 9 ) ( =N{ 3) ) 
and (10) (=,.0( 2) ) 
It is regrettable that this argument, on close scrutiny, 
requires an additional premise to avoid fallaciousness. Premise (4) 
requires strengthening in the following way: not only must it be 
certain for the subject that the conditions for successful reference 
are met, but he must further know what the conditions are. He must 
know all truths of the form: 
'It is a condition for C that qt. 
Thus, 'that the referent is embodied' may be one of the conditions 
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for successful reference of which I know that, whatever they are, 
they are satisfied; but if I do not know it is one of the condit-
ions, I may not be certain of its truth. Analogously, a person even 
more ignorant of the laws of Newtonian mechanics than the present 
writer, observes that his car is stationary. So he is certain that 
the conditions for its being stationary are met. But due to the 
defects of a classical education, he is not certain that the forces 
acting upon the car are equal and opposite (he just doesn't know 
about such arcane matters). 
It seems that the mistake in this version of the Tank 
Argument, then, is the following: 'There is something of which I 
have no guarantee (that I am embodied). This cannot figure as a 
condition of something of which I do have a guarantee (that every 
act of reference involving 'I' is successful). (So 'I' doesn't 
refer to something essentially embodied.)' But we have seen that 
this first step is invalid; for in addition to knowing that the 
conditions obtain, I need to know, of each of the conditions, that 
it is a condition. To repeat, knowing that the conditions for 
successful reference (Whatever they are) obtain, is compatible with 
ignorance that one of the conditions, specified in 'logically 
isolated' terms as 'that the subject is embodied', obtains; I can be 
ignorant of this truth, if such it is, only if I do not know that it 
is one of the above-mentioned conditions (if it is such). So this 
version of the Tank Argument will not of itself achieve for Anscombe 
the conclusion that I am not essentially embodied ('I' does not 
refer to something essentially embodied). 
(iv) Climax of the Anscombian dialectic 
The defective argument can be amended, however, to avoid the 
fallacy and to present three alternatives (4, 4' and 4" below) for 
negation in contraposition. This is the definitive Tank Argument; 
for those who, unlike the present writer, are not afflicted with 
logical dyslexia, the labelling of assumptions and inferences may 
help understanding. It should be emphasised that, as in previous 
versions, the argument is to be administered to himself by the 
subject in the Tank: 
So (1,2) 
So (1,2) 
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(1) It is certain that: if 'I' is a referr-
ing expression, then each serious and 
comprehending use of 'I' is guaranteed to 
have successful reference. 
(2) It is certain that 'I' is a referring 
expression. 
(3) It is certain that each serious and 
comprehending use of 'I' is guaranteed 
to have successful reference. 
(4) It is certain that the conditions for 
the successful reference of any genuine 
'I'-thought are met in the Tank. 
(4' ) It is certain that embodiment is necess-
[Ass. ] 
[Ass. ] 
[from 1,2] 
[from 3] 
[Ass. ] 
ary for a successful referential use of 'I' • 
(4") It is certain that 'I'm missing the 2.30 
at Goodwood', thought by myself in the 
Tank, is a genuine 'I'-thought. 
So (1,2, (5) It is certain that when I think 'I'm 
But 
4',4") missing the 2.30 at Goodwood' in the 
Tank, I am embodied. 
(6) (=N5) It is not certain that when I think 
'I'm missing the 2.30 ••• ' in the Tank, I 
am embodied. 
[Ass.] 
[from 4, 
4',4"] 
[Ass.] 
So (4', 
4",6) 
(7) (=N4) It is not certain that the condit- [from 6, 
ions for successful reference for any 4',4"] 
genuine 'I'-thought of the sort which 
could figure in premise (6) are met in 
the Tank. 
This rearrangement serves to focus attention on the main point at 
issue, whether the subject's doubt about embodiment is possible. It 
is this point which affords Trojanism its strongest intuitive 
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purchase. (It is true that, on the second option for the Greeks 
that I will outline, it is accepted that the doubt is possible - but 
no clear account of the thought involved (said not to be a genuine 
'I '-thought) is given.) The rearrangement also avoids the afore-
mentioned fallacy. It should be noted that two things are presupp-
osed by the argument if it is to yield a Trojan conclusion. 
First, that certainty is transitive across logical 
consequence; viz. that the following principle holds: 
C(r), C(r~q) 
Cq 
Second, that the idea of doubting the existence of one's body, in 
the absence of current information about it, is intelligible and 
unproblematic. The latter is not uncontroversial. Finally, is the 
conclusion as it stands in fact Trojan? After all, what is claimed 
is just that it is not certain that the conditions for successful 
reference, for any of the 'I'-thoughts in question, are met in the 
Tank. The argument requires supplementation, then, to take it 
beyond the original Anscombe conclusion, as follows: 
(8) It is a truth knowable a priori, if it 
is a truth at all, that 'I' is a referring 
expression. 
(9) For any a priori truth, it must be 
possible for one to be certain of it. 
(4',4",6) (10) In the Tank, it is not certain that the 
conditions for successful reference of 
any genuine 'I'-thought which could 
figure in (6) are met. 
So (4', 
4",6) 
(11) It is not certain that each serious and 
comprehending use of 'I' (in the sort of 
thought which could figure in (6» is 
guaranteed to have successful reference. 
[Ass. ] 
[Ass. ] 
[=7] 
[from 10] 
73 
So (1,4', (12) It is not certain that 'I' is a ref err- [from 1,11] 
4" ,6) ing expression (in the sort of thought 
which could figure in (6) ) • 
So (1,4', (13 ) It is not the case that 'I' is a [from 8,9,12] 
4" ,6, referring expression (in the sort of 
8,9) thought which could figure in (6) ) • 
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2.6) Anscombe's Tank Argument (III): Assessment 
(i) Three Greek options 
So the conclusion is that in a range of uses at least, 'I' is 
not a referring expression. This range corresponds to the range of 
'I'-thoughts which the subject can entertain consistently with 
doubting the existence of his body. The non-referring uses will 
thus be those in 'psychological' self-ascriptions; which, if one had 
not thought too deeply about the matter, one might think were the 
IEM-uses. (Of course, as we have already shown, there are physical 
self-ascriptions which are IEM.) 
What is happening at this point in our discussion is of the 
first importance. What is the thought expressed in (7) (p. 71)? 
It is that maybe my 'I'-thought has no object (to dismiss the alter-
native variety of unsuccessful reference: that I end up referring to 
an object other than the one I intended to). Now the Greek can 
react to the argument in two ways. On the first option, both sides 
will agree that the thought that my 'I'-thought has no object is 
implied by the thought that maybe I am not embodied (on the assumpt-
ion that it is certain both that embodiment is necessary for 
successful reference and that the contemporaneous 'I'-thought in 
(4") is a coherent one). It is in a sense equivalent to it. 
Anscombe writes (in a vein that, as will become apparent, I am not 
sure is a Trojan one): 
(In the Tank] I should perhaps believe that there is ••• a body. 
But the possibility will perhaps strike me that there is none. 
That is, the possibility that there is then nothing that I am 
( ibid. p. 62). 
But the thought 'Maybe my 'I'-thought has no object / I am nothing' 
seems impossibly difficult to entertain. Like the brain in a vat, 
the subject who believes himself to be disembodied is trying to work 
with, as Evans puts it, an inadequate Idea of himself. (But of 
course he is simply deluded, whereas with the unfortunate Brain, not 
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even psychotherapy could help.) The fact that the doubt about 
embodiment amounts to the doubt about object-direction, and that the 
latter can be represented as the absurd doubt about one's own 
existence, leads the Greek to contend that the superficial plaus-
ibility of the former hides a deep unintelligibility. Still, the 
idea that the doubt about embodiment can be entertained is an 
appealing one, and if he denies it, we need from the Greek a 
diagnosis of the error. A possible diagnosis, suggested by Evans' 
discussion, is as follows: 'It is just the old mistake of thinking 
that what happens sometimes can happen always. In the Tank, the 
subject is temporarily deprived of one kind of information about 
himself which normally forms the basis of his self-conscious 
thought. But we allow that even in this situation, he has 
'I '-thoughts. So why should it not be the case that all self-
conscious thought involves no more than these 'I'-thoughts do? This 
gives us the idea that there could be a subject who never received 
information about his body or anything else, who in fact has no body 
to receive information about. And this is the content of the doubt 
in the Tank. But it is a requirement on self-conscious thought that 
the subject has the capacity to locate himself as an element in the 
1 
objective order ; and though we can credit this capacity to a 
subject for whom circumstances prevent its exercise, though it once 
was exercised, we cannot credit it to a subject which ex hypothesi 
could never exercise it. Disembodiment perhaps makes sense if, ~ 
la Strawson [1959J, we make it essential that the subject has been 
embodied; but such a subject will not be the essentially thinking 
subject of Anscombe's conception'. 
This first option, then, consists in a refusal to countenance 
the doubt about embodiment, on the grounds that it involves a doubt 
that one obviously cannot entertain, a doubt that amounts to a doubt 
about one's own existence. The subject of an 'I'-thought cannot 
think of himself as nothing and nowhere. So by reductio ad 
absurdum, it must be held that it is certain that I am embodied in 
the Tank. 
1 
Alternatively one could say: self-consciousness essent-
ially involves ways of knowing things about the object that 
one is. 
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The second Greek option, in contrast, consists in an accept-
ance of the doubt about embodiment, and an acceptance of one of the 
alternative consequences. The Greek accepts the plausibility of (6) 
and (4"). The effect of the stratagem is not much different from 
denying (6) straight off. But it means that (4), (4') and (4") are 
seen clearly as a trilemma, with the two chief protagonists, and a 
third disputant, each selecting a different premise for negation. 
The Trojan response discussed shortly, is as presented in the argu-
ment; the denial of premise (4), that it is certain that 'I' refers 
in any coherent 'I'-thought in the Tank. The Cartesian, the third 
disputant and too weak as a Mediterranean power to be afforded a 
full part in the Homeric scenario, will choose to deny (4'), that it 
is certain that embodiment is necessary for a successful referential 
use of 'I'. Thus one can say that the Cartesian view contains 
elements of the views of the Homeric opponents; the Trojan attitude 
towards embodiment, and the Greek attitude towards reference. The 
result is unsatisfactory, as has been noted in the discussion of the 
concept of a thinking thing; viz. reference to something imponder-
able. It should be noted, incidentally, that premise (4') is in 
fact acceptable to Trojanism - because otiose from that viewpoint. 
It may be the case that embodiment is necessary for successful 
reference by means of 'I'; but since 'I' does not in the cases in 
question refer, successful reference is no part of its use. (In 
fact, of course, there is a referring use of 'I' - the 'I'-as-object 
use featured in bodily self-ascription. That successful reference 
in this case obviously requires embodiment is a further 
justification for (4') on the Trojan account.) 
The Greek response on this second option is thus to claim that 
if it is admitted that it is doubtful that I am embodied, then it 
will follow that it is doubtful that my putative 'I'-thoughts are 
genuine 'I'-thoughts - for the reasons advanced before, equating the 
doubt about embodiment with a doubt about object-direction. On this 
option, however, the doubt is allowed some intelligibility. But as 
it is not allowed to be an 'I'-thought, it is hard to say what 
structure it could possibly have. For this reason, the second 
option does not seem very plausible. 
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On the Trojan account, in contrast, though the doubt about 
embodiment amounts to the doubt about object-direction, the latter 
is not interpreted as the doubt about one's existence. (Though it 
is not easy here to make sense of Anscombe's contention that I 
therefore doubt whether there is then anything that I am. Her view 
seems to be that 'I'-thoughts necessarily stand in some relation 
other than that of reference, to a living human being.) Rather, 
one's doubt about object-direction amounts to an insight into the 
objectless nature of self-conscious thought. 
What is the current state of play between the Homeric oppon-
ents then? The only viable Greek response so far, is to question 
the possibility of the doubt about embodiment. This is not a very 
tractable issue. But in fact there is a third Greek option also. 
The third Greek option is like the second option but negates 
premiss (4) about guaranteed reference instead of (4") about the 
genuineness of the 'I '-thought. But then the Tank Argument, 
apparently Trojan, could be represented as compatible with Hellen-
ism. Curious - but there is an analogy to this option in the 
account by Evans in his [1982] of 'the perennial nightmare' 
(perennial in the imaginings of philosophers), the brain in a vat 
horror-story. The scenario is that a human brain is taken at birth 
and placed in a vat, where it is stimulated by scientists in such a 
way that it hallucinates normal human experiences and is then 
allowed a 'normal' cognitive development. The subject makes the 
usual range of self-ascriptions - all founded on the delusion that 
it is a normal embodied person. The question arises: how ought the 
subject to think of itself? Or, how, apprised of its true situation 
(if that is the correct term!), can it think of itself? As the 
subject in the sensory-deprivation tank believes he can think of 
himself, so the brain must attempt to think of itself - if, with 
Evans, we deny that the latter can identify itself with a brain in a 
vat ( ibid. p. 251). 
What, then, will be the structure of these thoughts that, as 
Evans says, 'fail to net any object at all?' On the Trojan account, 
it may be said that there is no problem: the brain's thoughts share 
the structure of 'I'-thoughts, and it is not the case that there is 
a body which the enquirer might be misled into thinking had a role 
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to playas referent. Anscombe would not be quite happy with this 
response, for the reason mentioned above - that there is a relation 
between the 'I'-thought and the living human being who has it, 
albeit not that of reference. On the Greek account, there are two 
options, corresponding to the second and third options above. The 
former will then be that the brain does not have the 'I'-thoughts, 
such thoughts being guaranteed of reference. Its thoughts have the 
surface structure of 'I'-thoughts (if one can attribute such a 
structure to thought), but in reality are 'Je'-thoughts - where 'Je' 
is a non-referring term signifying that there is a subject that is 
not an object. Obviously this is just a label! It will not 
answer the query about the nature of the doubt about embodiment 
when, on the second Greek option, that doubt is allowed to be 
intelligible. To allude to a recent debate, it might be held that 
the brain does not have 'I'-thoughts because such thoughts are about 
an actually existing object, and could not exist without that very 
Object's existing - that is, they are de re thoughts (see Wood-
field ed. [1982] p. v). 
The option favoured by Evans is the latter: these thoughts are 
'I'-thoughts featuring a non-referring use of 'I' (so 'I'-thoughts 
are not de re). Thus he claims that 'the Cartesian assumption 
that [our ordinary thoughts about ourselves] are always guaranteed 
to have an object cannot be sustained' ( Ope cit. p. 249). But is 
this not a Greek assumption also? It need not be. The Homeric 
opponents hold respectively that 'I' is, in its 'psychological' (or 
in its IEM uses) a referring (or non-referring) expression. But 
Strawson himself, the Agamemnon of the dispute, seems to suggest 
that there is a non-referring use of 'I' - albeit the transcendental 
use ([1966] p. 166). So it is only at first sight curious that the 
Tank Argument as presented on pp. 71-72 might have a conclusion 
acceptable to the Greeks. (The conclusion being that 'I' does not 
refer in 'psychological' thoughts entertained in the absence of 
sensory information from one's body.) If it is not certain that I 
am embodied, then it is not certain that my 'I'-thoughts refer - in 
the unusual circumstances of Cartesian doubt in the tank. On an 
/ 
option acceptable to Greeks with a taste for outre thought-
experiments, the latter thought, instead of leading to a reductio ad 
absurdum of the former, might be regarded as entertainable. 
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Although Varieties of Reference suggests this line of thought, 
Evans himself would not be happy with its application to the Tank 
Argument, however. He emphasises that a subject's Idea of himself 
does not require him to have a 'current conception' of himself: 
what is required, in the exceptional circumstances in which 
the various avenues of self-knowledge are blocked, is that the 
subject be disposed to accept any information accessible in 
those ways as germane to the thoughts we regard as manifesting 
self-consciousness ( ibid. p. 249). 
Cases where the 'Cartesian assumption' about reference-failure is 
not sustainable are 'science-fiction' examples - of which the Tank 
is not one ( ibid. pp. 249-55). I would be inclined to agree with 
this assessment - which amounts to a refusal to allow that the 
possibility of Cartesian doubt in a sensory-deprivation tank can 
have any very important consequences. 
I have done my best to present the Tank Argument in its 
strongest possible terms, shorn of any obvious fallacy. Despite the 
second and third Greek options just canvassed, the first I think 
locates the key point at issue - the doubt about embodiment. We can 
take discussion of this issue further by considering the merits of 
arguments put forward by Kenny in his [1979]. 
(ii) Kenny on 'The First Person' 
In the course of Kenny's discussion, there is some possible 
confusion over the separateness of the Trojan and Cartesian 
viewpoints which should be dealt with first. He discusses the Tank 
Argument, states what he takes to be Anscombe's conclusion, and 
criticises it: 
'I am the thinker of these thoughts' is not a genuine 
proposition, but 'I am this body' is ••• [she claims]. This 
conclusion I found surprisingly unWittgensteinian: the thinker 
of these thoughts who is possibly not this person with this body 
seems uncomfortably similar to a Cartesian ego; and if we allow 
the conceivability of the notion that we are thus spiritual, it 
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seems no great matter that when we use 'I' we are not actually 
referring to any such spirit or self ( ibid. p. 13). 
It is this line of thought and, connectedly, his concern that in her 
positive account of self-consciousness, Anscombe is making play with 
the b~te noire of private ostensive definition, that makes Kenny 
query, only half-ironically I think, whether the article 'marks the 
conversion of Professor Anscombe from Wittgenstein to Descartes' 
( ibid p. 13). 
Now it is often thought that, since the Trojan denies that 'I' 
refers to something embodied, he is thereby countenancing the 
existence of an incorporeal self. It has to be insisted that the 
Trojan is not committed to any such view (certainly not consciously, 
nor I think logically). However, it is not clear that this mistaken 
view is Kenny's; for he endorses the 'no-reference' view and seems 
concerned rather that it is Anscombe's use of the Tank Argument and 
her positive account of self-consciousness that may be driving her 
to the heretical, Cartesian conclusion. This is a different matter 
which will now be discussed at some length. (Incidentally, this 
latter account of self-consciousness is an extreme example of 
Anscombian cryptic opacity, in this respect anticipating, albeit 
briefly, the sustained and bravura opacity of her paper 'Propos-
1 
itions' (see her [1975] pp. 61-64).) 
In his discussion of the Argument, Kenny considers the problematic 
status of the Tank-victim's doubt about embodiment. Can I have the 
thought 'Maybe I don't have a body'? Kenny finds the thought 
incoherent. He has two arguments, it seems. The first is as 
follows: 
(1) The assertion of an 'I'-thought is verified or falsified 
with essential respect to the behaviour of the body; this 
fact is part of the sense of 'I'. 
1 
Delivered to packed houses at St. Andrews and elsewhere 
in 1983. 
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(2) The doubt 'Maybe I don't have a body' must violate this rule 
(in a way to be specified). 
So either 
(3) It has no clear public sense. 
or (4) It must have a logically private sense belonging to it when 
it is entertained in thought (which is an incoherent and 
pernicious supposition). 
Kenny believes that Anscombe will have to endorse the incoherent and 
pernicious (4); but does the sense in which the doubt violates rule 
(1) compel Anscombe to this position? Does rule (1) indeed make the 
doubt incoherent? We need to spell out the rule-violation in more 
detail. 
(iii) The argument from pragmatic self-defeat 
Let us postulate (if this has not already been done by someone 
else) a class of pragmatically self-defeating doubts. Contenders 
are 'Maybe I don't have a body', 'Maybe I'm dreaming' and (more 
picturesquely) 'Maybe I'm mad'. These are doubts the verbal 
expression of which, given a certain condition, defeats the doubt. 
The precise condition varies somewhat from case to case - usually it 
is that the verbal expression must be a comprehending one. 
Now the point to be urged against Kenny is that just because a 
doubt is pragmatically self-defeating does not mean it is essent-
ially self-defeating, i.e. incoherent or self-contradictory. Let us 
examine the looser cases of pragmatic self-defeat, then the stricter 
cases of which the Anscombian doubt is the limiting one. (The former 
are indeed sufficiently removed from the last-named that discussion 
of them is chiefly justified by their intrinsic fascination.) 
'Maybe I'm mad' is the grossest example from a number of doubts 
which refer to afflictions the obtaining of which to a decisive 
extent rules out the victim's awareness of them. It is the grossest 
because the terms 'madness' and 'insanity' are ill-defined, and 
frequently figure as merely pejorative expressions lacking in 
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content - but the doubt is nonetheless a coherent one which features 
poignantly in the fears of the neurotic and (arguably) the psycho-
tic. If we take 'mad' and 'insane' in their only clear sense -
'mentally ill' - then to the extent that a psychotic patient in a 
non-acute phase of his illness has awareness of his condition, the 
doubt is not in fact pragmatically self-defeating ( ~ certain 
1 
accounts). (Schizophrenic patients in an acute phase do not 
display any insight into their condition - but this fact is not 
sufficient to make the doubt pragmatically self-defeating, because 
of insight that may be displayed after the phase has passed.) The 
doubt is a well-attested one amongst neurotics, in contrast, where 
it may be taken as expressing a more colourful range of fears about 
losing one's grip, 'cracking-up', etc.; in such cases the doubt is 
not pragmatically self-defeating, but merely false. (The subjects, 
assisted by the widespread ignorance about mental illness, have made 
a serious mistake about their condition; which is not to belittle 
their fears.) But there are related doubts which are pragmatically 
self-defeating where the kind of mental incapacity is of a diff-
erent sort. One example of this sort of doubt would be 'Maybe my 
memory has been radically impaired as in e.g. Korsakov's Syndrome' 
an exotic doubt, but one which acquires some poignancy when one 
considers the situation of the hapless victim of the condition 
referred to, and the extent to which he may be able to obtain some 
glimpse into his state. It is unlikely that any such glimpse is 
going to satisfy the requirement of comprehending utterance necess-
ary if the doubt is to avoid being pragmatically self-defeating, 
however; the subject's sense of self-identity will be sufficiently 
attenuated that he will not be able to articulate what he has 
2 
lost. But no Kenny-style argument is needed to show that the 
1 
e.g. Kenny [1973] p. 209. 
2 
Proponents of a more expansive attitude toward the 
concepts of the congenitally blind may be inclined to differ 
here. But memory is so integral a component of self-identity 
that in severe cases of Korsakov's Syndrome it is hard to 
credit the subject with any insight into his condition; or 
indeed to understand the quality of his experience at all. In 
his fascinating [1985], Oliver Sacks discusses the case of his 
patient, the wretched Jimmie R., for whom one's sympathy is 
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doubt is not merely pragmatically self-defeating, but essentially 
so; nothing hinges on the matter of the verbal expression of the 
doubt. 
So we need to look to other examples to see how pragmatic and 
essential self-defeat come apart. The example of dreaming is 
discussed by Kenny himself in his [1968], where his views seem at 
least in tension with his strictures against Anscombe. He writes: 
I agree with Malcolm against Descartes that one cannot make 
judgements during dreams. It does not follow, however, that the 
judgement 'I am dreaming' is senseless. It can never be made 
truly, but it can be made falsely. To dream that one is 
dreaming is not to judge that one is dreaming, but a waking man 
might be persuaded falsely to judge that he is dreaming ([1968] 
pp. 30-31). 
Kenny here concurs that judgement-making requires that one be 
the greater in virtue of his cheerful obliviousness of his 
affliction. When Sacks suggests he has difficulties with his 
memory, and illustrates why he might not realise this, he 
replies: ,''So that's my problem ••• I kinda thought it was. 
I do find myself forgetting things, once in a while - things 
that have just happened. The past is clear, though'" ( ibid. 
p. 25). Yet his terror on being shown himself in the mirror, 
a middle-aged man 30 years on from the point at which his 
long-term memory ceases and from the past in which he lives, 
quickly subsides when the mirror is removed - poignantly 
illustrating the pathologically-conditioned limits of his 
self-knowledge. Sacks' analogy of his patient's mental life 
with the flux and movement of the Humean bundle of perceptions 
without its unifying principle of personal identity seems, if 
not philosophically, at least imaginatively, not so wide of 
the mark. (Incidentally, the book is full of philosophically 
interesting case-studies, most notably 'the man who mistook 
his wife for a hat' - now the subject of a tedious opera by 
Michael Nyman - and the female patient who lost her 
proprioceptive sense, with horrifying consequences.) 
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conscious, without concluding 'I am dreaming' is senseless; should 
he not conclude similarly for 'I have no body', whilst maintaining 
that judgement-making requires embodiment? Plausibly yes - in which 
case one must find premise (2) of the argument (p. 80) false. From 
this it may be concluded that, although principle (1) may furnish a 
counter-argument to Anscombe's, it will not do so via consideration 
of the Anscombian doubt as pragmatically self-defeating. The charge 
of illicitly logical privacy will not be made to stick that way, 
therefore, and is undermined in general by the following consider-
ations. Like Descartes' Cogito, the Tank Argument is an argument 
one a~ministers to oneself; but it can generally be so administered. 
It is true that 'Maybe I don't have a body', like 'Maybe I'm 
dreaming', can be immune from pragmatic self-defeat only when 
entertained 'privately', if at all. (I discuss the caveat in the 
next paragraph.) But the fact that the doubts can be expressed 
publicly, though subject to self-defeat, shows that Wittgensteinian 
sensibilities about logical privacy need not be offended. 
Three points require immediate statement. First, it is indeed 
difficult to see how Kenny, and anyone persuaded by his account of 
the doubt about dreaming, can reject the analogy between that and 
the doubt about embodiment, since he cannot maintain that the latter 
is pragmatically self-defeating whilst the former is merely always 
false. Second, though, I presume that Kenny is also wanting to 
claim that when contingently privately entertained, the latter doubt 
is pragmatically self-defeating too. But unlike in the case of the 
verbal expression, this further claim presupposes an anti-Trojan 
argument and does not furnish one. That is, whilst clearly one must 
be embodied in order to give a thought verbal expression, certain 
proponents of Trojanism might claim that this was not necessary 
merely for one to have the thought - and to assume this is wrong is 
merely to beg the question against these proponents. (It is not 
just Trojans who make this claim - so too does Strawson with 
arguable consistency, in the famous and putatively Hellenistic cameo 
of the disembodied person ([1959J pp. 115-6) - reiterated with the 
authority accorded by the then burgeoning doctrine of Strawsonian 
infallibility in his [1980J p. 270.) An anti-Trojan conclusion does 
not follow immediately from principle (1). Third, the Anscombian 
doubt might even be publicly expressed by the subject in the Tank, 
though undetected by him. (Solitary persons often unthinkingly give 
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verbal expression to their solitary thoughts, this being a symptom 
of loneliness or rejection of the world rather than insanity; 
under-water microphones could monitor any such pronouncements of the 
Tank-subject, from which a Becket-like monologue might emerge.) 
(iv) A better line of argument 
The fact that any such sub-aquatic musings are undetected by 
the subject is one among the many circumstances that, according to 
Anscombe, make it seem to him as if he might not have a body any 
more. But Kenny is on a better tack when, in his second argument, 
he challenges the grounds rather than the coherence of the doubt: 
(1) It is not by sensory experience that I know I have a body. 
So (2) Lack of sensory experience in the Tank cannot ground a doubt 
about whether I have a body. 
Claim (1) might be made out by showing that 'I have a body' is a 
proposition without grounds - the sort of idea Wittgenstein is 
1 
concerned with in On Certainty. To endorse Kenny's argument 
here, is to say that the special circumstances of the Tank do not 
afford a rationale for a particular doubt about embodiment above and 
beyond that of Cartesian sceptical doubt in general. But in making 
this an effective objection, Kenny is not exposing any obviously 
Cartesian inclination in Anscombe's account in the direction of 
privacy of experience. 
He is, however, exposing the key issue in the assessment of 
the Tank Argument. It is the plausibility of his claim (1) which 
leads one to feel that Anscombe's doubt about embodiment is, at 
best, ill-grounded. Further work obviously needs to be done but I 
1 
See e.g. para 387: 
Someone might ask me: "How certain are you that ••• that 
is your foot?" And the answer ••• might be ••• "I can't 
doubt it". And [this] answer would make sense even 
without any grounds. 
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close by recording my suspicion that, even on the best presentation 
of the Tank Argument (which I think I have given), it will succumb 
to a Kenny-style objection of the above sort. The second and third 
Greek options of pp. 74-78 are therefore misguided. 
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2.7) Trojan Arguments from IEM (I): The Unigue Guarantee for 'I' 
(i) 'No unnoticed substitution' of the object of self-reference 
is not the 'unigue guarantee', and is empty 
It was stated in Chapter 1 (p. 25) that IEM for 'I', as 
opposed to other indexicals, extends over time, and this seems to 
indicate a persisting subject statements about which are immune to 
error through misidentification. Before examining the implications 
of this immunity from which the Trojan seeks advantage, we must be 
clear exactly what the immunity is. We need to distinguish two 
kinds of guarantee about identification over time. The first, 
perhaps because it is a reflection of 'guaranteed reference' 
(discussed in Chapter 1), turns out to yield no substantial 
consequences. It is the second, the genuinely IEM guarantee, which 
will later form the basis for the important Trojan arguments in 
section (2.8). 
Trojans have attempted to base a case on each of these 
phenomena, in fact. (If the patient reader has been thinking 'Oh 
no, not ~ about IEM', he should be assured that things get rather 
more exciting from this point onwards.) The weaker, though 
initially plausible case, based on the first phenomenon, concerns 
what Anscombe terms 'no unnoticed substitution'. It is met by 
Evans' argument in ibid. p. 214; and this does not involve IEM as we 
shall see. There is a second case, which does involve IEM; of this, 
Evans' remarks on pp. 214-5 constitute an inadequate denial, whilst 
those on p. 218 do not even acknowledge it. However, both cases do 
involve a guarantee about identification over time in some sensei 
and we need to show why the triviality of the first case does not 
affect the substantiality of the second. Matters are not helped by 
the fact that in Evans' discussion on pp. 213-5, the two cases are 
run together and jointly diagnosed as expressions of the same error. 
It is no simple mistake Evans makes here. In the first, the Trojan 
derives his case simply by presupposing in the description of the 
situation which he uses, the conclusion which he wishes to draw. 
But the second is different. The Trojan case is based on independ-
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ently describable facts (viz. those about IEM), facts which the 
Greek may, if he wishes, deny, but which are not simply conjured up 
by one's way of describing the situation. 
Let me explain these unhelpfully abstract remarks. On p. 213 
Evans issues a warning about 'a danger inherent in all reflection 
about self-consciousness'. He writes: 
••• we have been able to take the subject of thought, and his 
identity, for granted ••• Now there is no harm in continuing 
this way of proceeding when we come to consider self-
identification: indeed it is unavoidable. But we must realise 
what we are doing. We are building the subject's identity over 
time into our description of his situation. This may make it 
appear that he has an infallible knowledge of what is involved 
in this identity; but the appearance is nothing but an artefact 
of our way of describing the situation ( ibid. pp. 213-4). 
Evans' point (which will become clearer) is one of those brilliant 
aperlus with which The Varieties of Reference is well-endowed; but 
in examining its applications one must be careful to prevent one's 
admiration from quite overwhelming one's judgement. 
Its first application is in connection with Anscornbe's 
suspicions arising from the fact that there can be no 'unnoticed 
substitution' of the object of self-reference. Perhaps it is 
intelligible to suppose that I wake up one morning and find that, 
like the central character in Franz Kafka's Metamorphosis, I have 
changed into a beetle. But it is not conceivable that I have 
changed into a different person, such that I fail to identify, by 
means of 'I', the same object that I identified in like manner 
yesterday. In contrast, it is quite possible that an 'unnoticed 
substitution' may occur of the object I intend to refer to by 
e.g. 'that man' in our earlier example. This is logically possible 
even if I am looking at the poor fellow continuously for some period 
from the time at which he fell out of the carriage; a fortiori if 
the subject is not under continuous observation and I have to pick 
him out later in an identification parade. The Trojan case 
suggested by Anscornbe is that the 'logical guarantee' of correct 
re-identification present in the case of 'I', but of no other 
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expression, is a symptom of non-reference. Unfortunately for 
Anscombe, the following two responses to her suggestion are correct: 
(i) the 'logical guarantee' of correct re-identification is 
empty, by Evans' apercu, and so cannot indicate 
J 
non-reference. 
(ii) further, there is a case for saying that if we describe the 
behaviour of the other indexicals in a relevantly similar 
way to that in terms of which we describe 'I', then we will 
obtain a similar (and similarly empty) guarantee of 'no 
unnoticed substitution' with them too. 
The second point will be dealt with at length and shortly. With 
regard to the first point, Evans writes: 
But, of course, the 'logical guarantee' is simply produced by 
Miss Anscombe's way of describing the situation, in terms of one 
and the same subject having thoughts at different times. It is 
a simple tautology that, if it is correct to describe the 
situation thus, the self-identifications are all identificat-
ions of the same self, and hence it cannot be a reason for 
anything ([1982] p. 214). 
Now, there are indeed 'mind-stretching' puzzles about the self, and 
the fact that Evans has just delivered a knock-out blow does not 
detract from the fact that this issue between Anscombe and Evans 
constitutes one of them. It raises in particularly acute form a 
problem apparent throughout the course of the Homeric Opposition -
that how you choose to say it seems to determine what you will say. 
Everything that one says about the self seems, in Evans' words, 
simply to be a product of one's way of describing the situation! 
Before we consider this defeatist response in connection with 
the stronger Trojan case, it would be well to discuss whether there 
is indeed a disparity between 'I' and the other indexicals with 
regard to the possibility of unnoticed substitution. There will be 
such a disparity as long as we fail to regard constancy of subject 
(that is, of speaker or thinker) as just another aspect of the 
context of utterance or thought. It is this context which in the 
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case of indexicals alone, must be specified before we can know the 
referent. Let us consider the contextual rules for the different 
indexicals: 
1. In order to determine what is the referent of 'I', one needs 
to know who is thinking or speaking. 
2. In order to determine what is the referent of 'here', one 
needs to know where the thought is entertained or the 
utterance made. 
3. In order to determine what is the referent of 'that 0', one 
needs to know the context which fixes the object of 
demonstration. 
Now, Anscombe assumes tautologically that in re-identification in 
the case of 'I', it is the same person who is thinking or speaking. 
If we make analogous assumptions with the other indexicals, we will 
get the same empty guarantee of correct re-identification. That is, 
if we specify that the thought is entertained or the utterance made 
in the same place, 'here'; or that it is the same context which is 
fixing the object of demonstration, 'that man', say. So the dis-
parity between the indexicals regarding 'no unnoticed substitution' 
is mere appearance. 
If this view is correct, then not only is the 'no unnoticed 
substitution' of 'I' in fact empty, but a similarly empty feature 
can be generated for other indexicals - 'an artefact of one's way of 
describing the situation', to use Evans' words. The existence of a 
genuine such parity between the indexicals would be one less reason 
for sharing the Trojan suspicions about the referring role of the 
1st-person pronoun, or for endorsing their claims about its uniquely 
non-referring role amongst the indexical expressions. 
(ii) The unique IEM guarantee and the substantial Trojan case 
But the second Trojan case is not, at first sight at any rate, 
any mere artefact of one's way of describing a subject's situation. 
This case, which I have already summarised, is not one about immun-
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ity to error in re-identification (in the sense of guaranteed 
co-reference to oneself at different times), but is about the immun-
ity to error through misidentification of certain past- and future-
tense statements made on certain grounds. Not a point about the 
reference of certain terms (nor of identification in the sense of 
reference) but a point about certain statements and their immunity 
to a certain kind of error. This case is based on the disanalogy 
between 'I' and other indexicals brought out in (IEM). To 
7 
re-iterate: It is not just that in IEM-utterances (as in all 
'I '-utterances) I refer to myself, and-that one such utterance and 
any past- or future-tense transformation of it will co-refer. That 
is the 'no unnoticed substitution' phenomenon, a reflection of the 
empty 'guaranteed reference'. Rather, it is that there will be an 
IEM-basis available for a past-tense, and often for a future-tense, 
transformation of a present-tense 1st-person I&~-judgement. Thus we 
have the idea of a persisting subject, who can at different times 
make the same statement about himself, which if he bases it on a 
certain type of ground, will not be falsifiable due to misidentif-
ication. Two examples will clarify this claim. First, to take the 
now-hackneyed example. I say, on the basis of my intention to walk 
across the Tay Bridge on a day which is not the calmest of summer, 
'My hair will be blowing in the wind (I'd better get out the Bryl-
creem)'. But I then forget to apply the famous hair-product. So, I 
walk across the Tay Bridge, reflecting on the pleasant sensation of 
my hair blowing in the wind, and give verbal expression to the 
appropriate IEM-judgement. Later I say 'My hair was blowing in the 
wind', on the basis of my recollection of the sensation. This is 
the sense of guaranteed identification over time which the Trojan is 
after. The second example is a little different. This time I do 
apply the Brylcreem, and start walking across the bridge. Unfortun-
ately a freak gust of wind picks me up and hurls me over the parapet 
- but I happen to land on the deck of a passing marmalade-carrier 
(Dundee being a leading centre for the production of this important 
foodstuff). I strike my head a glancing blow on the deck and, in a 
Baldy-type misadventure, suffer consequent amnesia. Throughout this 
extraordinary episode the Brylcreem has done its work and my hair 
never blows in the wind. However, to cut a long and tedious story 
short, I later come to believe on the basis of inaccurate testimony 
(a case of mistaken identity) that my hair had been blowing in the 
wind after all. Clearly, then, not any transformation of the 
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present-tense utterance will do; there has to be some continuity in 
the basis for the judgement. 
Now, that Evans' first application of his apercu has no 
J 
connection with IEM, and thus with the second Trojan case, is 
brought out if we consider that his criticism of Anscornbe applies to 
non-IEM utterances. If one of the gentle giants in our earlier 
example (p. 11) says 'I weigh 25 stone', and later says 'No, the 
weighing machines was rigged [sic], I only weigh 24 stone', 
there is guaranteed re-identification in the second utterance of the 
object identified in the first, but neither utterance is IEM. 
So it is the IEM of past- and future-tense transforms of 
present-tense utterances, and not this latter feature, which is 
captured in (IEM ), and as noted earlier, it does not seem to be 
6 
present in the case of 'that' (nor of other indexicals e.g. 'here'). 
We have reason, then, to doubt a comment which Evans makes on 
Wittgenstein's move from IEM to the 'no-reference' view: 
This seems to be just a mistake. For we have seen that immunity 
to error through misidentification is a straightforward 
consequence of demonstrative identification ••• [which] is, 
precisely, a way in which a thought can concern (be about) an 
object ( ibid. p. 218). 
(Though see p. 94n.) But before discussing arguments from IEM to 
'no-reference', we need to get clear the difference in behaviour 
between 'I' on the one hand, and the demonstratives (and other 
indexicals) on the other. In so doing we will examine whether 
Evans' second application of his apercu does indeed bear on the 
5 
second Trojan case. 
Two diagrams may help: 
'I am 0' 
referent 
93 
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= myself--~r-------------______________________ +-__________ ~>~ 
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'That man is 0' 
~
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,~ 
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'That man was flP 
~
No IEM 
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(ex~t 'retrospec-
/ 
tive' demonstrative 
- see p. 94n) 
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In the second diagram, X and Y may be the same person but the 
absence of a guarantee that they are is not, in the stronger case, 
the Trojan point. Rather, it is that sentences of the form 'That F 
is 0', when transformed into the past or future tense, and uttered 
on the same grounds, can never exhibit IEM. There are no grounds 
such that an utterance of that sort will carry a guarantee of IEM 
though of course many such utterances will in fact not exhibit error 
through misidentification. (A past- or future-tense demonstrative 
utterance may by itself carry the guarantee of immunity of this 
sort. 'That man was in a street-fight', said on the basis of his 
present appearance, is so immune - but IEM is not preserved over 
time, in the sense of formulation (IEM ) for the reason given on 
. 7 
94 
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pp. 25-26). In contrast, as already explained, every present-
tense IEM-judgement in the 1st-person seems to imply the potential 
for a past-tense IEM-judgement to be made on the same grounds, and 
often to look back to a future-tense IEM-judgement that could have 
been made. (This is a complex matter though. It looks as if, for 
subsequent past-tense judgements, the grounds of the present-tense 
judgement are simply preserved in recollection. But take a 
future-tense IEM-judgement made on the basis of knowledge of one's 
intention; the present-tense transform of this could not be asserted 
on the basis of intention recollected.) 
In his second application of his thought, does Evans quite 
grasp the distinction between the two Trojan cases? Does his 
argument fully meet the stronger Trojan case? Well, it is not clear 
whether Evans has really taken on board the features of IEM thus far 
outlined, and of which he subsequently gives a not dissimilar 
treatment to that of the present writer. He seems to be giving a 
'Parfit-style' objection to the phenomenon of IEM, but in a footnote 
he writes: 
My point is not to deny that there is such a thing as criterion-
less self-ascription of anticipated properties ••• But I do want 
to deny that this is a matter of a logical guarantee of an 
identity assumption ( ibid. p. 215n). 
This latter denial is intelligible, but as we shall see, it is 
false. Adopting Evans' example, take the utterance 'Tomorrow my 
hair will be blowing in the wind', made on the grounds, inter 
1 
This question of the 'retrospective demonstrative' (a 
demonstrative judgement in the past-tense which exhibits IEM) 
is a vexed one, in fact. The Trojan point, endorsed above, 
that there is no cross-temporal identification guarantee 
because a demonstrative thought is not repeatable (pp. 25-26 
above), may cause anxiety. Is the special IEM of 'I' simply 
demonstrative IEM plus the empty 'no unnoticed substitution'? 
This thought may provide a short-cut to a Greek refutation at 
what in the light of the plausible arguments in section (2.8), 
is the weak link for Trojanism. 
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alia, of intention, and thus prima facie IEM. It is, in this case, 
not necessary, nor is it possible, to exercise criteria of 
subject-identity. Evans' contention is that this criterionless 
self-ascription of anticipated properties does not mean such 
ascription cannot be mistaken, that there is a logical guarantee of 
correctness in identification involved. But as we shall see, there 
is such a logical guarantee - IEM. Evans' concessionary footnote is 
thus inadequate. 
1 (iii) Parfitian considerations 
To return to the 'Parfit-style objection'. It can be 
presented in the following way: 
Suppose someone who is an unthinking adherent of the Simple View 
of Personal Identity, makes the statement n20 years ago I fell 
out of a carriage". He makes this statement on the basis of 
2 
q-memory. But in fact, the self that suffered the 
accident is merely psychologically continuous with the speaker. 
So here is a non-IEM transformation of a judgement which, if 
made at the time of the accident, would have been IEM. 
Acquaintance with the true facts about Personal Identity, its 
limited extent and relative unimportance, will make us realise 
that the above kind of failure of past-tense IEM (and, 
analogously, future-tense IEM) is widespread. And how are we to 
know, for any particular past- or future-tense statement in the 
1st-person, whether the guarantee of IEM holds or not? 
1 
The following section was written before I had a chance 
to look at Parfit's [1984], but no substantial point seems to 
be altered by my having adverted solely to the earlier 
articles. In fact, no essential thread of the main argument 
is missed by turning now to p. 100. 
2 Q-memories are allegedly 'phenomenologically identical' 
to and caused in the same way as ordinary memories but 
originate in the experience of a person other than oneself. 
The 'Simple View' is that of Parfit's opponent as described in 
his [1971]. 
96 
Evans makes what I assume is this same point, but related to future 
self-identification, in which a Parfit-style explanation is 
implicit: 
[It may seem that] a subject [has] an infallible knowledge of 
what it is for a state of affairs to concern his own future ••• 
We might say: ••• when time It' comes, [the subject] will know 
whether or not the hypothesis that he expressed earlier by 'I'll 
be in pain at t' was or was not correct; so all he has to 
envisage, when he envisages the future state of affairs of his 
being in pain, is a future pain ••• It is not possible for the 
subject to have got hold of the wrong person at time It'. 
Evans continues: 
there is something correct about this [viz. that there is 
criterionless self-ascription of anticipated properties] 
Of course it is not possible for the subject to have got 
hold of the wrong person - as the case is described, there is a 
logical guarantee of adequacy. But this, again, is an artefact 
of our way of describing the situation: it certainly does not 
show that, just by envisaging future situations, a subject has a 
complete and clear conception of what it is for a future state 
of affairs to involve himself. The 'method of verification' has 
a presupposition ••• that the subject who exists at t and 
'remembers' the hypothesis expressed earlier is the person who 
made the hypothesis, and hence is the person whom it concerns. 
And this is something of which he can have no logical guarantee 
( ibid. pp. 214-5). 
This is a difficult point to unravel. But first, Evans does 
not make it explicit that he is dealing with IEM. True, the example 
'I'll be in pain at t' could be IEM; but it need not be. (Say I'm 
one of six prisoners, and know that at t one of us will be tortured, 
and suspect that, as the most likely informant, it will be myself. 
In this case, my grounds for believing someone will be in pain at t 
will survive the discovery that I am in fact to be released before 
time t and that it will be one of the others who will be in pain 
then.) In one sense, Evans writes, 'It is not possible for the 
subject [now] to have got hold of the wrong person at [future] time 
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t', in making his prediction - in using 'I', the subject is 
guaranteed a reference to himself. But Evans does not bring out the 
different sense in which an extra identificatory guarantee holds for 
some (viz. IEM) utterances and not others. For in the prisoner 
example, of course, it is not true that the subject, just by 
'envisaging future situations ••• has a complete and clear 
conception of what it is for a future state of affairs to involve 
himself'. 
But when the subject seems to have such a conception, both for 
future and past states - that is, in the IEM cases - must we say, 
with Evans, that this apparent truth is a mere artefact of our way 
of describing the situation? And that there is a presupposition -
that the subject who exists at t and 'remembers' the hypothesis is 
the person who made it, to use Evans' example? Is this really a 
presupposition? 
Only if we take the Parfit-style objection (a) seriously and 
(b) treat it in a certain way. The objection seems to involve 
denying that the phenomenon of IEM existsior rather, denying that 
one can know in any particular case, that the immunity obtains. 
This, on the grounds that one can identify, on the basis of 
q-memory, q-intention etc., certain past or future mental states of 
a subject in the same way that one identifies one's own, yet these 
states belong to a self merely psychologically continuous with 
oneself. Only if this is admitted as a possibility does it become a 
presupposition that the remembering subject is the hypothesising 
one; but in admitting this, the independently describable facts of 
I&~ are being denied, and it is here that the dispute lies. The 
Trojan, in his second and stronger case, has not committed the 
Anscombe fallacy uncovered by Evans' apercu. , 
I have said that the dispute is over whether the apparent 
facts of IEM do indeed hold, or whether the existence of q-memory 
etc. would limit these facts in an anti-Trojan way. But we need to 
refine the Parfitian claim before we assess the dispute. As I said 
above, we have to treat it in a certain way. Let us look back at 
(IEM ), which referred to the making of the same 1st-person 
7 
assertion at different times. But presumably 'I've just fallen out 
of the carriage' and 'I fell out of the carriage' uttered 20 years 
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later by a merely psychologically continuous self, are not the same 
assertion. Sameness of reference is required, but in fact the 
subjects are not identical. Since, the Trojan argument continues, 
the latter assertion is not a genuine transformation of the former, 
we should not expect it to be IEM. The IEM over time we are 
concerned with relates only to transformations of present-tense 
IEM-utterances. With the extinction of the self that fell out of 
the carriage (where 'self' simply means 'person'!), the original 
assertion is no longer available to be made in the 1st-person 
(though of course it can be made in the 3rd-personj unless we are 
attracted by the solipsistic strain of Trojanism). 
This Trojan defence is effective only if we say that a 
competent 'I'-user cannot be mistaken about the duration of his 
present self, the Parfitian objector will rejoin. However, the 
speaker who uses 'I' in talking of a merely psychologically 
continuous self is not using it uncomprehendingly, but simply 
mistakenly. And the consequence of this is that a comprehending 
'I'-user may not know whether some past-tense IEM utterance in the 
1st-person is a genuine transformation of some present-tense IEM 
utterance. The Trojan wants to say that, if selves are less durable 
than bodies, IEM can still apply throughout the shorter duration of 
a self. But because the Subject can be mistaken about the status of 
a 'former' or 'future self' (to use Parfit's facon de parler), 
S 
judgements in the 1st-person can be mistaken owing to an error in 
misidentification. 
It is becoming apparent that the disputants of the Trojan 
plain, and perhaps the indulgent reader too, are wearying of combat, 
but I will suggest two lines of Trojan response to this last point 
that seem to render it ineffective as a Greek objection: 
(i) The error that the subject in the example makes is one of 
reference, not identification - or, if we prefer, given the 
ambiguity of the latter term, we should say that the 
statement does not fail to exhibit IEM, but rather contains 
a term which fails to pick out its semantic referent. If we 
recall, it was stressed in our earlier account of the 
distinction between IEM and guaranteed reference, that both 
IEM and non-IEM 1st-person utterances refer to the speaker. 
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The present aberration is thus not connected with IEM. (The 
Trojan would need to show why this kind of response cannot 
be deployed, in an anti-Trojan way, in the case of 
cross-temporal demonstrative identification discussed on 
p. 94n.) 
(ii) We don't have the q-concepts which are integral to Parfit's 
account of the limits of Personal Identity. But even if we 
did, would we have to concede that, say, the kind of thing 
known on the basis of other-originating q-memory would be 
indistinguishable from the kind of thing known on the basis 
of a member of the sub-class of q-memories, 'genuine' 
memory? I might know of someone else's intention in the way 
I know of my own, but does that mean I might be mistaken 
about whether the intention was someone else's or my own? 
I am thus unconvinced that the Parfit-style objection (if Evans in 
fact endorses it) offers a serious Greek objection to the account of 
IEM from which the Trojan seeks advantage. 
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2.8) Trojan Arguments from IEM (II): The Wittgensteinian Route 
to the 'No-Reference' View 
(i) Two Trojan arguments 
What the phenomenon on which the Trojan arguments are based 
is, and what it is not, should be clear. So I will now spell out 
these arguments in detail, adverting first of all to their origin in 
that passage of the Blue Book previously mentioned (on p. 3). For 
whilst the passages in the Philosophical Remarks constitute not much 
more than an illustration of Trojanism, that in the Blue Book 
provides the basis for a justification of it. After the afore-
mentioned discussion of 'I'-as-object and 'I'-as-subject uses, 
Wittgenstein writes: 
••• it is as impossible that in making the statement nI have 
toothache" I should have mistaken another person for myself, as 
it is to moan with pain by mistake, having mistaken someone else 
for me. To say "I have pain" is no more a statement about a 
particular person than moaning is. "But surely the word 'I' in 
the mouth of a man refers to the man who says it; it points to 
himself; and very often a man who says it actually points to 
himself with his finger". But it was quite superfluous to point 
to himself. He might just as well only have raised his hand. 
The example of pain and moaning does not help to dispel the 
confusion between IEM and avowal mentioned previously (pp. 18-21); 
nor is Wittgenstein exactly expansive on the connection between IEM 
and the fact that 'I' is non-referring! Some compensating expan-
siveness on the part of the present writer is therefore called for. 
The arguments from IEM to 'no-reference' are alluded to rather 
than stated in the post-Wittgenstein literature, but it is possible 
to present two forms: 
(i) There are no criteria for, and thus no possibility of 
justification of, any identification of a subject in 1st-
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person IEM-judgements. Hence these judgements cannot 
involve an identification of (and thus reference to) a 
subject. 
(ii) One cannot fail to identify correctly the subject of 1st-
person IEM-judgements. But then there is no sense to the 
idea of succeeding in identifying (and hence referring to) 
a subject either. 
There are analogous arguments from the criterionless and incorrigib-
le self-ascription of avowable states to the non-assertoric thesis 
of avowals. This is hardly surprising in view of the structural 
similarities of IEM-judgements and avowals (viz. that avowals exhib-
it the IEM phenomenon plus a similar phenomenon applying to the 
predication component if one may so put it (see p. 23)). There is 
this difference between the conclusions of the two sets of arguments 
(the 'no-reference' and the non-assertoric theses), however. In the 
case of the non-assertoric thesis we have very strong additional 
reasons which urge its acceptance (viz. the flight from Cartesian-
ism), but in the case of the 'no-reference' thesis, there are just 
the arguments. It is this absence of a compelling motive which mak-
es the 'no-reference' view appear recherch~ and idiosyncratic, wh-
ereas in contrast the non-assertoric thesis, though commonly albeit 
mistakenly viewed as a desperate expedient, is quite intelligible. 
The first argument is less powerful. The phenomenon it refers 
to worries Strawson, however, who says it 'lies at the root of the 
Cartesian illusion' - and therefore, one may add, at the root of the 
other 'dualistic' illusion, Trojanism (see his [1959] p. 98). His 
positive account can be seen as directed against both 'illusions': 
'I' can be used without criteria of subject-identity and yet 
refer to a subject because even in such a use, the links with 
criteria are not in practice severed ([1966] p. 165). 
The links according to Strawson are: that the utterer of the 
1st-person sentence is one for whom there are empirical criteria of 
personal identity, and that he is one who would recognise such 
criteria to be applicable to himself. Well, it is rather lame of 
Strawson to plead this! Let's say a bit about the links and the 
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lameness. What Strawson seems to be driving at is something like 
the point about truth-value links already deprecated in the 
discussion of arguments from the Generality Constraint (pp. 49-50). 
For instance, say Straws on says, 'I am perambulating around Oxford'. 
There are no 'criteria of subject-identity' here (the judgement is 
1 
IEM). But there are truth-value links between this sentence 
and: 'Strawson is perambulating around Oxford' (for instance). And 
in the latter case there clearly are empirical criteria of subject-
identity. Indeed, for any 1st-person utterance Strawson or anyone 
else makes, there are truth-value links with 3rd-person utterances 
exhibiting criteria ·of subject-identity. However, if one regards 
this as a telling point against Trojanism, then that doctrine gets a 
rather short run for its money_ As has already been urged, though, 
co-reference is simply the most economical explanation of these 
links, and is not a datum. Hence, the Trojan may (and will) concede 
the applicability of such empirical criteria and their links with 
the 1st-person, without conceding that such links establish 
co-reference of 1st- and 3rd-personal expressions and the identity 
of self and person. (He may give an account in terms of verificat-
ion - see Anscombe Ope cit. p. 61.) It is not my intention to 
pursue the first argument further, however, since the second 
argument is more compelling. 
(ii) 'If you can't be wrong, you can't be right either' 
Graham Nerlich [1967] has attempted to characterise the second 
form of argument, which relies on the slogan 'if you can't be wrong, 
then you can't be right either'. He says arguments of this type 
have been common in philosophy since the publication of the 
2 
Philosophical Investigations, and cites the example of 
1 
And it is IEM that Strawson is referring to - even though 
he thinks it is limited to certain kinds of psychological 
self-ascription. 
2 
The slogan itself seems to underlie the discussion of 
sensation'S' in the course of the Private Language Argument 
(PI 258-70), and a closely related principle is clearly 
implied in the course of the later discussion of intention: 
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D.M. Armstrong, who writes 'We can speak of gaining knowledge only 
in cases where it makes sense to speak of thinking wrongly that we 
have gained knowledge' [1963]. Nerlich tries to elucidate the 
principle behind the argument, finds that it licenses absurd 
results, and offers a diagnosis: the principle involves a fallacy in 
which there is the shift of a modal operator. His version of the 
principle is the following: 
'Fx' is meaningfully applicable to cases where 'Gx' is true 
:: possibly (3y)(Gy.-Fy) ( ibid. p. 303). 
He writes that 'Armstrong has agreed, in conversation, that it 
fairly represents the principle he invoked'. It is clear that 
Nerlich did not show Armstrong the rest of the article, however; 
otherwise this doughty philosopher would surely not have made such a 
foolish admission. 
The principle is meant to underlie a form of argument employed 
by Trojanism. So it will come as no surprise that the non-cognitive 
thesis of avowals will, so Nerlich would contend, appeal to such a 
principle. And we can see by sUbstituting IX knows that he is in 
pain' for 'Fx', and 'x is in pain' for 'Gx', and similarly for 'Fy' 
and 'Gy', that the principle does have the thesis as an implication. 
Unfortunately for Armstrong & co., apparently, it also has the 
implication that we cannot say of any unmarried adult male that he 
is a bachelor (substituting 'x is a bachelor' for 'Fx', 'x is an 
unmarried adult male' for 'Gx' and so on). But of course no such 
principle can underlie the intuitively appealing form of argument in 
question. The reason for this is clear - the principle underlying 
the argument must make reference to what is required for the subject 
not just to possess some property, but to be credited with some 
achievement. The kind of achievement under consideration in the 
avowal and IEM cases is a cognitive one, and suggests the following 
principle: 
'But in the sense in which I cannot fail to will, I cannot try 
to will either' (PI 618). 
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(K) 'X knows that p' is meaningfully assertable only if possibly 
1 (p & X believes that _p) 
This principle would rule out as examples of knowledge the following 
knowledge-ascriptions: 
(i) X knows that it is he himself ('I'-reflexive) who is that 
person whose hair is blowing in the wind (where X knows 'My 
hair is blowing in the wind' on an IEM-basis). 
(ii) X knows that he is in pain. 
In the first case, clearly X can know 'My hair is blowing in the 
wind' since he may be wrong; but there can be no error in the 
identification component and it is this latter which cannot be a 
genuine item of knowledge for him, the principle implies. 
The motivation behind (K) might be, as has been implied, the 
idea that, in cognitive as well as other kinds of achievement, the 
possibility of failure is required for the notion of achievement to 
be applicable. A separate motivation arises from a suspicion 
pertaining to knowledge itself; a suspicion that apparent truths the 
obtaining of which is conceptually connected with their apprehension 
by a knowing subject are not genuine items of knowledge (or belief). 
The conceptual connection is such that the obtaining of the truth 
'Hamilton is in pain' is invariably concurrent with its apprehension 
by the subject: a remarkable fact! Perhaps this motivation has no 
force independent of (or is just an unhelpfully abstract way of 
putting) the more specific anti-Cartesian motivation, pertaining to 
the particular range of apparent knowledge-claims involving 
avowable-states: that there can be no such knowledge-claims because 
of the Cartesian incoherences they would imply. 
1 
Nerlich does consider incorporating 'belief' in his 
principle, but produces an unsatisfactory formulation and so 
rejects the idea. A principle analogous to (K), but dealing 
with assertion, is discussed below in connection with the 
non-assertoric thesis of avowals (p. 180). 
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The fact that the identification component of an IEM-judgement 
cannot properly be said to be known does not of itself establish 
that the subject-term is non-referential, of course. In any case, 
it is the immunity to error over time that ostensibly marks out the 
1st-personal non-subject-referring IEM-judgements from the rest. So 
the principle must rule out as a cognitive achievement only a 
certain kind of 'success' in identification - otherwise of course 
demonstrative identification too would be under attack. But also 
its employment in any Trojan argument must include a corollary to 
the effect that reference always involves identification. 
(iii) A first Greek response: identification can be 'passive' 
The refinement above will not be pursued directly here. 
Rather, consideration will be given to how the Greek need not be 
committed to direct refutation of the IEM arguments, since he can 
deny their implicit assumptions. These assumptions are, first (as 
already mentioned), that reference always involves identification 
1 (or that the two are essentially equivalent). And second, that 
identification is essentially something active or intentional; it 
can never be passive or non-intentional. One can never identify an 
object without, in some sense, intending to identify it (though the 
ascription of intention here may well be problematic in the way that 
ascription of intention to follow linguistic rules is problematic 
viz. because the level of description of behaviour is too basic). 
The Greek may deny the first assumption whilst agreeing with the 
second; or vice versa. Gareth Evans takes the latter course. He 
agrees with the first assumption, though not in the way the Trojan 
envisages, and attempts to distinguish two senses of 'identificat-
ion', in only the first of which is it 'active'. His remarks occur 
in the context of his criticism, considered unsatisfactory above, of 
Wittgenstein's move from IEM to 'no-reference' (see p. 92): 
In one sense, anyone who thinks about an object identifies that 
1 
It might be said that there is an argument for this view 
in Evans' deployment of 'Russell's Principle' - that reference 
requires identifying knowledge. But read on. 
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object (in thought): this is the sense involved in the use I 
have just made of the phrase 'demonstrative identification'. It 
is quite another matter ••• for the thought to involve an ident-
ification component - for the thought to be identification-
dependent. There is a danger of moving from the fact that there 
is no identification in the latter sense (that no criteria of 
recognition are brought to bear, and so forth) to the conclusion 
that there is no identification in the former sense ••• ( ibid. 
p. 218). 
Evans is claiming that, far from reference essentially involving the 
active components of identification, and failing to occur when these 
are absent (as the Trojan wants to claim), rather there is a sense 
of identification (the passive sense) in which it is equivalent to 
reference. At least, that is how his remarks may be construed if 
one takes object-direction in thought as the correlate of reference. 
Two points must be borne in mind in assessing this 'passive identif-
ication' response to the Trojan arguments: 
(i) 'Active identification' and 'passive identification' are 
just labels for concepts as yet unclear. In particular, we 
would need to be told more by Evans of what his 'identif-
ication without criteria etc.' consists in. 
(ii) Evans' comments may in fact turn out to be decisive against 
the first argument from IEM (regarding criteria), yet not 
the second. Is thinking about an object something that 
'just happens' to me? If not, and if it therefore makes 
sense to intend to think of an object and yet fail to do so, 
the familiar strictures apply in the use of identification 
qua object-direction too. 
There is in the Greek annals another attempt to show that the 
principle behind the second argument from IEM need not yield a 
Trojan conclusion. Shoemaker, in his seminal [1968], takes the 
alternative course to Gareth Evans, denying the first Trojan 
assumption that reference always involves identification - though 
the upshot is the same (viz. reference without ('active') identif-
ication). He begins by endorsing the idea that 'identification 
necessarily goes together with the possibility of misidentificat-
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ion'. Yet he also concedes (as he must) that there are predicates 
'the self-ascription of which is immune to error through misidentif-
ication' (p. 562 - indeed he originated the phrase, though without 
noting that it is certain uses of predicates which are so immune). 
He writes: 
I see nothing wrong with describing the self-ascription of such 
predicates as manifestation of self-knowledge or self-awareness 
••• the main source of the [Trojan] trouble here is a tendency 
to think of awareness as a kind of perception ••• [but] self-
awareness does not involve any sort of perception of one's self, 
i.e. does not involve what I have called 'being presented to 
oneself as an object' ••• the way out of [the] incoherence is to 
abandon completely ••• the perceptual model of self-knowledge 
( ibid. p. 563-4). 
Shoemaker goes on to argue that the existence of a class of IEM-
judgements is necessary for self-ascription to be possible at all: 
It is possible for there to be self-ascription involving self-
identification only if there are some self-ascriptions (the IEM 
ones) which do not involve self-identification. 
The case he makes need not concern us here. What is of interest is 
the way Shoemaker anticipates Evans in proposing a variety of 
self-reference (or, as he puts it, self-awareness / self-knowledge) 
without self-identification in the 'active' sense. But as with 
Evans' comments, we need to be told more about what this non-
perceptual 'non-identificatory' self-knowledge is like. On this 
question Shoemaker is silent. 
(iv) A second Greek response: 'Active' identification can be 
infallible 
I will not pursue further the option of 'passive' identificat-
ion, but return instead to the unresolved question of how the Greek 
can give an account of an 'active' identification that can never 
fail. Consider two kinds of case. First, I run a number of what 
seem to be races, and win them all. Second, I make a number of what 
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appear to be self-identifications, and make them all correctly. 
What are the explanations for these occurrences? In the first, it 
turns out that I am the only 'competitor' - so I haven't in fact 
'won' anything. What explanation of the identification case will 
prevent us saying something analogous? Well, most IEM non-avowals 
are grounded in identification of an avowable-state which is an 
immediate sensation. But the concept of sensation excludes any error 
in identification when ascribed on an immediate, transparently 
non-inferential basis rather than on the basis of behaviour - i.e. 
when self- rather than other-ascribed. (Recall Mrs. Gradgrind's 
final mistake!) The explanation of why most IEM-judgements have 
the property they do, then, is that they require the exercise of a 
distinct ability to identify sensations, which ability, in the kind 
of case under consideration, necessarily involves identification of 
the owner. This is a substantial explanation (or justification), 
unlike the simple grammatical explanation in the one-man race which 
pointed out the connection between winning and competing. It is a 
genuine explanation of success in identification which characterises 
the class of IEM-judgements independently of the property of IEM, in 
terms of their grounding in immediate sensation. 
Three points arise: 
(i) The account needs to be supplemented to cover IEM-judgements 
not grounded in sensation (e.g. expressions of desire or 
intention). 
(ii) The account is a 'grammatical' one nonetheless; it does 
nothing to establish that the continued success in 
identification is contingent (and how could it?). So the 
suspicious logical guarantee of correctness remains, the 
Trojan can urge. 
(iii) The Trojan may have a rival story to tell. 
I will first say a little about the third point. For the Trojan may 
well rejoin: 'Isn't the explanation of the "correct identification" 
simply that the concept of sensation, in the range of cases under 
consideration, makes no provision for the identification of an 
owner?' Well, this is what we would expect the Trojan to say (and 
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the fact that he can do so brings to mind the Evans-inspired 
pessimism mentioned on p. 89!). It is simply an illustration of 
his viewpoint - an alternative picture to that of the Greek. As 
such it requires supplementation with the sort of argument indicated 
by point (ii) - a circularity argument, in effect. Just what 
circularity should the Trojan point to in the Greek account? He 
might try to urge that the Greek is trying to explain incorrigible 
identification of the subject in terms of incorrigible identif-
ication of sensation - the very same problematic kind of phenomenon. 
But he would perhaps be ill-advised to try this move, for reasons to 
be discussed shortly. A better alternative would be to urge that 
the Greek is explaining IEM as it appears in the entire range of 
IEM-judgements in terms of the IEM of avowals - since this is the 
'cash-value' of the aspect of sensation dwelt on. The Greek, to 
counter this latter charge, would need to maintain that the feature 
of sensation he is pointing to (the necessary identification of an 
owner) is not just the IEM phenomenon as it applies to avowals 
(though it can be presented that way - and has been in our neutral 
characterisation, pp. 23-24 above). It is, rather, a basic, 
unexplained phenomenon, which itself explains IEM. 
I will not say anything further on this dispute, nor indeed on 
the arguments from IEM. The arguments remain attractive, their 
consequences - in terms of the disunity introduced into our account 
of 'I' - less so. The inconclusiveness of this state of affairs 
should not be too worrying however - since Trojanism as thus far 
considered (i.e. the 'no-reference' view of 'I') is an unstable 
position. Recall the charge which it was claimed above that the 
Trojan might be ill-advised to make - viz. that the Greek is trying 
to explain incorrigible identification of the subject in terms of 
incorrigible identification of sensation. Well, to this there is 
the following Greek riposte: 'You claim to find difficulty in the 
notion of incorrigible self-identification. Very well, then I pose 
the following dilemma. Either you must accept that analogous 
arguments apply in the case of incorrigible identification of 
sensation - in which case you are committed to the non-assertoric 
thesis of avowals (which is, of course, anathema). Or else you must 
drop them in the case of self-identification. Your current position 
is therefore quite unstable'. 
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It does seem that the riposte is justified - and indeed that 
the 'no-reference' view of 'I' is unstable, though not perhaps in 
the sense that the Greek portrays it. What the riposte establishes 
is that Trojanism must at least include a non-assertoric account of 
avowals. This is because it is hard to see how, with neither the 
identification nor the predication component referring, an avowal 
could be an assertion. (Though the converse would not hold - that 
an avowal is not an assertion does not imply its components are 
non-referential.) It is difficult, then, to see how the 'no-
reference' view can be assessed in isolation then - we will need to 
move on to discuss the non-assertoric account of avowals. However, 
the fact that the Trojan case thus far remains 'not proven', 
combined with the non-Trojan outcome of the later discussion of 
avowals, justifies the Greek stance of the chapter in between - on 
Self-Consciousness. 
CHAPTER 
THREE 
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It is the task of this chapter to elucidate the self-reference 
of 'I'. The bipartisan policy of Chapter 1 is now clearly abandon-
ed, and we are adopting the Greek perspective; but all the phenomena 
to be discussed would need to be acknowledged by any Trojan diehard. 
(The resolution this implies pertains only to the first part of the 
Homeric Opposition - the validity of a 'Trojanism of avowals' has 
yet to be decided, of course.) An understanding of the self-refer-
ence of 'I' is clearly fundamental to an understanding of self-
consciousness; but it is only the first step. It would be an 
impossible task to deal with the general topic of self-consciousness 
within the one chapter which is all that can be allotted. Beyond 
self-reference, some consideration will be given to the role of IEM 
in the constitution of self-consciousness, but more than that will 
not be attempted. The question of the relation of self-conscious-
ness to 'consciousness' or sentience, and of the range of capacities 
required for the former, is left almost wholly untouched. Clearly, 
however, the discussion of avowal in Chapter 4 must have a major 
bearing on these questions. 
Any account of the self-reference of 'I' must begin with the 
feature indicated by Anscombe and already discussed in Chapter 2 -
the feature missing in the fortuitous self-reference of Oedipus and 
Emma. The self-reference effected by 'I' is one in which the 
speaker knows and intends that he refers to himself ('I'-reflexive). 
When this circularity-inducing requirement is satisfied, let us talk 
(following Nozick, pp. 113-14 below) of reflexive self-reference (as 
in 'indirect reflexive', 'token-reflexive', etc.). 
How should one try to spell out what 'reflexive self-refer-
ence' entails? The chapter begins with Nozick's account. Quite 
lengthy but justifiably impatient consideration is given to this 
depressing account, and then we move on to the more fruitful ground 
of Anscombe's discussion. Here, the points made in Chapter 2 are 
taken up and developed further. The problem of circularity is 
treated and the self-reference principle of Evans is discussed. 
Finally, there is discussion of Anscombe's 'A'-users, whose self-
reference is allegedly not self-conscious. 
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3.1) Nozick on 'Reflexive Self-Reference' 
(i) 'Self-reference' and 'auto-reference' 
Nozick in his [1981] attempts to explain reflexive self-
reference and thereby reflexive self-knowledge (pp. 71-114). This 
account and (so I am told - I could not manage any more) the rest of 
the book exhibit the author's characteristic self-indulgence to a 
grotesque degree - sloppy, careless, little evidence of editing, at 
times incoherent, often tasteless - the whole being informed by the 
peculiar idea that the most interesting facts are the facts about R. 
Nozick himself. Nevertheless it is probably worth enduring the 
resultant battering of one's sensibilities in order to seize upon 
the author's one undoubted equivocation and upon the few grainy 
pearls deep-buried in the bloated oystery mass. 
The equivocation comes at the beginning and it is a serious 
one from which the account does not really recover. My present 
purpose is therefore really diagnostic; also the recovery of 
accidental insight. Nozick wants to explain the difference between 
self-conscious or 'reflexive' self-reference and fortuitous self-
reference as in our 'Emma' example (p. 58) or in Oedipus' search for 
'the person whose acts have brought trouble to Thebes'. He writes: 
For a person X to reflexively self-refer is not merely for X to 
use a term that actually refers to X; this omits as internal to 
the act of referring that it is himself to which he refers 
( ibid. p. 72). 
This is of course familiar from our discussion of Anscombe (pp. 58-
62); but note that it is the person who is self-referring. Nozick 
seems to forget this fact when he goes on to postulate a class of 
reflexively self-referring terms : 
Some indexical terms have a reference that not only varies with 
the context of their utterance, but also depends essentially on 
the very utterance in which they appear: for example, "this 
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very phrase" refers to that phrase itself, and "I ••• " refers to 
the producer of that token itself. Let us call such linguistic 
devices reflexively self-referring. 
I will turn shortly to the idea that, equivocation apart, there may 
be something in what Nozick writes; but first let us conclusively 
establish that there is an equivocation. He attempts to explicate 
'reflexive self-reference' first in terms of the joint requirement 
of rigidity of reference (as used in the actual world, the 
expression refers in any possible world to that very same thing it 
actually refers to in the actual world), and (in virtue of the 
term's sense) necessary self-reference. This is inadequate, Nozick 
contends, because of the counter-example of self-reference via Godel 
numbering ( ibid. p. 75), so he goes on to consider the more 
promising idea of 'reference from inside', of which more anon. Here 
he is clearly talking of self-referring terms : 
With reflexive self-reference, it follows from - is part of -
the sense that the term necessarily self-refers in virtue of a 
feature bestowed in the token act of referring ( ibid. p. 76). 
Yet shortly afterwards, Nozick asks 
••• to explain how 'I' refers, must we use the notion of 
reflexive self-reference, speaking of someone producing a token 
with the intention of reflexively self-referring? 
In this case it is the speaker who is self-referring. Let us call 
the phenomenon of the self-referring expression, 'auto-reference', 
reserving 'self-reference' for 'I' etc. Since it seems to preclude 
the possibility of determinate truth-conditions, auto-reference is a 
worrying thing; but it is not yet apparent that 1st-person 
utterances are infected with it - and in any case, we must first be 
aware of the distinction between self- and auto-reference. 
Is there anything in Nozick's account thus far, despite the 
equivocation? Is there nevertheless something in common between 'I' 
and 'this very phrase' which illuminates the idea of reflexive self-
reference? Regrettably, not as Nozick explains it there isn't. To 
return to his original explanation - 'I' is meant to have a refer-
ll5 
ence that varies not only with the context of utterance, but which 
also depends essentially on the very utterance in which it appears 
(as does that of 'this very phrase'). Well, the context is: who the 
speaker is. Just as the context for 'here' is: where the speaker 
is. In the case of 'I', there does not seem to be any further 
'essential dependence' of the reference on the very utterance in 
which 'I' appears. Insofar as there is such a dependence, it is 
1 
simply a dependence on: who makes the utterance. 
'But I've shown the difference between the reflexive self-
reference of "I" and ordinary indexical reference by means of my 
brilliant notion of "reference from the insideR, haven't I?' pleads 
Nozick. 'You haven't said much about that yet, have you!' Insofar 
as one can make sense of this notion, it does not, unfortunately, 
seem to mark out a distinction between 'I' and other indexicals. 
'Outside references', we are told 
••• pick out their referent in virtue of some property or feature 
it independently has, a feature it has independently of being 
referred to then. Whereas, reference from the inside ••• is 
peculiarly internal to the act of referring since that act 
refers in virtue of a feature created by or produced in that 
very act itself. 
Nozick continues: 
The act of referring is sufficient to bestow [that feature] but 
may the referent also have it independently, apart from the act 
of referring? ( ibid. pp. 75-76) 
Since the feature is, presumably, 'being the producer of the lst-
person utterance', the question looks unintelligible; but be that as 
it may, Nozick fortunately declares that 'We need not decide this 
now'. It is difficult not to become impatient in the face of such 
high-powered garbage, but it should be clear that, using the given 
1 
Specifying the context in this way showed that there is 
no disparity between the indexicals in respect of 'no 
unnoticed substitution' either (pp. 89-90). 
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account, 'here', 'now' etc. will also 'refer from the inside'. If I 
say, standing outside Nozick's office at Harvard, 'There's a great 
philosopher working here', I will be referring to the vicinity of 
Nozick's office in virtue of a feature bestowed on it by the very 
act of reference itself - being the place where the 'here'-utterance 
is made. If I go on to say, uncharitably, and sotto voce, 'Actually 
he's not so good now', I will be referring to the time (around 1986, 
say) in virtue of a feature bestowed on it by the very act of 
reference itself - being the occasion when the utterance is made. 
(If I am indeed 'referring' to it at all.) 
These considerations point to the fact that what makes 'I' 
different from the other indexicals like 'here' is not some feature 
it has in common with 'this very phrase', but a feature it has in 
common with personal proper names when used by their referents 
viz. self-reference in the sense of reference to oneself. When it 
is realised that the alleged 'dependence on the very utterance' is 
not a shared feature of 'I' and 'this very phrase', the need for 
Nozick's subsequent account of the 'I' 'synthesised in the very act 
of reflexive self-reference' is undermined. The 'performative' 
aspect of 'I' is something shared with 'here' - but it is absurd to 
talk of 'place-synthesis in the very act of reflexive place-
reference' (see below - p. 120). 
This is not to say that the metaphor 'from the inside' may not 
be suggestive. It might be proposed that to use 'I' is to engage in 
an act of 'performative self-reference'. And there is a line of 
argument to Nozick's conclusion which, though it rests on several 
questionable assumptions, may be worth representing - as an indicat-
ion of the kind of work a supporter of Nozick would need to do. It 
goes as follows: 
(1) 'I' and 'The producer of this very token' are (in some 
sense) equivalent in meaning. 
So (2) (T ) 'I am immobile' may be rendered as (T ) 'The 
1 2 
producer of this very token is immobile'. 
(3) In (T ) (a) 'The producer of this very token' refers to 
2 
the speaker (self-reference); (b) 'This very token' refers 
to (T ) (auto-reference). 
2 
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(4) The reference in (a) is achieved by dint of the reference in 
(b). 
(5) So is the reference in (T ) (somehow). 
1 
It will be difficult to make out (4) and (5), and I do not propose 
to try here; it should further be noted that Nozick himself would 
probably be unhappy with (1) (see p. 118 below). 
(ii) A muddle over IEM and 'reflexive access' 
In the light of the vitiating equivocation at the outset, it 
is embarrassing to have to retail the seriousness with which the 
subsequent self-synthesising tour de force has been taken. W. 
Richards gives a favourable account of it in his [1984] ('admi~ably 
lucid'(!)), whilst Richard Rorty speaks of ' ••• an intriguing 
1 
quasi-Fichtean theory about the self as "self-synthesiser"'. 
Actually the account is intriguing, but not in the sense in which 
Rorty means it. Our present purpose is again diagnostic. What is 
going on behind this bizarre piece of philosophising? 
In fact, between his equivocatory account and the self-
synthesising tour de force, Nozick does raise an interesting 
question, though he makes a muddle of it. • Self-synthesis , is a 
product of the equivocation and the muddle. The question is this: 
How is reflexive self-knowledge possible? What is the status of the 
self-knowledge expressed in reflexive self-reference? Nozick 
approaches this by asking 'How do I know I am referring to myself 
(when I reflexively self-refer)?' 
Any adequate explanation of this knowledge appears, according 
to Nozick, to be circular. If I say 'I am in Cambridge', my 
knowledge that it is I who is referred to cannot be captured by 
substituting some descriptive expression for 'I'. It would always 
1 
Article in 'London Review of Books' (20/5/82). 
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be possible for the subject to fail to realise his identity with the 
referent of that description: 
Is my knowledge, "I am in Cambridge", captured by my knowing ••• 
"this very producer of this very token is in Cambridge"? Yet 
this knowledge cannot consist in my knowing that the producer of 
the first part of that token referred to himself, for that 
involves the same problem of no guarantee that I (reflexively) 
know that I produced it ••• We need to add the very phenomenon 
to be understood: his knowing that he himself produced the 
token ( ibid. pp. 80-81). 
This problem of Nozick's is, as far as I can tell (he rambles), the 
very same as Anscombe's problem of how to characterise the meaning 
of 'I' in terms employing the indirect reflexive (see pp. 58-62). 
(Though it is not the only problem to which Nozick seems to think 
self-synthesis offers the solution - see p. 122.) 
The problem provokes from Nozick a shoddy collection of half-
baked thoughts which shows that he has not really understood the 
post-Shoemaker literature on IEM. He concludes, from the insuffic-
iency of anything but a circular account of reflexive self-
reference, that 'we must each have a kind of access to ourselves 
which is not via a term or referring expression, not via knowing 
that a term holds true (of something or other)' (p. 81). Well, 'I' 
itself may surely be such a 'referring expression'; but what Nozick 
seems to be groping for (mistakenly, as it will turn out) is the 
phenomenon of IEM. Later, he refers to IEM explicitly and says that 
it is incompatible with a 'pre-existing I' ( ibid. p.90). He says 
that there may be some way of observing oneself which cannot be used 
to observe anything else: 
On this view, I know it is I who is in pain, by observing in 
that particular way that someone is in pain (And concluding that 
it must be I?). 
But this does not fit reflexive self-reference that is non-
psychological: 
Moreover, my knowing that someone or other observes himself in 
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pain in this way does not constitute my knowing that I am the 
one who so observed himself. Reflexive access to ourselves, 
thus, cannot be a special mode of relating to ourselves as 
objects ( ibid. p. 81). 
It is doubtful that any self-respecting adherent of the Greek view 
will be troubled by these arguments. It can hardly be denied that 
there is a mode of self-observation which is sui generis. But 
clearly, when, by means of it, I 'observe' that someone is in pain 
(if that is not a tendentious formulation), I thereby know that I am 
that someone (I do not need to 'conclude' this) (see (IEM ), 
4 
p. 8). Of course, my knowing that someone observes himself in that 
special way, does not constitute my knowing that I am that one (as 
Nozick puts it in the last passage just quoted). But my 'observing' 
someone in that way does involve knowing that I am that one. And to 
the Greek, of course, 'reflexive access' just is a mode of relating 
to ourselves as objects. 
But we haven't teased out Nozick's puzzle. What of the non-
IEM reflexive self-references, e.g. 'I was born in Brooklyn'? The 
reflexive self-reference there cannot be explained in terms of IEM. 
May I infer this judgement from IEM-judgements, though? But to talk 
in this way is to go on running together the ideas of IEM and 
reflexive self-reference as Nozick's careless account has been 
suggesting. Really, all the talk of special modes of self-
observation which are IEM is beside the point here~ If I know that 
I 'observe' someone in a way that is IEM, I know that it is myself 
that I 'observe'. But if I know that someone observes himself in an 
IEM way, clearly I do not know simply on that basis that it is 
myself who is observed. Nozick's original point is correct; reflex-
ive self-reference cannot be explained without recourse to 'I' -
there is no description under which I am guaranteed to recognise the 
identity of myself with the referent except 'I'. And this has 
nothing to do with IEM. This fact Nozick seems not to appreciate -
both in his remarks just discussed and in his later positive account 
1 
of self-synthesis. 
1 
Despite noting that there are reflexively self-referring 
judgements which are non-IEM, Nozick later treats his self-
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I said before that the self-synthetic tour de force is a 
product of the equivocation and a later muddle. The equivocation 
ensures that Nozick fails to perceive that the consequences he draws 
from the behaviour of 'I' could equally be drawn from the behaviour 
of 'here, 'now' etc. 'Self-synthesis in the very act of reflexive 
self-reference' means synthesis of a self in that very act. Why not 
talk of 'Place-synthesis in the very act of reflexive place-
reference', then? The reason is that Nozick's account has a 
Cartesian plausibility - which place-synthesis doesn't! If one is 
in a Cartesian frame of mind, it might seem that his account offers 
an explanation of the knowledge-gap between 'I am F' and 'The 0 is 
1 
F' • But in fact self-synthesis only seems like an explanation 
of this phenomenon if one muddles up reflexive self-reference with 
the expression of a mode of self-knowledge. There is, in fact, no 
one special mode of access of oneself characteristic of reflexive 
self-knowledge - rather, there are several different modes some of 
which generate IEM and some of which don't, but in all of which the 
Oedipus mistake is not possible. A fortiori, one cannot conclude, 
as Nozick does, that not only do we have a special 'reflexive access 
to ourselves', but that, moreover, it is not 'a special mode of 
relating to ourselves as objects' ( ibid. p. 81). 
(iii) The self-synthetic 'tour de force' 
The over-emphasis on the performative aspect of reflexive 
self-reference, and the muddle over reflexive self-knowledge as a 
mode of self-knowledge which is IEM, lead Nozick to present his 
self-synthetic 'solution' to the problem of reflexive self-
knowledge. He does this under duress - driven to 'entertain 
(but not quite to endorsing it yet)', as the only solution to the 
'intractable problem'. He has already rejected two other solutions. 
One of these is even crazier than self-synthesis; it is the idea 
that 'the self places itself into its reflexive self-referrings'. 
This seems to be the idea that 'I' is identical with a self - which 
synthetic account as an explanation of IEM - partially mis-
construed as guaranteed reference of 'I' (see below p. 122). 
1 
See above, pp. 117-8. 
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itself takes the place of e.g. 'Hamilton' in 'Hamilton is tired' 
when said by me: 
By putting itself into the blank, mentally stepping forward into 
the space ('--- is tired') (as in the dance where "you put your 
whole self inn) the self, we are imagining, succeeds in 
referring to itself ( ibid. p. 83). 
Such an account calls for psychiatric rather than philosophical 
diagnosis; and as such is beyond the competence of the present 
writer. 
The other rejected account is more attractive, however; it is 
that reflexive self-knowledge is a 'basic phenomenon'. Shorn of its 
Nozickian excrescences, this amounts to the view discussed on 
pp. 132-34 that there is a non-vicious circularity in the explan-
ation of the indirect reflexive from which 'I' is ineliminable. 
That is, self-consciousness must be manifested in and constituted by 
the use of a linguistic device with the features of the 1st-person. 
This view acquires greater plausibility when we examine the 
rival substantial account involving self-synthesis. Nozick begins 
with the act of reflexive self-reference, characterised as 'this 
very act of reflexive self-reference'. In attempting to 'draw 
boundaries' round this act, we may be tempted to search for a 
'pre-existing entity, the doer' - if we are attracted to the 'agent 
theory' that every act has a doer. (One may question whether this 
is a theory, but never mind.) On this theory, 'I' is equivalent to 
'this very act's doer'. But: 
If we start with a separate pre-existing I, and a reflexive 
reference to 'this very act's doer', there will be the problem, 
familiar by now, of the nature of my knowledge that I = this 
very act's doer. I know it by doing the act, but how do I know 
that the pre-existing I is the doer of that reflexive act? 
( ibid. p. 87). 
Well, 'the problem' may be familiar to Nozick, but he has not taken 
sufficient trouble to make it familiar to his readers. What exactly 
-
is the problem now? By this point we are in a position to identify 
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three contenders: 
(i) (Suggested earlier - see p. 118.) How can reflexive self-
reference or self-knowledge be explained non-circularly, 
i.e. without recourse to the 1st-person? 
(ii) What is the explanation of IEM? 
(iii) What is the explanation of the guaranteed reference of 'I'? 
To the first, the answer may just be 'It can't' - as suggested 
above. It is not yet clear how self-synthesis provides the answer, 
in any case. That the question is the second, is suggested by 
Nozick's later remarks to the effect that 'a pre-existing I' is 
incompatible with IEM - which can therefore only be explained by 
self-synthesis. He muddles together the second and third question 
when he goes on from these remarks to say: 
Only an object synthesised by the act of referring is guaranteed 
to be hit by that act. Only a theory of such a synthesised self 
can explain why, when we reflexively self-refer, we know it is 
ourselves to which we refer ( ibid. p. 90). 
We have already had occasion to observe the effects of conflating 
IEM and 'guaranteed reference' (pp. 10-12); no more need be said on 
this mistake here. It should be clear how Nozick thinks the second 
and third questions can be solved by self-synthesis. The first 
question would be 'solved' in the following way, presumably: To 
refer to oneself reflexively is not to refer to a pre-existing 
object of which I know that it is I; but rather to synthesise such 
an object. (But this doesn't remove the circularity; and I think 
Nozick has probably dropped this question.) 
What precisely is self-synthesis? Nozick vacillates. He asks 
whether we can say that what performed the reflexive act was the 
entity which the act synthesised: 
Can the rabbit be pulled out of the rabbit? It is some such 
theory as this that Fichte presents; he speaks of the self as 
positing itself, also of the self as positing itself as 
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positing itself ••• Is there really no pre-existing self 
independent of the act A of reflexive synthesis? Can the 
o 
self really be a Fichtetious object? ( ibid. p. 89). 
It must be so if the self-synthetic account is to be a solution to 
the problems Nozick has set himself; yet he draws back from its 
evident absurdity by talking, not wholly intelligibily, of a current 
synthesis affecting a later synthesis as a 'non-binding precedent': 
A fresh creative act is not necessary with each act of reflexive 
self-reference. Usually, the self habitually follows the 
earlier precedents ••• Sometimes self-reference will occur more 
self-consciously, a self will step back from habit to consider 
its nature ( ibid. p. 89). 
It seems that for someone concerned to expose the illusion of pre-
existing selves, Robert Nozick is rather too knowledgeable about 
their activities and predilections! But the provenance of his 
knowledge is uncertain. He concludes his account of self-synthesis 
with the throwaway remark, in Humean vein, that the 'delineation' of 
the boundaries of the act of reflexive synthesis 
might give rise to the illusion that the reference is to an 
independently pre-existing and bounded entity ( ibid. 
1 
p. 90). 
1 
Nozick refers to Hume's 'bundle of perceptions' when he 
floats, as an afterthought, the view of the self as a 
property. In virtue of having the property (P) of being 
reflexively self-referring, I also have the property of being 
I. The implications of this view for Nozick's own conception 
are presented with refreshing directness: 
The property of being I came into existence at a certain 
time in virtue of the property P being instantiated in 
what arose from the fertilisation of Sophie Cohen 
Nozick's ovum by Max Nozick's sperm, a fact for which I 
am very grateful ibid. p. 113). 
But the view of self as property is rejected on the, for 
Nozick, I would think, insufficient grounds that it 'seems 
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This really is the most extraordinary flight of fancy, 
unanchored by any kind of appeal to empirical fact or responsible 
philosophical argument. The theoretical apparatus of 'classificat-
ion' and 'entification' attendant on the 'serious' notion of self-
synthesis is a wonder to behold; it is called into being (or maybe 
it synthesised itself) as a result of Nozick's awareness of the 
obvious objection to his account. This is one made explicitly by 
Richards in his [1984J 
••• hasn't Nozick ••• smuggled into the first stage of self-
synthesis an underlying unity, which is both essential to the 
process and has a 1st-person nature? ( ibid. p. 156). 
This is of course the pre-existing agent which performs the act of 
self-synthesis. Richards believes that the account can work despite 
his criticism, and goes on to offer an unconvincing Nozickian 
supplement drawing on Castaneda's Guise Theory ( ibid. pp. 158-165). 
Nozick himself misappropriates Lichtenberg, the first Trojan, in 
support of the idea that just as thinking can be going on without a 
subject, so can acting ( ibid. pp. 87 and 93). But Lichtenberg was 
concerned to show what, on Cartesian grounds, one is entitled to 
assert about thoughti if one doubts the existence of others, one is 
not entitled to the distinction between self and others. But this 
does not demonstrate the intelligibility of subjectless thought (let 
alone action). 
Mention of Lichtenberg brings us to the heart of the diagnosis 
of self-synthesis. For in his espousal of subjectless action, and 
in his rejection of a persisting substantial self, Nozick's view may 
seem to have deep affinities with Trojanism. This is indeed SOi but 
its affinities with Cartesianism are deeper. To the committed 
Labour Party supporter Social Democrats and Liberals are 'pink 
Tories'; and to the committed Greek, Trojans are 'pink Cartesians'. 
So the assertion of the dual affinity of self-synthesis with the two 
anti-Greek positions should come as no surprise. 
like a bit of philosophical chicanery, too much froth and too 
little substance' (ho, ho) ( ibid. p. 114). 
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Let us spell out these compressed remarks. Trojanism and 
Cartesianism each offer substantive metaphysical responses to the 
existence of the linguistic peculiarities of 'I' which have been 
under discussion (IEM, guaranteed reference, privileged access, 
etc.). Self-synthesis is clearly a similar responsej and it 
amounts, I think, to a 'solipsism of the present moment' which is 
the end-result of the Cartesian way. Anscombe's objection to the 
Cartesian res cogitans expounded on p. 68 comes to mind; viz. that 
its identity persists for the duration of the thought-episode only 
(which is no time at all). And as noted, the trouble does not stop 
there; for the self required by Descartes and postulated by Nozick 
as self-synthesised can have no criteria of individuation as well as 
none of identity (see p. 68). I said above that Nozick thinks he 
can make play with the idea of subjectless action; but if this idea 
is denied him, how was it that the Trojan's espousal of subjectless 
thought was accorded a degree of respect? Well, on the Trojan 
account the subject of reflexively self-referential acts is clearly 
identifiable; it is a person, a persisting, embodied subject. In 
the case of the present writer, that subject can be referred to by 
means e.g. of 'Hamilton'; but not by means of 'I'. Hamilton is a 
subject of thoughts and experiences; but he is not referred to when 
he says 'I am thinking of terminating this discussion'. The Trojan 
view is of course plagued with difficulties - and indeed the mili-
tant Trojan (see p. 50) may have special problems in accommodating 
the concept of a person as a subject of experiences. But these 
difficulties are simply multiplied when instead of saying no object 
is referred to by 'I', we say that a 'self-synthesised object' is 
referred to. Nozick's self-synthesis is indeed a limiting case of 
'a cloud of philosophy condensed in a drop of grammar'; or should it 
be 'a cloud of conceit ••• '? 
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3.2) 'Fortuitous' and 'Aware' Self-Reference; the Circularity of 
the Self-Reference Principle 
(i) Anscombe's 'striking phenomenon' 
It might be thought that a good way into reflexive self-
reference is via consideration of the question favoured by Anscombe 
and insisted on by her at some length in Elizabeth Anscombe und der 
Bangor Kreis (see Appendix ) - viz. what is it that someone real-
ises when he comes to know that the person he has been referring to 
by some name or description is in fact himself? What is it that 
Oedipus realises when he comes to know that it is he himself who has 
brought trouble to Thebes, or Emma, when it dawns on her that it is 
she herself who has brought about the spring in Mr. Knightley's 
step? Such cases can be very striking, especially when, as in the 
Oedipus example or those in der Bangor Kreis, the subject has no 
idea, before the dawning of self-knowledge, who the referent may be. 
Two salient grammatical facts which these cases bring out (the first 
has already been discussed) are these: 
(i) There is no sufficient yet non-circular account of the self-
reference of 'I'. 
(ii) 'I'-statements are not reducible to statements which do not 
use 'I'. 
The first is insisted on by Anscombe, as we have seen; the second is 
1 
endorsed by Nozick ( Ope cit. ) and Perry [1979]. (It might be 
questioned how far (ii) is acceptable to Trojanism and therefore 
whether it is a 'grammatical fact'; certainly it conflicts with 
Wittgenstein's Philosophical Remarks account. But this matter will 
1 
In addition to the passage quoted above (p. 118), Nozick 
also discusses how 'I'-statements are not deducible solely 
from non-'I'-statements - the converse phenomenon to non-
reducibility ( ibid. p. 73). 
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not be pursued here.) The non-reducibility of 'I'-statements is 
manifested in our knowledge-attributions to subjects. If I know 
that I am in hospital, it doesn't follow that I know that Andrew 
Hamilton is in hospital - the reason for my being there might be 
Korsakov's Syndrome caused by a stress-related alcoholism of the 
protracted final stages of thesis-completion. It might even be 
possible that there are no identifying descriptions of myself that I 
1 
know, and which therefore could be substituted for 'I'. 
In fact, the striking phenomenon which Anscombe is excited 
about ( der Bangor Kreis p. 238) is not peculiar to self-conscious-
ness. Enver Hoxha, long-time and wily post-war ruler of Albania, 
made the horrifying discovery that his equally long-time deputy of 
40 years, Mehmet Shehu, had all along been in the pay of, at various 
times, the Gestapo, the CIA, the KGB, MIS, and the Italian and 
2 
Yugoslav secret services. How extraordinary, then, was the 
discovery expressed by 'It is my trusted aide, Mehmet Shehu, who has 
brought trouble to Albania!' A husband becomes convinced that his 
wife is having an affair. Imagine his awful realisation 'It is my 
best friend with whom my wife is having an affair'. A shadowy 
figure, known only by the presumed effects of his presumed actions, 
suddenly stands revealed in broad daylight - as someone very close 
to one. It is true that he is described as 'my aide', 'my friend', 
so a certain range of feelings and attitudes becomes appropriate. 
The realisation 'It is the Chancellor of the Exchequer with whom my 
wife is having an affair', though also striking in its way, would 
not normally invoke the same feelings of betrayal. But these 
1 
Nozick considers, as a possible synonym, 'this very 
producer of this very token' - and rejects it because there is 
'no guarantee that I (reflexively) know that I produced it' 
( ibid. p. 80). See also p. 118 above. 
2 
Or so Hoxha claimed. Shehu's apparently stalwart support 
as deputy leader in the People's Republic would be explained 
as 'deep cover'. Whether the discovery was in fact prompted 
solely by the great Albanian's paranoia is beyond the scope of 
the present work (see The Artful Albanian: Memoirs of Enver 
Hoxha, London 1986 (pp. 327-37) - a remarkable exercise in 
self-justification). 
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feelings, though self-regarding, are not prompted by a discovery 
about oneself, but about another; which however exhibits just that 
strikingness of the Oedipus example. Oedipus now refers to himself 
self-consciously rather than fortuitously; but do we need to say 
'what his realisation consists in', as Anscombe implies, any more 
than we need to say what Hoxha's realisation consists in? 'They now 
know the identity of the perpetrator of the troubles' seems to 
capture the realisation in both cases. 
What is striking about the self-conscious cases seems to 
extend to 3rd-personal discoveries too, then. Further, many self-
conscious cases are not that striking - when they betoken no 
dramatic self-discovery. Emma discovers that she is the object of 
Mr. Knightley's love - as much a discovery about Mr. Knightley as 
about herself. But one may say here that she is finding out about 
love as much as that she is finding out about herself. (Those who 
are most struck by 'voyages of self-discovery' and the like, 
particularly as pertaining to themselves, generally possess the 
idlest and weakest minds which can find little of greater importance 
to dwell on.) To take a more mundane example: The present writer 
searched the basement of the Philosophy Department at St. Andrews 
University to find the source of a curious squeaking noise. Rodents 
perhaps? They proved elusive until he realised that he himself was 
making the noise - his boots had let in water under the heel and 
were squeaking as they dried out. A self-conscious realisation -
but the most important discovery was about the properties of certain 
footwear. 
The preceding remarks about Oedipus and Hoxha may serve to 
cast doubts on our original idea: that self-consciousness will be 
illuminated by considering the difference between fortuitous and 
reflexive self-reference. 'Well', it may be said, 'undoubtedly 
reflexive self-reference is integral to self-consciousness (though 
we've yet properly to characterise the former notion); but all that 
the examples of self-conscious realisation serve to bring out is the 
difference between fortuitous and "aware n reference, which happens 
to be to oneself but is equally manifest in the 3rd-personal exam-
ples. Consequences for his own thought and action follow from 
Oedipus' realisation; but equally, consequences for his own thought 
and action follow from Hoxha's. The possibility of fortuitous 
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reference follows simply from the fact that the singular terms in 
question have a sense as well as a reference; we have said next to 
nothing about self-conscious self-reference just by saying it is 
non-fortuitous.' 
This response presupposes (to put it as vaguely as it is 
possible to do) that there is something 'special' about self-
consciousness. This is a feeling which it is hard to deny! But 
it would be wrong to think that many of the constituents of self-
consciousness might not, by themselves, be quite 'ordinary', and 
encountered in one's consciousness of others. Thus, 'reflexive 
self-reference' may just be 'aware' self-reference. In cashing out 
the latter notion, however, it will be apparent that not a lot is 
being said about self-consciousness. This is because, of course, 
'aware' self-reference is self-reference plus the circularity-
inducing requirements already discussed (pp. 58-62). What are we to 
make of the alleged circularity of the 'self-reference principle'? 
(ii) Is the self-reference principle circular? 
The principle, obvious enough to all appearances, in fact 
requires lengthy and careful presentation. It is fundamental to any 
account of self-consciousness. Although the 'no-reference' view has 
been abandoned, the diagnosis of the motivation for the viewpoint it 
expresses may still with profit be engaged in. Anscornbe, we recall, 
is worried about circularity. 'If the self-reference principle is 
circular, it tells us nothing about self-consciousness. Attempts to 
build something substantial on its foundations are vertiginous. We 
must abandon it therefore - together with the Greek view it express-
es'. - This seems to be her underlying view. When one examines the 
self-reference principle, one cannot but have some sympathy for this 
view. But, as Evans says, 'nevertheless [the] principle ••• must be 
respected'. 
The precise questions to be considered now are these: 
(i) Is the principle in fact circular? 
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(ii) If it is, what is the significance of this fact? Is the 
circularity 'vicious'? 
Related to these is the further question: 
(iii) To what extent is the self-reference principle meant to 
capture the idea of self-consciousness? Would Anscombe's 
1 
'A', as well as 'I', fall under the principle? 
The circularity in the self-referential account, it will be 
recalled, consisted in the following. In the definition 
'I' is the word each one uses (a) to refer to some person, 
(b) knowing and intending that person to be himself 
the knowledge and intention can be specified only by using the lst-
person. What must the subject know and intend? 'That I am the 
person referred to (by "I")' (see p. 61). The matter of circularity 
is discussed by Evans in an 'Appendix' to his chapter on self-
identification in his [1982], and it is to this that we now turn. 
This 'Appendix' contains some of Evans' deepest and most 
suggestive remarks on self-consciousness. But its opening 
criticisms of Anscombe are not satisfactory as they stand. Evans 
takes her circularity objection seriously, and seeks to demonstrate 
non-circularity (rather than showing that circularity doesn't 
matter). He writes: 
It is perfectly possible to ascribe to a subject the intention 
to refer to himself, in the sense of the intention of bringing 
it about that he satisfies the one-place concept-expression 
'(refers to ~'. Of course intending to satisfy [this] ••• 
concept-expression is the same as intending to satisfy the one-
place concept-expression '~refers to mel (since II satisfy ~x 
(x refers to X)I is logically equivalent to 'I refer to mel). 
But it does not follow that in order to elucidate the intention 
of satisfying I frefers to ~I, we need a grasp of the self-
1 
See pp. 138-9. 
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conscious Idea-type that we have of ourselves ( ibid. p. 258). 
He later talks of 'the self-reference principle' 
••• that a fully self-conscious thinker will be aware that he 
satisfies the concept-expression 'l;is thinking of "(' ( ibid. 
p. 260). 
Well! This is perplexing stuff. The preferred intention (to 
bring it about that he satisfies '~refers to~') is not one that 
the ordinary speaker could articulate; it does not keep faith with 
any conception of his intention that he might reasonably be held to 
have. (The problem here is a bit like that of a speaker's under-
standing of the axioms of a systematic theory of meaning.) Further-
more, if the original Anscombe objection is allowed, then it must be 
allowed to apply here too. For the intention in question could be 
ascribed to Oedipus in one of his fortuitously self-referring moods. 
Let us say that he intends to extract a confession from 'the slayer 
of Laius' (not realising it is himself): viz. 'I did it'. Then, by 
the lights of relatively unconstrained intention-ascription licensed 
by Evans' self-reference principle, he intends to make the slayer of 
Laius self-refer. So he intends to bring it about that he satisfies 
'~refers to ~' - without realising it. Therefore it is not suffic-
ient that an agent have this intention since he may be mistaken 
about the means required to fulfil it. 
Whether or not one feels that the foregoing insufficiency 
charge can be made to stick (and it will be a patient reader with a 
high tolerance for the absurd in philosophy who has got so far as 
understanding it), Evans obviously felt that a circularity charge 
was more pertinent. It is to this charge that his final disingen-
uous disclaimer is directed. But it was not suggested that the 
self-referential accounts were circular because they presupposed, as 
Evans writes, 'a grasp of the self-conscious Idea-type that we have 
of ourselves'; simply that the 1st-person figured in the explanans 
of which it is the explanandum. To overcome the insufficiency 
charge (and perhaps anyway) it needs to be said that the speaker 
intends to being it about that he himself satisfies '~refers to~' 
- where 'himself' is the 'I'-reflexive, requiring explanation in 
terms of the 1st-person. So it looks as if anyway circularity has 
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not been transcended. 
(iii) The consequences of circularity 
The correct presentation of a self-reference principle in the 
Evans style, though now of course circular, would be as follows, 
then: 
A fully self-conscious thinker will be aware that he himself 
satisfies the concept-expression '1;is thinking of!;' (where 
'himself
' 
is the III-reflexive). 
This principle is essentially circular; the requirement on the 
subject's awareness will contain, explicitly or covertly, an 
'II-reflexive. 
What is the consequence of this essential circularity? It 
will be worrying only if one is occupied by one of the following 
sorts of thought (which are probably related). First, that it must 
be possible to furnish a completely introductory explanation of any 
term in the language, and in particular of II' - an explanation that 
does not presuppose any particular previous understanding. But this 
view, which has its origin in a network of ideas related to that of 
the primacy of ostensive definition, is surely rather antique, and 
quite implausible when contrasted with the idea that 'light dawns 
gradually over the whole' of language for the novitiate. Second, 
the circularity will be worrying if it is thought that the nature of 
self-consciousness must be made explicit by examining the 
consequences of the self-reference principle. This is a rather coy 
formulation, but what I have in mind is this. In the original 
presentation of the self-reference principle by Evans, the subject 
simply has to be aware that he satisfies '~is thinking Oft;, -
rather than 'he himself ' , which incorporates the self-conscious 
perspective from the outset. Evans then considers various proposals 
which seek either to make clear what the subject's awareness 
involves, or what it implies ( ibid. pp. 259-60). These have 
validity despite the circularity of the self-reference principle, 
and will be considered shortly, but acknowledgement of the 
circularity will mean that one's attitude to the proposals will be 
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different. This is because one will, in a sense, regard 
self-consciousness as something ineffable, since it is impossible to 
explain the phenomenon non-circularly - at least, that is how it 
might be put by someone in the Evans camp. One could never, for 
instance, explain self-consciousness as a species of knowledge of 
objects - because the self-reference principle, as currently viewed, 
does not merely say that the self-conscious subject is aware that he 
(an object) satisfies 'l;(an object) is thinking of i; (an object)'. 
Rather, to reiterate, it implies that the subject's awareness that 
he satisfies that expression is already self-conscious - a fact 
which ultimately we can put no further gloss on, certainly not that 
involving the viewing of an object in a certain way. 
The conclusion that consciousness of self and consciousness of 
objects is each sui generis (it is not as if 'consciousness of 
objects' is here any more clearly understood than that of self) 
anticipates the denouement of the Homeric Opposition in Chapter 4 
(see pp. 214-16). Certainly, if the self-reference principle is 
circular then we are going to have to say something like the 
foregoing - something involving the fact that the nature of self-
consciousness cannot be made fully explicit. Clearly, there are 
major meta-philosophical issues arising at this point, concerned 
with exactly what should be involved in giving a philosophical 
account of self-consciousness (or anything, for that matter) - these 
I'll do my best to sidestep. The danger of talking vacuously is 
ever-present; but it does seem clear that there is at least a diff-
erence in attitude, between proponents of circular and non-circular 
principles, regarding proposed supplementation of self-reference. I 
will simply expand on these differences of attitude, without going 
on to assess the proposals. Evans writes: 
What is required for a subject genuinely to be a self-thinker is 
a difficult and obscure question ••• Some would say ••• that it 
is not implausible to hold that there is an essential connection 
between self-consciousness and the conception of oneself as the 
subject of certain psychological properties: specifically, 
thinking, and any properties that are necessarily possessed by a 
thinker. According to this view, what we need to add to the 
description of the present case [given by the self-reference 
principle], to secure full self-consciousness, is more of the 
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same sort of thing: a disposition on the part of the subject to 
ascribe thoughts to himself ( ibid. p. 259). 
The proposal is of interest independently of the 'non-circular' view 
to which it is tied. But when detached from that view, it will no 
longer be seen to 'secure full self-consciousness', since no addit-
ion to the self-reference principle will eliminate its circularity. 
Evans is in fact concerned to contrast two conflicting 
accounts of what the self-reference principle involves - each of 
which will have to be re-interpreted as giving, if correct, salient 
features rather than necessary and sufficient conditions of self-
consciousness. The first, the dispositional account just mentioned, 
says that the principle involves the subject showing his knowledge 
of the identity between subject and object - by being disposed to 
ascribe thoughts to himself. Thus the fully self-conscious nature 
of his thought 'I am hot' would come out in his later willingness to 
judge 'I was hot, and I thought that I was hot' (i.e. there was 
something which both was hot and thought that it was hot). (Evans 
is also building in the thinker's awareness that he is a persisting 
subject of thoughts - since otherwise the required disposition could 
be manifested by a present-tense judgement 'I am hot and I think I 
am hot'.) The second account is really an 'anti-account' - the 
salient feature of self-conscious thought is something much more 
vertiginous than the dispositional account allows - perhaps some-
thing viciously auto-referential such that fully self-conscious 
thought is strictly impossible. One can in general understand what 
it is for an object of a thought to be its subject. But this is not 
enough; one must also realise what it is for any particular thought 
of one's own to have an identity of object and subject, one must 
1 
grasp that the object of this very thought is its subject. 
It is doubtful, in fact, from what we have said of Nozick's 
'auto-referential' account, that such a vertiginous 'anti-account' 
is plausible. Be that as it may, I hope I have illustrated some of 
1 
Evans intended a full discussion of this last, 'vertig-
inous' thought; but that just outlined is all we have to go on 
(see ibid. p. 26In6). 
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the effects of the circularity of the self-reference principle on 
accounts of self-consciousness, and have defused objections that 
such circularity is vicious. 
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3.3) IEM and Self-Consciousness 
Having ploughed through an exhaustive process of refinement of 
the notion of IEM, the reader may be disappointed to discover that 
little is to be said about the notion beyond its dialectical funct-
ion in the Homeric Opposition. This is due simply to the limitat-
ions of space caused by the need to complete the second and final 
stage of that Opposition - for the notion of IEM looks as if it is 
central to any account of self-consciousness. Something will 
however be said on the relation between these concepts, within the 
context of Anscombe's discussion of self-reference. 
Anscombe has a laconic and suggestive discussion of a self-
referential term 'A' which is not expressive of self-conscious-
1 
ness. Her characterisation of 'A' is incomplete (and indeed 
she has confided to the present writer that she is 'not happy' with 
2 
it ). But it is intended to cast some light on the nature of 
self-consciousness. It is worth enquiring whether, even given our 
rejection of the 'no-reference' view, it may nonetheless do so. 
Here is what Anscombe says: 
Imagine a society in which everyone is labelled with two 
names. One appears on their backs and at the top of their 
chests, and these names, which their bearers cannot see, are 
various: 'B' to 'z' let us say. The other, 'A', is stamped on 
the inside of their wrists, and is the same for everyone. In 
making reports on people's actions everyone uses the names on 
their chests or backs if he can see these names or is used to 
seeing them. Everyone also learns to respond to utterance of 
the name on his own chest and back in the sort of way and 
circumstances in which we tend to respond to utterance of our 
1 
The discussion does, for example, suggest some thoughts 
to Noonan in his [1979] - not all of them quite coherent, 
however (but see p. 138 below). 
2 
Appendix p. 242. 
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names. Reports on one's own actions, which one gives straight 
off from observation, are made using the name on the wrist. 
Such reports are made, not on the basis of observation alone, 
but also on that of inference and testimony or other informat-
ion. 'B', for example, derives conclusions expressed by 
sentences with 'A' as subject, from other people's statements 
using 'B' as subject. 
Thus for each person there is one person of whom he has 
characteristically limited and also characteristically 
privileged views: except in mirrors he never sees the whole 
person, and can only get rather special views of what he does 
see. Some of these are specially good, others specially bad. 
Of course, a man B may sometimes make a mistake through seeing 
the name 'A' on the wrist of another, and not realising it is 
the wrist of a man whose other name is after all not inaccess-
ible to B in the special way in which his own name ('B') is. 
( ibid. p. 49). 
She goes on to say 
the reidentification of selves ••• is not any part of the role 
of 'I'. [But] the corresponding reidentification ~ involved 
in the use of 'A' ••• ( ibid. pp. 52-3). 
'A' exhibits guaranteed reference (1) (see above, p. 13), but not 
(2), Anscombe implies: 
The 'A'-user means to speak of a certain human being, one who 
falls under his observation in a rather special way. That 
person is himself, and so, given that he has grasped the use of 
'A', he cannot but be speaking of a real person •••••• [But] we 
saw that the 'A'-user would not be immune to mistaken identif-
ication of someone else as 'A' ••• The suggestion [that 'I' 
would not] seems absurd ••• ( ibid. p. 57). 
In fact Anscombe is confusing guaranteed reference with IEM at this 
point. Both 'A' and 'I' exhibit guaranteed reference (diagnosed as 
uninteresting on pp. 13-15). Some uses of 'I' exhibit IEM; which 
'A' never exhibits. This indeed seems to be the crucial difference 
between them; and since, as Anscombe maintains, 'I' manifests self-
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consciousness but 'A' seems not to, IEM would seem to have something 
important to do with self-consciousness. 
Anscombe's discussion is far from clear, however, as well as 
being incomplete. 'A'-users lack the capacity to make IEM-judge-
ments, a fortiori avowals. They therefore cannot articulate 
intentions, and thus cannot be said to act, merely to 'behave'. It 
is not, then, strictly their 'actions' on which they 'report', in 
bizarre fashion, using 'A'. By means of 'A', it would seem, they 
can make non-IEM judgements (Wittgenstein's 'I'-as-object use - see 
p. 3 above), plus perhaps some non-IEM caricature supplanting our 
IEM-judgements (the 'I'-as-subject use). Noonan, in his [1979], 
argues that the capacity to use 'I'-as-object requires a capacity to 
use 'I'-as-subject; but he sees the former as distinct from 'A'. 
However, Anscombe in der Bangor Kreis, in reporting her dissatis-
faction with her earlier discussion, suggests that the use of 'A' 
may depend on understanding of, inter alia, 'This is my body' 
(below, p. 242). A doubt is thus raised over whether, even as it 
stands, the story of the 'A'-users does not covertly depend on their 
having an understanding of 'I' and in particular the 'I'-as-subject 
use. 
It is not in fact Anscombe's intention in this story to expand 
on the connection between IEM and self-consciousness - especially 
given she is not clear about IEM! As already discussed in Chapter 
2, she seems rather to be directing her discussion at the 'mislead-
ing platitude' that self-consciousness is consciousness of the 
object one is. For the reason there given, this attempt is wayward 
(p. 63 above). It is, however, worth exploring one line of argument 
intended to yield the down-grading of the 'self-reference principle' 
- thought not quite in the Trojan way which Anscombe intends. This 
is (briefly) as follows: 
(1) 'A' is not expressive of self-consciousness. 
(2) 'A' falls under the self-reference principle. 
so (3) The self-reference principle does not illuminate self-
consciousness. 
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Now, the self-reference principle as thus far formulated employs the 
'I'-reflexive 'himself'; so clearly 'A' will not fall under that 
principle. However, there is ~ self-reference principle under which 
it falls, sufficiently analogous to give support to the conclusion 
of the argument above. It is the following: 
'A' is the word each one (a) uses to refer to some person, 
(b) knowing and intending that person to be himself 
('A*'-reflexive). 
The 'A*'-reflexive (so-called to distinguish it from our earlier 
'A'-reflexive, pp. 60-62 above) is meant to convey the fact that the 
'A'-user must know: 'A is the person referred to'. 
But really, this argument is so hedged about with qualificat-
ions that it is doubtful that much can be made of it. It is not 
clear what is conveyed by the 'A'-version of the self-reference 
principle; what does the 'A'-user understand by 'A is the person 
referred to'? Even if this were clear, and the principle correct, 
is mere analogousness to the self-reference principle for 'I' 
sufficient? And what does it mean to say self-consciousness is not 
therefore 'illuminated'? We have encountered this line of thought 
(that self-consciousness must be 'special', cannot be contaminated 
by principles operating elsewhere) before (p. 129). 
Likewise it is not clear how far the Anscornbe thought-
experiment elucidates the connection between IEM and self-
consciousness. This connection is clearly a topic for a future 
work. 
CHAPTER 
FOUR 
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In this final chapter the second stage of the Homeric Opposit-
ion is discussed and, as far as possible, resolved. Although the 
problem of avowals which is its subject-matter is in many respects 
of great difficulty, it is in fact easier to be confident that some 
sort of solution has been achieved than in the case of the first 
stage of the Opposition. This is simply because the issue is 
ultimately (if not perhaps at first) much clearer! The more 
closely we looked at 'no-reference' Trojanism, the harder it became 
to discern just what the position amounted to. In contrast, the 
Trojanism of the non-assertoric thesis of avowals addresses a real 
issue that compels some response, and is as a result easier to 
define - even if in the end it is rejected. 
The opening section provides a brief resume of the so-called 
'non-assertoric thesis' of avowals as it appears in the work of 
Wittgenstein and Ryle, and of the problem which provoked it. Next, 
detailed work on selected examples of types of avowal is undertaken, 
in an attempt to display the diversity of the phenomenon. This work 
is necessarily incomplete, but at least the concentration on the 
'pain-paradigm' is mitigated. An account of an argument to the 
non-assertoric thesis follows, and the final and longest section 
discusses the Wittgensteinian idea that avowals are primarily 
expressive, and whether this apparently (but only apparently) Trojan 
proposal offers a resolution of the problem. It is contended that 
the notion of 'expression' is indeed at the centre of such a 
resolution; but that it need not imply that avowals are not 
assertions. The 'non-assertoric thesis' of which the 'expressive 
thesis' is often seen as a variant, in fact faces serious 
difficulties from the existence of truth-value links, which are 
discussed. But furthermore, provided we give the right account of 
the cognitive and hence authoritative status of avowals (as not 
involving some analogue of 'expert' knowledge), we do not need a 
non-assertoric account. Hence the account proferred here involves a 
progressive refinement of the Trojan view - a refinement out of 
existence. An analogous account of authority replaces the non-
assertoric and non-cognitive theses, and that authority is explained 
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conceptually by the idea of a subject of experience giving express-
ion to its avowable states. 
Such an account is broadly Wittgensteinian, except that 
Wittgenstein himself clearly advocated a non-cognitive account of 
avowals. The extent to which his remarks imply a non-assertoric (as 
opposed to an 'expressive') thesis is in fact unclear, but at the 
outset of the discussion the traditional view (that they do) is 
taken, and the subtleties in the various viewpoints are gradually 
introduced. 
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4.1) The Problem of Avowals 
The two most well-known accounts of avowals are those of Ryle 
and Wittgenstein. The latter hardly offers an account in fact, more 
a series of suggestions that avowals should be viewed in a certain 
way - as akin to purely expressive behaviour. His most categorical 
statement occurs in Zettel : 
Plan for the treatment of psychological concepts. Psychological 
verbs characterised by the fact that the 3rd-person of the 
present is to be verified by observation, the 1st-person not. 
Sentences in the 3rd-person of the present: information. In 
the 1st-person present: expression «Not quite right)). 
(Z 472) 
(It will be considered shortly why this is 'not quite right'). In 
the Investigations, we are several times encouraged to view the 
avowal that one is in pain as akin to natural, unlearnt, purely 
expressive pain-behaviour. But as in the Blue Book discussion of 
IEM, various contexts exhibit an ambiguity in Wittgenstein's 
account: is the claim (i) that 'I am in pain' is not an assertion 
about a particular person, or (ii) that it is not an assertion at 
all? (an ambiguity noted by Hacker in his [1972] p. 263). 
Wittgenstein writes: 
and 
in saying ['I am in pain'] I don't name any person. Just 
as I don't name anyone when I groan with pain. (PI 404) 
But surely what you want to do with the words 'I am ••• ' is to 
distinguish between yourself and other people'. Can this be 
said in every case? Even when I merely groan? (ibid. 406) 
If these passages are intended to support a merely 'no-reference' 
view of 'I' the comparison with groans of pain is unsuitable, as 
already noted in connection with the passage on IEM in the Blue Book 
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(p. 67). (Admittedly, other examples of sentences with a pseudo-
subject which may serve as analogies are hard to find. Wittgenstein 
has already used 'It is snowing' in the Philosophical Remarks.) 
The suggestion is less oblique in the following passage from Part 
II: 
A cry is not a description. But there are transitions. And the 
words 'I am afraid' may approximate, more or less, to being a 
cry. They may come quite close to this and also be far removed 
from it ••• But if 'I am afraid' is not always a cry of 
complaint and yet sometimes is, then why should it always be a 
description of a state of mind? (ibid. p. 189). 
The existence of this continuum opens up the possibility that a 
non-assertoric account of the 'expressive' uses of e.g. 'I'm afraid' 
will leave unresolved the problem of what to do with the 
'descriptive' uses. Perhaps they should be treated as 'non-avowals' 
in the sense of the Famous Five - whatever account one chooses to 
give of the central cases of avowal. Their existence may be the 
reason why Wittgenstein felt the Zettel account above to be 'not 
quite right'. (Or perhaps he felt the terms 'information' and 
'expression' were 'not quite right' - the account will be taken up 
at length below.) 
Ryle too is opposed to the idea that avowals are primarily 
self-descriptive, and also favours a 'non-assertoric' account. He 
too is not unaware of the difficulties with such an account, but is 
prepared to gloss over them: 
If the avowal ['I feel depressed'] is to do its job, it must be 
said in a depressed tone of voice; it must be blurted out to a 
sympathiser, not reported to an investigator ••• if we are 
suspicious [of the avowal] we do not ask 'Fact or fiction?', 
'True or false?', 'Reliable or unreliable?', but 'Sincere or 
shammed?' ([1949] p. 99) 
And later 
[The] grammar [of avowals] makes it tempting to misconstrue all 
the sentences in which they occur as self-descriptions. But in 
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its primary employment 'I want ••• ' is not used to convey 
information, but to make a request or demand. (ibid. p. 175) 
Talk of an avowal 'doing its job', or of the 'primary employment' of 
an expression, is an attempt to focus attention away from those 
awkward instances where an avowal does indeed seem to have a 
descriptive role. 
A consequence of the non-assertoric thesis is the non-
cognitive thesis of avowals; one stated explicitly by Wittgenstein, 
but grounded by him in the principle that knowledge requires the 
logical possibility of doubt, rather than on the non-assertoric 
thesis. It is the possibility of a non-cognitive thesis of avowals 
that prevents us from supplementing feature (v) of the Famous Five 
(on the impossibility of doubt) by saying that knowledge is guaran-
teed. Hacker, in presenting the non-cognitive thesis, refers to 
Wittgenstein's advocacy of the impossibility of self-knowledge. 
This paradoxical phrase is acceptable provided one realises that it 
does not imply any epistemic inadequacy - that is comparable to 'the 
impossibility of feeling the pain of another'. (The non-cognitive 
thesis is discussed below (pp. 208-11).) 
Now, what is it that prevents us from regarding the 
non-assertoric and non-cognitive theses of avowals as interesting 
but idiosyncratic and ultimately unsatisfactory adjuncts to the 
Wittgensteinian and Rylean philosophies? Gareth Evans writes: 
[Wittgenstein] encouraged us to ••• think of [1st-person 
psychological statements] as unstructured responses to 
situations. (He was well aware that this would enable him not 
to think about certain issues.) ([1982] p. 209n) 
Behind this cryptic comment of Evans seems to lie the suggestion 
that the non-assertoric thesis enables Wittgenstein not to think 
about the basis for the authoritative nature of avowals. It is this 
issue that is central to the second stage of the Homeric Opposition. 
Why is it that the subject is accorded authority-status on his 
avowable-states? What is the explanation for the Famous Five? We 
might express the problem as follows: If avowals are construed 
assertorically, there will be some condition which makes the avowal 
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true or which warrants the assertion. A dilemma then arises: either 
the condition is the obtaining of some inner state of the subject, 
to which he has access in a way denied to others, or it is some 
outer state (behavioural or physical) to which he has access in the 
way others do. In any event, his authority is regarded as being 
based on access to some state of himself. 
Before discussing this dilemma, I need briefly to raise a 
question about formulation. Is it strictly the subject's 
'authority' that requires explanation? Such a term seems to imply 
an assertoric interpretation of features (iii) and (iv). 'Avowals 
are authoritative' is perhaps ambiguous between 'the utterance of an 
avowal, if comprehending and not intended to deceive, settles the 
matter of the utterer's mental state', which is acceptable, and 
'Avowals express the subject's authority on what his own mental 
state is', which is controversial. Controversial, because authority 
on a certain matter seems to imply a knowledge of that matter, 
something the non-assertoric account of avowals is intended to 
exclude. There is a second reason for not framing the problem in 
terms of authority. For isn't it the fact that the subject has 
different access to his mental states from that of others that 
requires explanation, not that his access is superior? Or what 
amounts to the same thing given the implausibility of 1st-person 
behavioural access, that he has any access at all? Re-expressing 
this point in our neutral fashion, the question becomes, 'Why are 
avowals evidence of the subject's mental state at all?' (Of course, 
such a question is not intended to express incredulity!) In 
practice, we find it impossible to conceive of the subject's access 
(if any) as different but not superior, since the image of 'access' 
is a Cartesian one, but it is worth separating the issues. It is 
with this practical point in mind that I continue to formulate the 
problem of avowals in terms of authority. 
To return to the dilemma, the latter option, that the truth-
or assertion-condition of the avowal is the obtaining of some outer 
behavioural state, is quite implausible, though maintained e.g. by 
Carnap [1959]. It is in contradiction with the first feature of the 
Famous Five, and leaves the explanation of the rest quite obscure. 
In contrast, the former option preserves all the Famous Five 
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features whilst encouraging an unacceptable Cartesian explanation of 
them. The authority which an individual has in pronouncing on his 
own mental state by means of the appropriate avowal (if this is how 
it should be described), and which is expressed in features (iii) 
and (iv), is explained in terms of the subject's superior access to 
an inner state. The especially direct character of this access 
explains features (i), (ii) and (v). But for two reasons which are 
well known, this is the sort of explanation we can do without. 
Taking these in the correct historical order: First, it was realised 
that this Cartesian position led ineluctably to sceptical problems 
over other-ascription - the so-called 'Problem of Other Minds'. (It 
is perhaps worth noting that the sceptical problems thus generated 
may not apply in the case of those psychological predicates whose 
self-ascription does not involve any special authority of the 
subject, e.g. 'is intelligent', 'is excitable'.) Second, it was 
shown by Wittgenstein in the Investigations that Cartesianism is not 
secure even within some 1st-personal redoubt, because of the 
apparent incoherence of the idea of a logically private language 
which it seems the Cartesian is forced to embrace. He faces a 
'Problem of Non-Other Minds' too, then (to use R.C. Buck's phrase 
from his eponymous [1962]). 
It is the apparent dilemma between inner and outer truth- or 
assertion-conditions that the non-assertoric thesis intends to 
undercut. We shall assess later the validity of this dialectic; but 
one further apparent option should be disposed of from the outset. 
This is to claim that the authority of avowals is a 'mere convent-
ion' in no need of explanation; and to leave things at that. But to 
try to say this is to say that any other condition would do just as 
well (e.g. we could cancel my authority for my own mental states and 
say that my best friend has authority for them). And this is 
something we do not feel. An explanation for the authority 
functions as a kind of justification for it. 
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4.2) Avowals of Belief 
(i) The categories of avowal 
The treatment of avowals thus far has been highly general and 
abstract; nothing has been done by way of applying the Famous Five 
features to particular 1st-person present-tense psychological 
utterances and thus delimiting the class of avowals. Which 
psychological self-ascriptions in the present tense actually fall 
into the category 'avowal'? (The concentration in the literature on 
the case of 'I am in pain', coupled with apologetic excursions into 
the realms of 'I have a pain in my foot' etc., is quite remarkable.) 
What counts as psychological, rather than physical, self-
ascription, will depend upon one's purposes. (Though the 
traditional distinction between mental and physical is, as Gareth 
Evans has remarked, 'almost entirely arbitrary' ([1982] p. 223).) 
What is clear for present purposes, however, is that many 
traditionally psychological self-ascriptions do not satisfy the 
Famous Five and are therefore not avowals. These are self-
ascriptions of more enduring qualities (dispositions) that can be 
made on a behavioural basis and for which the subject is, to use a 
tendentious phrase, in no better position than others well-
acquainted with him to make the ascription. They are thus akin to 
3rd-personal ascriptions. Such will include those of character 
traits, moral qualities and pathological states. These carry a 
heavy predictive content which furnishes the possibility of 
1 
falsification in a way not catered for by the Famous Five. At 
the other end of the spectrum will be the 'paradigmatic' avowals of 
episodic mental states - sensations, perceptual appearances, moods, 
feelings and emotions. In their lack of propositional content these 
states will contrast with a third category of self-ascriptions which 
occupies an intermediate position on the avowal/non-avowal 
continuum - states which have propositional content and which figure 
1 
Though see pp. 227-29 below. 
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in the self-ascription of propositional attitudes. These I term 
'qualified' avowals. 
The sub-category 'paradigm' avowal is, as the term suggests, 
the sort of avowal that most readily springs to mind when that kind 
of self-ascription is under discussion. These are avowals of mental 
episodes which have natural behavioural expression - thus affording 
a range of linguistic and non-linguistic behaviour which furnishes 
criteria for the mental state. It seems right to say with Rorty 
[1970] that the ascription of these mental states is compatible with 
any range of future behaviour of the subject (see pp. 162-3). Thus 
it is plausible to hold that the holistic constraints, which 
complicate the ascription of those states which feature in 
1 
'qualified' avowals, are absent here. 
Examples of 'paradigm' avowals would be 'I am in pain', 'I am 
angry', 'I am nervous', II am joyful', 'I am afraid', 'I'm hot', 
'I'm cold', 'I feel sick', II feel depressed' ••• i.e. we are 
dealing here with sensations and with a range of feelings, emotions 
and moods. 
(ii) Sources of error in avowals of belief: identification and 
attitude 
What this range is, is discussed below (p. 178). Our concern 
now is with present-tense self-ascriptions of propositional 
attitude. To what extent do they conform to the Famous Five and thus 
belong to the class of avowals? Let us break down the ascription 
into the familiar identification and predication components and 
locate three contending sources for error. (I will deal generally 
1 
These constraints do not serve to over-ride individual 
self-ascription in particular cases - except perhaps where the 
'qualified' avowal is corrigible (see pp. 153-56). Rather, if 
an individual's self-ascriptions fail to conform to the 
constraints in terms of presenting a satisfying picture to 
others, that individual would be held not to be competent in 
self-ascription. 
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with all sorts of propositional attitude at this point, though 
focusing on belief. Desire I will deal with later.) 
First the identification component. No error is possible 
here; it makes no sense to ask 'Someone believes that p, but is it 
I?' In general, it seems that all propositional attitude 
self-ascriptions in the present tense are IEM. 
Next the predication component. This can be divided into the 
attitude element, and the propositional element. With regard to the 
former, it might seem that the question 'I have a certain attitude 
towards p, but is that attitude one of belief, or doubt, or some 
other attitude?', is intelligible. But I cannot, for instance, 
wonder whether my attitude towards p is one of belief or, say, 
desire (though I may wonder whether I believe some important fact 
simply because I very much want it to be so). To borrow a phrase 
from Mark Platts, one attitude can be substituted for another only 
if it at least has the same 'direction of fit' with the world (see 
his [1979] pp. 256-7). More importantly, the formulation is 
tendentious. How? Well, as Evans has pointed out, in making a 
self-ascription of belief (to limit ourselves for the moment to that 
attitude), I consider the question whether p, not whether I believe 
that p ([1982] p. 225 - see below). It may be thought, then, that 
questions about what my attitude is can be translated into questions 
about the propositional element (see below); that is, if I am 
wondering whether my attitude towards p is one of belief or doubt, I 
am in fact wondering whether it is p or_p that I believe. But as 
may be guessed, questions about which shade of belief I have (from 
commitment to increasingly tentative evaluation) cannot be so treat-
ed. In fact, Evans' point has direct application only in the dis-
cussion of the propositional element; it is an analogous point that 
needs to be made here. That is, that the formulation is tendentious 
because it misrepresents the business of arriving at an attitude as 
a process of investigation into something that was there all 
1 
along. This is brought out by the consideration that once the 
sincere comprehending avowal 'I believe that p' has been made, it 
makes no sense to wonder whether it was belief that was my attitude. 
1 
cp. Hacker [1986] p. 302. 
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In contrast to the case of the identification component, then, there 
is a temporal restriction on the unintelligibility of the doubt. 
With attitudes other than belief, however, the doubt can on 
occasion make sense, because of two caveats. Firstly, there is the 
question of the long arm of the Unconscious, to be discussed more 
1 
fully shortly. A person may avow that he fears that his father 
will suffer a violent death, but under analysis can be brought to 
see that this apparent avowal was mistaken; for he desired it. 
However, analogously to the point made about the reflection prior to 
avowal, this post hoc error can justify the substitution of a 
propositional attitude from a limited set only; the original 
attitude (fear) can be replaced only by its polar opposite (desire). 
Secondly, a caveat analogous to the de re caveat pertaining to the 
propositional element (see below). On that matter Andrew Woodfield 
writes: 
••• a de re thought ••• has an external aspect which consists 
in its being related to a specific object. Because the external 
relation is not determined subjectively, the subject is not 
authoritative about that. ([1982] p. viii) 
Analogously, a subject may avow II know that pi, but be mistaken -
'p' is false and he merely believed that p. Philip Pettit has 
argued that this dependence of the propositional attitude on the 
'non-subjective' i.e. on aspects of the world as well as of the 
subject, extends beyond knowledge, its traditional resting-place, 
2 
and infects other propositional attitudes including belief. Be 
that as it may, other cases than knowledge can be recognised on 
grounds other than the Wittgensteinian ones Pettit is arguing for. 
Take the distinction between remorse and regret. I may express 
remorse over the suffering someone is undergoing, because I feel it 
1 
The reader can see where by 'avow' I mean 'sincerely and 
comprehendinglyavow'. 
2 
He calls such states limpure', and appeals to Wittgen-
stein's rule-following considerations. Amplification awaits 
the result of the search for the text of his paper, delivered 
at St. Andrews in 1983. (Though now see his [1986].) 
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was partly my responsibility. Others persuade me that I was not in 
any way responsible; I do not then feel remorse, but merely regret 
1 (which implies no responsibility). Perhaps I had all along 
felt merely regret. It is not clear that we would say this however; 
one might talk of irrational feelings of remorse (just as one speaks 
of the irrational feelings of guilt commonly experienced by the 
bereaved) • 
In the case of the propositional attitudes other than belief, 
then, we may be inclined to admit the intelligibility of the doubt 
about attitude; but, bearing the Evans point in mind, we will not be 
led to exaggerate the extent of the kind of investigation it 
licences. 
(iii) Sources of error: Propositional element 
Can I ask the question 'I believe something, but is it that p or 
that q, or some other proposition?' (We'll stick with belief just 
now, before broadening the discussion to treat other attitudes which 
may not be analogous in their behaviour.) Setting aside the 
1 
Theodore Streleski, who spent 19 years unsuccessfully 
pursuing a doctorate in mathematics at Stanford University and 
concluded by murdering his professor in protest, made a 
related point in his famous statement on release from jail: 
If I committed a murder to criticise Stanford, if I 
express remorse, I just throw my whole argument in the 
waste-basket . . . I feel regret. Not remorse ... regret as 
I see the tragic impact on people ... But if I had it to 
do over again, I'd do it the same way. Trenton Times 
Nov. 1985) 
Streleski's logic, if not his reason, is impeccable. What he 
regrets are the causal consequences, in terms of individual 
suffering, of what he sees as a justified action. He is 
responsible for the murder, but as it was not wrong, feels no 
remorse; its causal consequences (suffering) are mere natural 
concomitants, for which he is not responsible - they thus 
provoke only regret. 
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tendentious interpretation of this question, which implies 
investigation into a pre-existing belief, there are in fact two 
sorts of case in which the question makes sense (and thus two sets 
of case when honestly mistaken 'avowal' is possible): 
(i) When de re beliefs are involved - analogously to the 
discussion under the heading of the 'attitude element'. 
(ii) When the Unconscious is implicated - likewise analogously. 
Other apparent cases turn out not to be such and it is well to 
distinguish these at the outset. Let us suppose I am a loyal Tory 
party supporter, and I say (sincerely) 'I believe that Mrs. Thatcher 
did not mislead the House over the Westland affair'. Someone later 
convinces me that this statement was a mere expression of 
partisanship and wish-fulfilment. Do I then say 'So I didn't 
believe it after all'? Rather, I think, one would say that the 
grounds for my belief had been inadequate, that the belief was 
caused more by a wish than by the cool appraisal of evidence, 
1 
etc. Another example: Say I profess the belief 'Socialism is 
the best system'. Later, in the face of repeated attacks on my 
socialist credentials by 'fellow-socialists' (my support for 
'Solidarity' and NATO, distrust of Fidel Castro, etc. - the usual 
deviations), I begin to wonder whether I really am, and really have 
been, a socialist. Was I then mistaken about my beliefs - mistaken 
that I believed that socialism is the best system? There are a 
number of options here - but none of them adds up to the required 
straightforward 'honest mistake'. (Indeed it is hard to see what 
this requirement is - which is disturbing, since if the search is 
for the unobtainable perhaps the examples have been set up wrongly. 
But I demur on this!) I was perhaps mistaken about the 
implications of my socialist belief - that it conflicted with other, 
more important values to which I am attached, like liberty. Or 
maybe (and perhaps this comes to the same thing) I was mistaken 
about what 'socialism' meant. (Though a schoolgirl who thought 
social workers were socialists by virtue of semantics rather than 
1 
Those who still think it plausible that I was mistaken 
that I believed that p will want to say that it was just the 
avowal that was so caused. 
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inclination - she had muddled the two terms - might have professed a 
belief defective through misunderstanding of meaning and not 
implications). Finally, I might say that I had been deceiving 
myself - I very much wanted to believe in socialism (because 
otherwise, I feared, I would be betraying my family background) and 
this desire caused my belief, but really my reasons were insuffic-
ient. (This option is analogous to that of the Thatcher example, 
and will be pertinent in the discussion of the Unconscious shortly.) 
So care is needed in isolating the genuine examples. The 
first category are de re beliefs, where the subject's authority on 
what he believes is curtailed (see the Woodfield quotation on 
p. 151). For me to have the belief may require the existence of an 
object which does not in fact exist ('I believe Smith's murderer is 
insane' - see Wright [1983] p. 99). Or I may express a belief which 
is pragmatically self-defeating ('I believe that I'm disembodied', 
on some accounts). In each case, my belief is 'lost' - though, it 
may be said, this content-less mental state is adequately 
'expressed' (no more and no less) by the words I used. 
The second category involves the Unconscious. The intrusion 
of the Unconscious will affect any member of the range of proposit-
ional attitude self-ascriptions, so it is well to make some general 
comments here. Authorities disagree on how to characterise the 
consequences of Freudian theory for the Cartesian picture which 
causes our troubles. MacIntyre in his enjoyable [1958], notes the 
obvious restriction on self-knowledge, but goes on to claim that: 
The Cartesian philosophical tradition, mediated by Brentano, 
reinforces and is reinforced by [Freud's] depiction of the 
unconscious in terms which he had elaborated to deal with the 
entities of neurophysiology [viz. in substantial but non-
physical terms] «(1958] p. 46) 
In contrast, Flanagan in his (1984] sees Freud's discoveries, if 
such they are, as quite destructive of the Cartesian view: 
If introspection is highly inferential [i.e. self-knowledge 
is not really 'introspective' as this term is generally 
understood] ••• or, alternatively, if introspection is 
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non-inferential but highly unreliable (imagine that the mind's 
eye has the same degree of accuracy as the real eyes of a person 
who has defective vision), then 1st-person psychological reports 
have no special status ••• Freud's philosophy of mind ••• 
implies that all our ordinary 1st- and 3rd-person methods for 
gathering psychological data are about equally likely to yield 
truth or falsity ••• ([1984] pp. 67 and 73). 
This latter is clearly too extreme a view; but Flanagan and 
MacIntyre need not be in direct conflict, in fact. To the extent to 
which the substantiality of the mind (i.e. dualism) is central to 
Cartesian doctrine, Freud is reinforcing it; to the extent that 
Descartes requires the activities of that substantial mind to be 
transparent to the subject, Freud is undermining it. However, 
unless the quite implausible thesis of 'The All-Pervasiveness of 
Neurosis' is correct, there will still be a wide range of avowals 
the authority of which is left unimpaired since they are unaffected 
by unconscious motivation. And our problem of explaining this 
-authority will remain. 
The kind of example I have in mind in the case of belief is as 
follows: A woman develops a quite disabling agoraphobia, and in the 
course of analysis the reasons for her behaviour are probed. The 
analyst surmises that the condition has developed as a response to 
her husband's jealousy and possessiveness, manifested in aggressive 
interrogation after every excursion she made from the house (a not 
uncommon kind of cause of the phobia apparently - which undermines 
the value of behaviour therapy in such cases). He asks her whether 
she believes that if she leaves the house, she will inevitably be 
subjected to an unpleasant interrogation on her return, and whether 
this is a reason for her behaviour. The patient (Sincerely) 
disavows this belief, and reiterates her original inadequate 
explanation: 'I believe it's because of all those gossipy 
neighbours; I never know when I'm going to meet one of them in the 
street - it's got nothing to do with my husband!' However, as 
analysis proceeds she comes to see the correctness of the prof erred 
explanation; and to believe that her earlier avowal had been 
mistaken. The facts, then, are these: There was a sincere compre-
hending avowal 'I believe that pl. At the same time, certain 
behaviour was rationalised by, inter alia, the belief that-p, a 
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belief that was subsequently avowed. Was the subject therefore 
mistaken in the earlier avowal 'I believe that pi? Did she then, in 
fact, believe that ~p? I would be sympathetic to those who say 
'yes', whilst admitting that possibly the complexities of this kind 
of case (very close to those of self-deception) could lead one to 
say: 'There's no definite answer. The ascription of belief requires 
the confluence of avowal and behaviour, and does not cater for cases 
like this where the two seem to come apart'. 
The latter view prompts the following thought: 'We do not need 
to appeal to "the look within" to explain the authority of avowals. 
For what happens is this. A subject makes an avowal. This of 
itself is not authoritative until or unless we believe it to be 
sincere; and we test for sincerity by examining the rest of the 
subject's behaviour. "I am in pain", for instance, guarantees the 
truth of "He is in pain" said of the subject only when the rest of 
the subject's behaviour tallies with the avowal and the latter can 
therefore be regarded as sincere. What causes the perplexity in the 
case of unconscious belief is that the behaviour expressly does not 
confirm the sincerity of the original avowal, and yet the latter is, 
despite this, claimed to be sincere'. Would it were that simple! 
Unfortunately, we do not, in general, 'test for sincerity'. Avowals 
are 'positive presumptive' - they are assumed to be sincere unless 
shown otherwise. Their authority is not conditional, but a prima 
facie authority defeasible in certain ways (see pp. 224-25 below). 
The preceding way of explaining their authority is thus mistaken. 
(iv) Evans' account of 'belief self-ascription' 
To return now to the main track of our discussion. It appears 
that, for a range of propositional attitude self-ascriptions of 
which belief is the paradigm, conformity to the Famous Five and 
consequent avowal status is marred by the special case of the 
Unconscious alone and complicated by the existence of beliefs de 
~ (The former exceptions might be treated as non-avowals in the 
sense of our second category of mental states given at the outset 
(p. 148).) Now, we have already had occasion to refer to Evans' 
remark on belief (p. 150). Does his account as a whole serve to 
render the problem of avowals insofar as it applies to belief 
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self-ascriptions more tractable? Evans' aim, in this section as 
elsewhere, is, to put it crudely, to undermine the Cartesian picture 
of self-knowledge without endorsing the Wittgensteinian one, whilst 
keeping the whole bathed in a Kantian light. Less poetically he 
boldly predicts: 
I shall quite avoid the idea of this kind of self-knowledge (of 
what we believe and what we experience) as a form of perception 
mysterious in being incapable of delivering inaccurate results 
ibid. p. 225) 
and goes on to quote the extraordinary remark, so compressed and 
resonant, reported of Wittgenstein in discussion: 
If a man says to me, looking at the sky, 'I think it is going to 
rain, therefore I exist', I do not understand him. (Evans' 
emphasis.) 
Insofar as one can understand Wittgenstein's remark (!), it is 
intended to undermine the idea that knowledge of one's mental 
properties involves an inward glance, Evans claims - and with this 
project, though not with any non-assertoric denouement, he is in 
accord: 
The crucial point [in Wittgenstein's remark] is the one I have 
[underlined]: in making a self-ascription of belief, one's eyes 
are, so to speak, or occasionally literally, directed outward -
upon the world. 
It is worth quoting Evans' further remarks in full, since they have 
an important bearing on the question of the role of doubt in the 
self-ascription of belief - and hence the conformity or otherwise of 
such self-ascriptions to the Famous Five. He begins with an 
important principle: 
I get myself into a position to answer the question whether I 
believe that p by putting into operation whatever procedure I 
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1 
have for answering the question whether p. (There is no 
question of my applying the procedure for determining beliefs to 
something, and hence no question of my possibly applying the 
procedure to the wrong thing.) If a judging subject applies 
this procedure, then necessarily he will gain knowledge of one 
of his own mental states: even the most determined sceptic 
cannot find here a gap in which to insert his knife ( ibid. 
p. 225). 
This is a forceful statement of a viewpoint that commands attention. 
Before elaborating on it, it is worth spelling out the Kantian 
aspect of Evans' account mentioned above, which is contained in his 
treatment of what more is needed in an account of self-ascription of 
belief over and above the principle stated. In order to make such 
self-ascriptions, he says, my use must conform to the Generality 
Constraint - principally, in this case, I must be able to 
other-ascribe. Otherwise 
we secure no genuine 'I think' ('think that pi) to accompany 
[one's] thought ('p'): the II think' which accompanies all 
[one's] thoughts is purely formal ( ibid. p. 226). 
In making the related point in connection with the self-ascription 
of perceptual experience, Evans writes: 
I believe we have here an interpretation of Kant's remark about 
the transcendental 'I think' which accompanies all our 
perceptions. Without the background [of Generality] we have at 
most a formal [i.e. empty] 'I think' ( ibid. p. 228). 
(Kemp Smith translates as 'representation' what Evans has as 
1 Some have thought that this sentence implies that having 
'got myself into a position' to decide whether I believe that 
p by 'putting into operation' whatever procedure I have for 
deciding whether p, I still have some more work to do from 
that position. Evans' following sentence makes it clear that, 
any infelicity of expression notwithstanding, this is not what 
he means to say! 
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'perception' ( Critique of Pure Reason B 131-2); Kant's point, 
whatever it is, is not one limited to the self-ascription of 
perceptual experience.) In neither case, Evans claims, does the 
addition of the background encourage the myth of the 'inward 
glance'. Rather, it replaces it, it seems; in stating what more I 
need to be able to do in the self-ascription of belief beyond 
implementing the procedure to decide whether p, one should appeal, 
inter alia, to capacities to other-ascribe rather than to any 
unacceptable myths about self-ascription. 
(v) Wittgenstein's account: 'Moore's paradox' 
In its main features Evans' account bears a close similarity 
to that offered by Wittgenstein in Part II of the Investigations 
(pp. 190-192). It is worth looking at this account. In his 
discussion Wittgenstein makes frequent reference to Moore's paradox. 
This is not the paradox of how such a naive and unglamorous 
individual could become a famous philosopher, as is sometimes 
1 
thought, but rather consists in the following. The expression 
of '~p but I believe that p' is taken to be pragmatically self-
defeating, or self-contradictory, whereas someone may assert 'wp but 
Hamilton believes that p' with perfect propriety. Why is this? 
Wittgenstein expresses the paradox in several different ways, 
all along trying to undermine the picture of belief which finds the 
asymmetry in question puzzling. He writes: 
and 
Moore's paradox can be put like this: the expression 'I believe 
that this is the case' is used like the assertion 'This is the 
case'; and yet the hypothesis that I believe this is the case is 
not used like the hypothesis that this is the case. 
1 
Even the gripping narrative power revealed in Moore's 
racy autobiography in Schilpp ed. [1952] unfortunately does 
little to undermine the harsh assessment implied here. 
160 
If there were a verb meaning to 'to believe falsely', it would 
not have any significant 1st-person present indicative ( ibid. 
p. 190). 
Wittgenstein's diagnosis of the puzzlement this asymmetry may 
occasion parallels Evans' treatment. The idea both philosophers are 
concerned to combat is that I may consider whether I believe that p 
independently of considering whether Pi and Wittgenstein's diagnosis 
of the temptation to think this is a familiar one: 
'At bottom, when I say "I believe ••• n I am describing my own 
state of mind - but this description is indirectly an assertion 
of the fact believed'. As in certain circumstances I describe a 
photograph in order to describe the thing it is a photograph of. 
But then I must also be able to say that the photograph is a 
good one. So here too: 'I believe it's raining and my belief 
is reliable, so I have confidence in it = so it's raining].' -
In that case my belief would be a kind of sense-impression. (my 
suggested amendment) 
To this the reply is: 
One can mistrust one's own senses, but not one's belief ( ibid. 
p. 190). 
The reason why there is the asymmetry shown by the • paradox' -
why self-ascriptions of belief are 'qualified' avowals in the sense 
shortly to be summarised - is that they are not 'descriptions of 
one's state of mind'. 'There is a similarity here to expressions of 
emotion, of mood, etc.', Wittgenstein writes. Remarks in this 
section of the Investigations attempt to entice us away from the 
contrary picture: 
I say of someone else 'He seems to believe •••• and other people 
say it of me. Now, why do I never say it of myself, not even 
when others rightly say it of me? Do I myself not see and hear 
myself, then? - That can be said 
••• My own relation to my words is wholly different to other 
people·s. (ibid. pp. 191-2) 
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There is also the 'Wittgensteinian snort' discussed in another 
context (see p. 199 below). A 'deep resolution' of Moore's paradox 
will, however, require an explanation of the authority of belief 
self-ascriptions. 
(vi) What does Evans' account show? Qualified avowals defined 
Evans' account, though very similar to Wittgenstein's in its 
analysis, does not really offer much by way of such an explanation. 
What does his account show? Let us begin by examining more clearly 
the notion of 'qualified' avowal. From the discussion of the 
location of error in (to take our central example so far) belief 
self-ascriptions, and of Evans' account, we can now say how far 
these self-ascriptions conform to the Famous Five. They do so, in 
fact, in a qualified waY1 the qualifications stem from the behaviour 
of the propositional element, and the consequent non-immediacy of 
self-knowledge in the case of belief (cf. pain). Here are the five 
features, modified so that they constitute features of 'gualified' 
avowals - viz. propositional attitude self-ascriptions with belief 
as the paradigm: 
(i) There are no grounds for the utterance 'I believe 
that p' over and above the grounds for 'pl. 
(ii) IEM 
(iii) My very utterance of 'I believe that p' is a criterion for 
the correctness of 'He believes that p' said of myself by 
another - except when the subject has misidentified the 
object of his belief (see below). 
(iv) When X, comprehendingly and without intending to deceive, 
utters II believe that p', the truth of 'He believes that 
p' said of X is guaranteed - except as under (iii). 
(v) 'I doubt whether I believe that p' has no use except as an 
expression of doubt whether p, and no use at all after the 
1 
utterance of the avowal 'I believe that p'. 
Features (i), (ii) and (v) are each directly connected with the 
1 
Intervention of the Unconscious aside. 
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Evans principle. Because my beliefs are something I have a part in 
forming (they are not simply 'given'), because they are 'plastic' 
and responsive to information, my knowledge of them cannot be 
'immediate' as in the case of pains. There may be a period when, 
since I am considering whether p, there is no fact of the matter 
about whether I believe it or not. And we have already seen how 
misleading it is to ask certain questions (about whether my attitude 
towards p is one of belief or something else) which imply that there 
is always such a fact of the matter. Features (i) and (v) show that 
the presence of grounds and the possibility of doubt always pertain 
to the embedded proposition (the propositional element) and not to 
the complete self-ascription. 
There is a minor difficulty in the suggestion that 'qualified' 
avowals straightforwardly exhibit features (iii) and (iv) of our 
original formulation. Suppose I say, comprehendingly and without 
intending to deceive, 'I believe that Bill Bailey won't be going 
home tonight', intending to refer to a man slumped in the corner of 
the crowded room rather the worse for drink. But I have misidenti-
fied the object of my belief - it is not Bill Bailey but Fred Smith. 
It would not, I presume, be correct for someone to say of me 'He 
believes that Bill Bailey won't be going home tonight'. Assessing 
the significance of this point involves opening a can of worms; 
clearly, however, as in the modification of the Famous Five just 
discussed, the qualification stems from the behaviour of the 
1 
propositional element alone. 
It is worth noting at this point that we have arrived at a 
more rigorous account of what Rorty terms 'mental features' (cf. 
'events') than is provided by that author in his interesting article 
'Incorrigibility as the Mark of the Mental' ([1970] pp. 399-424). 
He exaggerates the extent to which avowals of propositional attitude 
can be subject to honest mistake, presumably because he has not 
carefully distinguished the merely apparent from the genuine cases 
(see under 'The propositional element', pp. 152-56), and writes: 
1 
This example is related to those of de re beliefs 
discussed under the earlier heading 'The propositional 
element' (pp. 152-56). 
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Statements about beliefs, desires, emotions, and intentions 
['mental features'] are implicit predictions of future 
behaviour, predictions which may be falsified. Such 
justification provides an accepted procedure for over-riding 
[1st-person] reports. In this they are distinct from reports of 
thoughts and sensations ['mental events'] which are compatible 
with any range of future behaviour. 
But the fact that we are not incorrigible in our reports of 
mental features as we are about mental events should not blind 
us to the fact that we are almost incorrigible. The possibility 
of over-riding reports about such features is real, but is 
actualised only rarely Further, as such mental features as 
beliefs and desires become more particular and limited and, 
thus, approach the status of episodes rather than dispositions, 
they become more incorrigible ( ibid. p. 420). 
The initial point to note is the ambiguity in the first sentence 
quoted - clearly, 3rd-person ascriptions of propositional attitude 
are implicit predictions, but the way in which 1st-person 
ascriptions figure as 'qualified' avowals makes it seem highly 
dubious that one should say the same about them. Further, we have 
given content to the 'almost incorrigible' status of the latter by 
describing them as 'qualified' avowals - and discussing the cases 
where the possibility of over-riding such avowals is actualised. 
The explanation of this intermediate 'qualified' avowal status in 
terms of reference to an intermediate and fluctuating position on an 
episode-disposition continuum looks enticing - but as in all 
generalisations about the mental, care is needed to avoid being 
trapped by pictures of appalling crudity. Less tentative judgement 
awaits discussion of other self-ascriptions - and I consider Rorty's 
views a little further in my treatment of the central question of 
expression (pp. 227-29 below). 
Now in answer to the question 'what does Evans' account 
show?', I will say 'It shows that self-ascriptions of belief are 
"qualified" avowals' in the sense just given; and little more. For 
Evans has not explained the authority that the 'qualified' avowals 
express (our central problem again); how is it that the procedure I 
put into operation for deciding whether p does not, in addition to 
deciding whether I believe that p, also decide whether my mother 
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believes that p? It might be thought that Evans has given us 
something in his observation that 'one's eyes are ••• directed 
outward - upon the world' in belief self-ascriptions. But the 
Wittgensteinian inspiration for this observation should bring to 
one's attention the fact that the data Evans adduces (for that is 
what they are) are equally compatible with a non-assertoric account 
- that belief self-ascriptions are non-assertoric speech-acts which 
do not serve to express self-knowledge. In response to Evans' claim 
that 'if a judging subject applies this procedure [as outlined], 
then necessarily he will gain knowledge of his own mental states', 
one may say: 'That is certainly correct, but you still owe us an 
account of what this knowledge consists in'. Such an account forms 
the conclusion of this chapter; and the particular case of 
'qualified' avowals is treated on pp. 231-33. 
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4.3) Avowals of Desire 
I will now discuss desire as the paradigm of a propositional 
attitude with a different 'direction of fit' with the world to that 
of belief, before moving on to perceptual experience and other 
mental states closer to the 'pain' paradigm. The analogies with 
belief will become apparent. No more need be said on the first two 
possible sources of error in the self-ascription 'I desire that pi; 
clearly it must be IEM, and the possibility of error in the attitude 
component has already been discussed. In connection with the 
propositional element (the embedded proposition), the points made 
about belief will carryover to desire; but the analogies with 
errors in the 'normal' (non-unconscious) cases need spelling out. 
As in the case of belief, some apparently mistaken avowals are 
not genuinely so. Take generally debilitated Gerald, who avows 
'What I want is a change of job'. So he gives up his employment as 
a highly-paid computing engineer and goes off to manage an hotel in 
the Outer Hebrides - where he is thoroughly miserable, missing the 
intellectual challenge of computing. One should not too readily 
assume that Gerald was mistaken in his avowal. More likely (though 
it would depend on a fuller description of the case) one should say 
that he made a mistake about the consequences of satisfying it; that 
if he'd consulted his doctor he would have discovered that his 
debility was in fact the result of a thyroid condition or, more 
picturesquely, a mid-life crisis, which a change of job would be 
ineffective in curing or resolving. In this the example would be 
analogous with one option in the example 'I believe that socialism 
is the best system' discussed earlier - in each case the subject 
comes to realise he has been mistaken about the consequences of the 
embedded proposition (or rather, the causal consequences of its 
1 
obtaining). 
1 
Likewise analogously with belief, 'I'm not sure whether 
that's what I want' is not an expression of ignorance about 
one's determinate mental state, but rather a reflection of the 
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More so than in the Thatcher example of allegedly mistaken 
belief, the pressure to regard the subject's avowal of his desire as 
mistaken may persist. It is well to understand the origin of this 
pressure. Part of the trouble may lie in an equivocation in the 
sense of 'satisfaction' when one talks of the 'satisfaction' of a 
desire. It is important to note that the satisfaction of a desire 
need not be satisfying; if a desire is satisfied, I need get no 
satisfaction out of it. However, we generally look for an 
explanation of the latter (unusual) phenomenon by constructing a 
practical inference schema. In order for us to regard a given case 
as one where the satisfaction of a desire has been unsatisfying, 
rather than saying that the subject made a mistaken avowal of the 
desire in the first place, we need to place the desire in question 
in the context of such a schema. It is then regarded as the desire 
satisfaction of which is incorrectly believed to be the means 
towards satisfying some higher-level desire. Thus Gerald wants to 
slough off his debility, and his desire to change his job is the 
unfortunate product of reasoning that a change of job is the means 
to the former end. (Questions about the justificatory compared with 
the explanatory role of the practical syllogism, and about how the 
latter can be fulfilled where it appears no conscious deliberation 
has occurred, cannot be allowed to detain us here.) This practice 
suggests that there are two principles about desire that need to be 
respected, tension between which the practice serves to lessen: 
(A) The desires ascribed to an agent must generally be such that 
their satisfaction is satisfying to him. 
(B) An agent's sincere avowals of desire are generally correct. 
It is interesting to note how principle (A) can begin that process 
of divorcing desire-ascription from avowal which has as its end-
result the justification of political tyranny. Both Rousseau's 
'forced to be force' dictum and Marxist accounts of the 'false 
consciousness' of those who adhere to 'bourgeois freedom' may make 
implicit appeal to the idea that an agent only really wants what is 
(according to Rousseau or Marx) in his fundamental interest. The 
indeterminacy of that state at that time (cf. Wittgenstein: 
Z 57). 
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authority of avowals of desire is, on such accounts, a heavily 
qualified one - if their talk of desire is other than a facon de $ 
parler. For present purposes, it is important simply to note that 
constraints on principle (A) are supplied by the need to respect 
principle (B). 
Cases of genuine error are, as in the case of belief, two -
cases where the Unconscious is implicated (on which no more need be 
said), and cases where the object is misidentified. Say I exper-
ience the delights of a liqueur known as 'Burns' Scotch Cream', but 
subsequently confuse it with the more well-known 'Bailey's Irish 
Cream'. I then avow 'I desire a measure of that excellent Bailey's 
Irish Cream' - a liqueur which I have never in fact tasted. It is 
clear in this case that what I in fact desire is Burns' Scotch Cream 
- as becomes apparent when I am offered some Bailey's, find it to be 
disgusting and cast around for an explanation. The importance of 
causal origin in determining the direction of a desire upon a 
particular object is apparent here (analogously to its role in the 
case of thought and object - see e.g. Wright [1983] pp. 100-101). 
There is a certain picture of desire which makes misident-
ification seem a more cornmon possibility than it is in the case of 
belief. Desires can be seen as forces to which propositional 
contents are attached but which are primarily to be identified in 
1 
terms of their 'fate' rather than their object. One may indeed 
not be conscious of desires at the appetitive or impulsive end of 
the desire continuum (as opposed to desires which are the product of 
practical reasoning). The self-ascriptions of such desires may turn 
out to be non-avowals ascribed on a behavioural basis rather than 
2 
'qualified' avowals. But in the case of the kinds of desire 
the self-ascription of which is authoritative, the Evans principle 
1 
Such a picture is favoured by Freudian theory, with 
its requirement of persisting desires with transient 
objects (see Wollheim [1979] p. 47). 
2 
If the use of 'desire' in question is extensional, 
the apparent avowal will be non-authoritative. Such 
cases will be analogous to 'I enjoy ••• ', which is 
extensional. 
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about the direction of the subject's attention carries over from 
belief. If I'm wondering whether I believe that p, I'm not doing 
anything over and above wondering whether p is true. Likewise, if 
I'm wondering whether I desire that p, I'm not doing anything over 
and above wondering whether p is good (pleasurable, useful or 
whatever). (R.M. Hare, in his [1952], attempted to demonstrate a 
tight connection between goodness and preference, but his view has 
been disputed, and it would seem unwise to insist on a similarly 
tight connection between goodness and desire.) 
169 
4.4) Avowals of Perceptual Experience 
(i) 'Sense-data' and non-avowals of perceptual experience 
The question of the self-ascription of perceptual experience 
is of such difficulty it makes that of the self-ascription of 
propositional attitudes seem quite straightforward in comparison. 
Once again we will turn to Evans for assistance, but will find that 
his insights are possibly mixed with confusions. 
Self-ascriptions of perceptual experience enjoy a significant 
position in epistemology, because of their historical role in 
attempts to discover alleged foundations of empirical knowledge. 
The recourse frequently made to them as expressions of certain 
knowledge on which the rest of our epistemic commerce with the world 
is based is a symptom of their status as avowals. In the empiricist 
tradition, avowals like 'I seem to see something red', ' ••• hear a 
high-pitched noise', ' ••• feel something hot', refer to 'sense-data' 
or 'sense-impressions' with which the subject's acquaintance is 
direct, immediate and certain. Claims about the world ('I see 
something red', etc., being minimal instances) may then be 
'inferred' from these avowals; the 'sense-data' thus have a logical 
role as well as the causal role they playas mental products of the 
physical objects, inferences to the existence of which the avowals 
license. This dual role is worth bearing in mind in the context of 
discussion of more sophisticated accounts of perception - including 
that of Gareth Evans, whose 'information-states' may trace their 
ancestry, in some distant way, to sense-data. 
Unfortunately for the sense-datum theorist (though this may be 
the least of his troubles) the class of avowals of perceptual 
experience is both more limited, and also perhaps (more seriously) 
unacceptably wider, than he may want to say. Firstly, 'appearances' 
can be 'objective' too. For it is of course possible to imagine a 
dispute over whether something looks red; think of two parties 
looking at cave drawings in poor lighting conditions, for instance. 
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'It looks red' isn't grammatically an avowal, of course; but as J.L. 
Austin notes, even when the claim becomes 1st-personal and thus 
'safer', it need not thereby be made incorrigible. Adding an 'It 
seems to me that' or an 'I seem to see' operator will not automat-
ically convert the claim in question into an avowal in our sense of 
the term. Austin, in the course of his remorseless and conclusive 
demolition of sense-datum theories ([1962]), points out that I can 
be honestly mistaken in the self-ascription of perceptual experience 
involving any but the very simplest observational concepts - and 
perhaps even with the latter: 
'It seems to me personally, here and now, as if I were seeing 
something magenta' ••• may be more cautious [than 'That is 
magenta'], but it isn't incorrigible ••• there is always the 
possibility not only that I may be brought to admit that magenta 
wasn't the right word to pick on for the colour before me, but 
also that I may be brought to see ••• that the colour before me 
1 just wasn't magenta ( ibid. p. 113). 
Evans similarly contends that 'I seem to see eleven points of light 
arranged in a circle' is not immune to honest mistake - the subject 
may have miscounted, forgetting where he began. He goes on to 
comment that in the case of very simple concepts (colour words like 
'red') it is hard to make sense of a mistake: 
[but] this sort of infallibility is rather limited and 
uninteresting. And it is of a quite different kind from that 
which arises in the case of the self-ascription of belief 
( ibid. p. 229). 
(We shall consider these comments later - see p. 175.) In conclus-
ion, then, claims about what I seem to experience, about what things 
appear or look to me to be like (a mixed collection) do not always 
constitute a retreat into personal experience on which the subject 
has authority. Rather than viewing such self-ascriptions as making 
definite claims about a percept, rather one should view them as 
making tentative (though still revisable) claims about an object -
1 
But see p. 173 below. 
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or sometimes as making no (further) claim at all. If, to take an 
Austinian example, I am challenged in my claim 'I see a pig', I may 
reply 'It looks like a pig' - another statement about the world. Or 
perhaps 'It seems to me like I see a pig' - more a retreat to one's 
disposition to make the original claim than an expression of or 
report on personal experience. 
(ii) 'Avowal' is a category of tokens, not types 
This brings us to our second point. For just as 'IEM' is 
applicable to a category of sentence-tokens rather than sentence-
types, so is 'avowal'. This point should have been apparent from 
the comments on 'non-avowal' uses of e.g. 'I am afraid'; which is 
not to say that all avowals have corresponding non-avowal uses 
(e.g. 'I feel hot'). It is thus apparent that, under certain 
conditions, plain statements of the form 'I see , . .. , 'I hear 
etc. may also constitute avowals (to the discomfiture, clearly, of 
our historical stalking-horse, the sense-datum theorist). However, 
in order to make out these claims, a non-circular characterisation 
of the conditions under which some token is an avowal is required. 
This is so at least for the reason that feature (iv) of the Famous 
Five already states conditions under which the utterance of 'I am in 
pain' guarantees the truth of 'He is in pain' said of me; conditions 
which will now require supplementation, but which already in fact 
imply that 'avowal' is a category of tokens. The conditions are, if 
the reader recalls, that the utterance is (a) comprehending, and 
(b) not intended to deceive. If we want to preserve the notion of 
an interesting class of avowals, we must be careful to show how 
these and further conditions do not constitute ad hoc revisions of 
what is (it will be suggested) a theoretical claim (that there is 
such a class), made in order to accommodate genuine counter-
examples. (Some may think this move has already been made, and that 
the possibility of error due to thinking that an ache is a species 
of pain, shows that 'I am in pain' is not interestingly 
incorrigible.) 
The waters are becoming murky. But we can at least say more 
about what these aforementioned supplementary conditions appear to 
be! Austin, in the course of his criticism of the notion of 
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1 
'intrinsic incorrigibility' notes that whether a statement is 
incorrigible 
is not a matter of what kind of sentence I use in making my 
statement, but of what the circumstances are in which I make it. 
If I carefully scrutinise some patch of colour in my visual 
field, take careful note of it, know English well, and pay 
scrupulous attention to what I am saying, I may say 'It seems to 
me now as if I were seeing something pink'; and nothing whatever 
could be produced as showing that I had made a mistake ( ibid. 
p. 114). 
The further condition for avowals of perceptual experience which the 
passage suggests is: 
(c) the utterer exercises appropriate care in his observation 
and judgement. 
But is 'appropriate care' strong enough? The formulation 
(c ) the utterer does not make an avoidable mistake 
1 
is stronger, but clearly more open to the charge of circularity. 
Ginet, in the course of his discussion of the infallible justif-
ication of knowledge-claims about one's current conscious state, 
makes a distinction between 'avoidable carelessness or inattention' 
and being 'the unwitting victim of unnoticed slips in calculation or 
delusory impressions of sense or memory or misleading appearances or 
evidence' ([1975] p. 59). When one arrives at this level of refine-
ment one knows one must be approaching the dizzy heights of the 
Grice-Strawson battle on non-natural meaning; and similar doubts 
arise as to whether it is the Homeric Opposition or the War of 
2 
Jenkins' Ear that is being decided. 
1 
Developed e.g. by G. Pitcher in his [1971], pp. 20ff. 
2 
In fact, of course, this conflict between England and 
Spain, provoked in 1739 when an English sea-captain lost his 
ear apparently at Spanish hands, was a serious one -
developing into the Seven Years' War. 
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(iii) Is there 'an interesting class of avowals?' 
It is worth noting that the range of observational judgements, 
tokens of which can constitute avowals, needs to be limited in a 
further way, moreover. For presumably the concepts involved must be 
non-technical; otherwise the requirement of comprehending utterance 
will just be an ad hoc sponge to soak up counter-examples. Thus, 
Austin's earlier 'magenta' example would not in fact constitute an 
avowal, whereas 'I seem to see something pink' would. (Many people 
would need a colour chart to decide whether something was magenta; 
the use of such a criterion would violate feature (i) of the Famous 
Five, at least.) But Austin would not be sympathetic to the idea 
that there is an 'interesting class of avowals'; there are just lots 
of different kinds of sentences which may be uttered in making 
statements that are in fact incorrigible ( ibid. p. 115). He wants 
to say that there is no interesting difference in respect of 
incorrigibility between 'I seem to see something pink' and examples 
such as the following: 
••• if I watch for some time an animal a few feet in front of me 
in a good light, if I prod it perhaps, sniff, and take note of 
the noises it makes, I may say, 'That's a pig'; and this too 
will be 'incorrigible'; nothing could be produced that would 
show that I had made a mistake. (ibid. p. 114) 
It is clearly necessary for an avowal to have 1st-personal grammat-
ical form; and 'That's a pig' is ruled out because it is not an 
avowal of some state of the subject, and hence cannot exhibit 
features (iii) and (iv) of the Famous Five which express the 
subject's authority. It might be thought, however, that the 
similarities between the two kinds of example Austin adduces at this 
point are sufficiently close, and the differences such grammatical 
inessentials, as to show that: 
(1) There may be no interesting class of avowals 
and/or (2) The solution of the 'problem' of avowals lies in showing 
how the incorrigibility of the latter is nothing unique 
or special. 
But this is mistaken. Our problem with the self-ascription of 
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perception arises just on the assumption that there is an 
interesting class of avowals the conditions on which we do not want 
to over-dilute; so cannot constitute an argument against the 
proposition that there is such a class. What marks out the class of 
avowals as interesting is that the subject cannot honestly be 
mistaken about the state he is in, and so feature (iv) of the Famous 
Five specifies as conditions only sincere and comprehending use. 
However, it might be insisted that perceptual self-ascriptions 
have to be central to the class of avowals, without which the claim 
of an interesting, unified such class lacks credibility. The 
following argument might then be pressed: 
Your claim dies the death of a thousand qualifications. I 
present a counter-example to your contention that a certain 
range of utterance-tokens exhibit the incorrigibility of 
avowals, and you promptly add on an extra condition accordingly. 
And so on. But your conditions are either insufficient or 
circular; which goes to show that they are mere ad hoc 
responses to a contention which is surely correct, viz. that one 
can specify no genuine unifying features common to this so-
called class of avowals. 
Austin would be sympathetic to the conclusion of this line of 
reasoning, if not to its premises. It is more likely to be deployed 
by a physicalist for whom the thought that the results of a 
scientific psychology must be beholden to a dogma of (obnoxious 
phrase) 'folk-psychology' (viz. the authority of avowals) is 
intolerable. Indeed, he would do better to deploy it than give time 
1 
to some of the more tendentious objections to this dogma. 
Now, it is certainly true that the Famous Five are meant to be 
1 
See e.g. Armstrong (1963] p. 424. He supposes that a 
correlation indicating identity has been established between 
a sensation of red and a brain-state - say 'no. 143'. It is 
conceivable, he suggests, that the subject should truthfully 
report such a sensation when he is not in that brain-state -
under laboratory conditions including administration of a 
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'salient features' of the class of avowals, and not necessary and 
sufficient conditions. Can one not then reply to the critic that 
the fact that the conditions are 'either insufficient or circular' 
doesn't matter? (One might go on to contend that avowals exhibit a 
mere 'family resemblance'.) Well, it is certainly true that we're 
not bothered about the kind of insufficiency implied by the 
following example. An actor on stage says, comprehendingly and 
without intending to deceive (and in all seriousness - acting is a 
serious business), 'I am in pain'. Yet the utterance is not, in 
contrast to other sincere and comprehending uses, an avowal. This 
is no worry to the present account, because no one would ever take 
such an utterance to be an avowal. (Indeed, mention has earlier 
been made of non-avowal tokens of e.g. 'I am afraid', etc. - though 
not, of course, of 'I am in pain'.) And we are not trying to build 
up an exhaustive, sufficient account that will exclude cases like 
that. However, the kind of insufficiency apparent in the perceptual 
cases is more important. Here, something looks like an avowal, but 
then fails to yield the appropriate guarantee as in Feature (iv) of 
the Five. Our account seems to be insufficient because it fails to 
include such cases. 
The objection of 'death by a thousand qualifications' 
overstates the case however. Perceptual self-ascriptions are 
important, but it is not essential that they be incorporated in the 
category of 'paradigm' avowals. Given this fact, it would be 
preferable to retain the integrity of the latter as a category where 
'honest mistake' is impossible, and to view 'avowals of perception' 
as akin to 'qualified' avowals, though puzzlingly more open to 
honest error. This would not be to endorse Evans' over-confident 
view that the infallibility in perceptual self-ascription is 'rather 
limited and uninteresting', and quite different from that of the 
self-ascription of belief. 
'truth-drug'. Armstrong's unquenchable scientism leads him to 
conclude that it is therefore possible for someone to believe 
he has a sensation of red when he doesn't have it. 
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(iv) Evans on self-ascription of perceptual experience; 
'intermediate avowals' 
We are left, then, with the conclusion that the avowal-status 
of perceptual experience is at best harder to define than that of 
self-ascriptions of belief; paradoxically, it might seem, given that 
the former are closer to the sensation paradigm of avowal than are 
the latter. Be that as it may, there is the same temptation in both 
cases to construe the self-knowledge involved (if such it is) on the 
model of 'looking within'. It would be useful, therefore, to 
examine an account of the self-ascription of perceptual experience 
(that of Evans) which, for all that it fails to discuss the kind of 
complexities in that experience brought out by our preceding 
discussion, does aim to avoid such a model. 
A perceptual experience is, according to Evans, an 'informat-
ional state' of the subject. In the present connection, such states 
share with sense-data what appears to be both a causal and a logical 
role (or some mixture of the two). They are 'internal', possess 
'content' ('the world is represented in a certain way') and some of 
them serve as 'input' to the 'concept-exercising and reasoning sys-
tem'. Judgements are 'based upon (reliably caused by)' these inter-
nal states; but though they possess (non-propositional??) content, 
the states are 'non-conceptualised'. The crucial point which Evans 
insists on is that though the subject's perceptual judgements are 
'based on informational states', they are not 'about' those states: 
His internal state cannot in any sense become an object to him. 
(He is in it.) ( ibid. p. 227). 
A subject can gain knowledge of such states (that is, I presume, can 
come to know simply how things appear to him to be) - but only in a 
roundabout way, by 
trying to make a judgement about how it is at this place now, 
1 
but excluding any knowledge he has of an extraneous kind 
( ibid. p. 227). 
1 
Evans refers us to Dummett's 'What is a Theory of 
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In contrast to the case of belief, though, this procedure does not 
produce infallible knowledge of the mental state - as we have 
already seen from the 'II points of light' and other examples (see 
p. 170). 
Now, Evans is quite explicit in denying that an informational 
state can have a justificatory or inferential role with regard to 
some perceptual judgement. That is, I do not and cannot (as sense-
datum theorists would require) infer, from the fact that I have some 
informational state, that the world is or appears to be thus-and-so; 
nor can I justify the latter judgement by appeal to my informat-
ional state. Such states are not, unlike the sense-data with which 
they are being compared, objects to their subject. However, it 
seems to the present writer that, from what it is possible to 
understand of Evans' highly compressed and abstract account, one 
ought to have some misgivings on this score. He comments that, in 
contrast to the case of belief, with perception 
there is something (namely an internal, informational state of 
the subject), distinct from his judgement, to which his 
judgement aims to be faithful ( ibid. p. 230). 
Though Evans goes on to insist that this 'something' is necessarily 
to be approached in the roundabout way he has described (by trying 
to make a judgement about how it is at this place now, but excluding 
any extraneous knowledge), one wonders how nonetheless a judgement 
can aim to be 'faithful' to something that is not an object to the 
judger. Further doubts arise from the statement that judgements are 
'based on (reliably caused by)' the informational states. Under-
lining of the relation does not help to make it clearer; the 
suggestion that only non-deviant causal chains can be allowed 
Meaning? (II)' ([1976] p. 95) for an explanation of 'extran-
eous'; but the single sentence there (a short one by Dummett's 
standards) is not greatly illuminating. The idea seems, 
however, to be that inferential knowledge is ruled out; 
e.g. if I seem to see a dagger, but know I have taken a 
hallucinogen, the knowledge I may have that the dagger is 
delusory counts as extraneous. 
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between the informational state and the judgement, makes an opponent 
of causal theories in the philosophy of mind wonder whether the 
relation between the two might not in fact be a logical one. 
Whatever the status of avowals of perceptual experience, there 
is nonetheless an intermediate sub-category of non-paradigm avowals 
which yet do not express propositional attitudes. This important 
sub-category is in fact rather a rag-bag. Avowals of perceptual 
experience (if such they are) have no connected natural behavioural 
expression; but nor are they, in a range of cases at least, subject 
to holistic constraint. Avowals of certain moods or feelings 
equally do not have connected natural expression, but are subject to 
holistic constraint. Moods and feelings thus fall into two 
categories: 
(a) Those which figure in 'paradigm' avowals. These are mental 
episodes whose origin is best viewed in causal terms, and 
for which if distressing to the subject the best injunction 
is 'pull yourself together'. 
(b) Those which figure in the sub-category which, for want of a 
better term, we may call 'intermediate' avowals. These are 
more enduring or recurring mental items whose origin should 
be viewed in intentional terms, and which if troublesome may 
call for some kind of analysis. 
It is important, in everyday life, to be clear about this distinct-
ion; much distress can be caused by mistaking the latter for the 
former, and much time wasted by mistaking the former for the latter. 
For instance, a feeling of remorse will fit into category (b). It 
has no natural behavioural expression over and above that perhaps 
associated with depression - than which it is clearly more refined. 
Its self-ascription must fit into a coherent self-image the subject 
presents to the world - in contrast to a feeling of depression, the 
relative transience and non-intentional provenance of which mean 
1 
that it need not so fit. Holistic constraints notwithstanding, 
1 A feeling of remorse must be accompanied by a number of 
beliefs about one's responsibility, the unhappy nature of the 
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we are peculiarly dependent for our discernment of intermediately 
avowable states on the subject's verbal expression of them. 
state of affairs one has brought about; and by a desire to 
ameliorate that state of affairs, perhaps. One might then 
say, that although 'intermediate' avowals do not express 
propositional attitudes, they imply them. 
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4.5) An Argument to the Non-Assertoric Thesis 
(i) Statement of the argument from non-justifiability 
We now turn from discussion of the different sorts of avowal 
to the general issue. In my account of the arguments from IEM to 
the 'no-reference' view, I contrasted the conclusion there with that 
of the arguments for the non-assertoric thesis, suggesting that in 
the latter case there was a motive for accepting it, but in the 
former case there were simply the arguments (p. 101). This was 
slightly unfair on the 'no-reference' view; for since arguments for 
the non-assertoric thesis, as distinct from mere anti-Cartesian 
motives for its acceptance, have been rather thin on the ground, one 
might in fact find the contrast favourable to the former. Is the 
non-assertoric thesis a mere proposed panacea, a label for the 
desired solution? 
It should come as no surprise that given the Wittgensteinian 
pedigree of both positions, some useful parallels may be drawn in 
the effort to give an argumentative justification for the non-
assertoric thesis. Here is an analogue of principle (K) for 
knowledge (p. 104 above): 
(A) 'X sincerely asserts that p' is meaningfully assertable only 
if possibly on the same occasion (p and X sincerely asserts that 
1 
~p) • 
Why should one adhere to such a principle which has the effect of 
legislating avowals as non-assertoric? In the case of (K), we 
relied on the idea that in cognitive as well as other kinds of 
achievement, failure must be a possibility for the notion of 
achievement to be applicable. How does 'sincere' assertion involve 
1 
The 'same occasion' qualification is necessary even in 
its possible vagueness to accommodate the fact that 'avowal' 
is a token-category. 
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a cognitive achievement? Not in a direct sense. There is some 
requirement on the speaker's comprehension of the expressions used 
in the utterance, which would require a cognitive achievement 
(language-learning). But the 'indirect' connection I have in mind 
between assertion and cognitive achievement is rather one derived 
from arguments of Huw Price ([1983J pp. 354-7). 
Price is concerned inter alia to define the notion of 
assertoric force, and commences by discussing one function of the 
terms 'true' and 'false' - 'to provide a uniform means of endorsing 
or rejecting a statement made by a previous speaker' ( ibid. p. 
1 
355). This characterisation is insufficient as it stands, 
Price argues, though a step in the right direction is made by 
Dummett when he writes 
the roots of the notions of truth and falsity lie in the 
distinction between a speaker's being, objectively, right or 
wrong in what he says when he makes an assertion ([1978] 
p. xvii). 
We need the notions of 'right' and 'wrong' here because questions, 
commands, requests etc. can be 'endorsed' or 'rejected' just as 
assertions can; yet only assertions can be true or false. Yet we 
still need an account of the function and consequences of the forms 
of criticism ('right', 'wrong', 'correct', 'incorrect', etc.) that 
Dummett has in mind. Price writes: 
It seems ••• that the primary significance of these forms of 
criticism lies in the fact that they constitute a challenge to a 
speaker to justify an utterance, and an indication of readiness 
on the part of the critic to engage in a dispute ••• Ideally the 
more well-justified [view] prevails ••• Plausibly, there is 
enough of a general advantage in such dispute behaviour to 
explain the existence of a powerful linguistic device to 
1 
He also genuflects to Davidson, being concerned to raise 
a difficulty for radical interpretation and the notion of 
'holding true'. But what he has to say has an importance 
exceeding such merely fashionable concerns. 
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facilitate it (i.e. the use of 'true' and 'false') ( ibid. 
p. 356). 
When one looks at society today, the prevalence of better-justified 
views must seem very 'ideal' indeed; yet such fin de si~cle 
pessimism does not affect the philosophical point. Price goes on to 
sum up his argument by substituting 'belief' for the imprecise 
'view'; disputes between speakers over utterances expressing, say, 
desires would seem to have little point, whereas 
some utterances (call them 'assertions') characteristically 
express states of mind ('beliefs') with respect to which there 
is reason to seek agreement between speakers (viz. the 'general 
advantage' above) ( ibid. p. 356). 
Where does this connection of assertion with justification get 
us? Well, if truth or falsity are predicable of any assertion, and 
only of assertions, and if the function of such predication is as 
outlined, then an assertion must be something for which it is 
1 
possible to gave a justification. But if it is not possible on 
some occasion both for p to be true and for X sincerely to assert 
its negation, then on that occasion the idea of a justification for 
the putative assertion that p has no place. When Mrs. Thatcher 
makes some claim about the principles of management of the economy, 
say 'It's just like running a very large grocer's shop in Grantham', 
she may think that justification for such a self-evident proposition 
2 
has no place, but nonetheless it is possible. ('Justification' 
1 
This may amount to the idea that to assert something is 
to make a knowledge-claim. 
2 
The Thatcher example may in fact indicate that the 
principle should be stronger; not just that there can be a 
justification, but that on the occasion in question the 
subject is prepared to offer one. Indeed this strengthening 
may be necessary in order to anchor 'assertion' as a token-
category; since the attitude of the subject towards the 
utterance will be part of the 'occasion of utterance'. What I 
have in mind is this. If Mrs. Thatcher is not prepared to 
offer a justification for her putative assertion, it might be 
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does not mean 'conclusive justification'; simply that reasons can be 
given or evidence adduced in support of the proposition.) As in the 
case of knowledge, principle (A) expresses the requirement that a 
mistake must be possible for something to count as an assertion - in 
this case, further, since we're concerned with a linguistic act 
where deceit is possible, it must be possible for the subject to be 
honestly mistaken. (Hence the qualification 'sincere assertion'.) 
The rationale for this requirement in the case of knowledge stems 
straightforwardly from the status of knowing as an achievement. In 
the case of assertion, the connection is with the 'achievement' of 
justification via an account which marks off assertoric from other 
speech-acts in terms of the unique appropriateness of dispute-
behaviour and its linguistic facilitation, which would be otiose if 
the kind of mistake specified in (A) were impossible. Avowals will 
fail test (A), and therefore, so the argument goes, cannot be 
assertions. 
(ii) ReSponses 
It may be thought that the connection of assertion and 
justification has its origin in an idea that renders dubious the 
application of the connection to the case of avowals. For surely, 
it might be objected, the rationale for making the possibility of 
justification a requirement for assertion consists in the need to 
rule out pseudo-assertion; a disreputable kind of speech act that 
succeeds in saying or expressing nothing. Take the following 
conversation overheard recently in a London pub, let's say: 
A: I've been to the moon, you know. 
B: Get away, when was that? 
more happily viewed as a 'framework principle' in the sense of 
Wittgenstein's On Certainty and thus possibly not as an 
assertion. This function might then explain the proponent's 
unwillingness to abandon the principle; this in the face of 
the significant body of evidence pointing to the catastrophic 
national effects of the wholesale rejection of Keynesianism 
which it implies. (This would be a charitable explanation.) 
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A: Oh, sometime ... 
B: How did you get there? One of them space-shuttles, was it? 
A: Oh no. 
B: A rocket then? 
A: No ... 
B: How did you get there then? 
A: Oh, I just ••• went ••• 
B: Love-a-duck! What was it like then? 
A: Hmm ••• so-so 
1 
Etc. 
A puzzling encounter indeed. It seems that A does not recognise the 
need for some justification for his opening remark; suggesting that 
it is a vacuous pseudo-assertion rather than, say, a lie. (Whether 
it is a piece of mischief-making or an altogether stranger pheno-
menon seems immaterial.) The phenomenon objected to is the kind of 
unsavoury item intended by the Logical Positivists to be impaled on 
the horns of the dilemma 'false or meaningless'. In contrast, it 
may be argued, avowals (or putative avowals) are rarely in either of 
these latter categories, since, when sincerely uttered, they are 
true (cases of uncomprehending utterance being quite bizarre). The 
absence of justification is a bar merely to the assertoric status of 
utterances one would not want to 'endorse'. 
A different response would be to say not that the unjustif-
iability of avowals is of the sort compatible with assertoric 
status, but rather that they are not, in the relevant sense, 
'unjustifiable'. For it is possible for a speaker to justify his 
avowal, not in the sense of showing that it is not the product of a 
mistake, but in showing that it is sincere. The 'dispute-behaviour' 
Price talks of would thus take a different form. It is true that 
avowals are treated as sincere unless proven otherwise (see pp. 
224-25 below) so such disputes could not be common. But there is in 
any case always the possibility of a 3rd-personal justification of 
XiS avowal to a third party, and of a dispute there. (E.g. X avows 
1 
I am indebted to Michael Luntley for the idea of such a 
conversation - suggested to him by the passages in On 
Certainty on lunar travel (e.g. para. 106). 
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he is full of joy, and two observers subsequently disagree over 
whether XiS circumstances are such that one should regard the avowal 
as sincere.) 
The argument from non-justifiability can certainly be critic-
1 
ised, then, in the preceding way and in others, but it should 
not be derided for what it could not do. The Cartesian, for instan-
ce, may well have a different account of assertion to that outlined, 
to go with his different account of the mental; the fact that, to 
adapt Wittgenstein's metaphor, we have in connecting assertion and 
justification put two books together on the library shelf, does not 
mean that someone else will not feel like carting the whole row off 
to the bonfire (BB pp. 44-5). We will at best have succeeded in 
presenting a plausible and coherent picture, and shown what wider 
view the assertoric proponent will be committed to endorsing or 
rejecting. (Though the account of assertion implies principle (A), 
the converse does not hold; but it is difficult to conceive of an 
alternative, and unconnected, rationale for the principle.) 
(iii) The 'anti-Cartesian motive' for the thesis 
Moreover, deciding the correctness or otherwise of the Price-
inspired argument does not seem to be crucial for present purposes. 
This is because although it has the non-assertoric status of avowals 
(but also of many other putative assertions) as a conclusion, it 
does not seem to have any specific anti-Cartesian motivation of the 
sort connected with our central problem. The real argument for the 
non-assertoric thesis, though it will not be analysed as such, is 
that labelled earlier as a 'mere anti-Cartesian motive' (p. 180 
above). 
This argument can take various forms; like the arguments from 
rEM to 'no-reference', it tends to be implied in the literature and 
1 
For instance, one would have to consider the status of 
other apparent assertions ruled as non-assertoric by principle 
(A); e.g. analytic truths and indexical non-avowals that are 
incorrigible. 
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not spelled out (see p. 100). One version mentioned at the start of 
this chapter (pp. 145-47) goes like this: 
(1) If avowals are assertions, they must have truth- or 
assertion-conditions. 
(2) Avowals are assertions. 
So (3) They have truth- or assertion-conditions. 
(4) Such a condition must be the obtaining either of an 'inner' 
or an 'outer' state of the subject (one to which he has an 
access of the sort denied to others, or one to which he has 
the same kind of access as do others). 
(5) The condition cannot be 'outer' (see p. 146). 
So (6) It must be 'inner'. 
So (7) The subject's authority expressed by his avowal must be 
based on his special access to an inner state on the model 
of expert knowledge. 
But (8) This account of authority involves Cartesian incoherence. 
So (9) (=N3) Avowals do not have truth- or assertion-conditions. 
So (10) (=_2) Avowals are not assertions. 
As must be apparent, this is a rather 'impressionistic' presentat-
ion. It is simply meant to reflect the sort of thinking that is 
going on when people propose a non-assertoric thesis. The argument 
will not be analysed further here; but it will become clear in the 
course of discussion that it is the move from (6) to (7) (at least) 
that is questionable. We need first to see what the conclusion of 
the argument amounts to, however. 
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4.6) • Expression' (I) 
(i) The intuitive notion 
If avowals are not genuine assertions, what force could they 
possess? For a start, we return to the idea first canvassed on 
p. 143. There, the important remark from Zettel on the expressive 
(cf. informational) role of sentences in the 1st-person present 
tense was quoted. We need now to explore sympathetically the idea 
of • expression' which Wittgenstein, in his few cryptic remarks on 
the topic, seemed to hope offered a way forward out of the mire. I 
will begin with a few broad brushstrokes - an account of the 
intuitive notion of expression, and (in the next section) of the 
relation of the expressive thesis to behaviourism. We will then 
need to return to refine the notion of expression along lines 
suggested by Charles Taylor's article [1979]. 
The first point to note is that just because an utterance is 
• expressive' in an ordinary sense of the term, does not on the face 
of it mean that it cannot be an assertion (or some other kind of 
speech-act). In a certain context we can say of each of the 
following assertions what they express: 
(i) 'Of course, you wouldn't understand that •••• : assertion 
expressing contempt. 
(ii) 'Come up and see me sometime' (Mae West): request 
expressing interest. 
(iii) 'Don't leave me': request expressing anxiety. 
(iv) 'Go, and take your wretched dog with you!': command 
expressing disgust. 
The difference between such examples of expression, and the kind of 
expression involved with avowals, is not quite that it is only 
particular tokens of these utterances which express the attitude in 
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question. For it is only particular tokens of e.g. 'I am full of 
joy' which express joy - i.e. there are non-expressive uses, though 
every use stands in some relation to the subject's joy. (Or so one 
would put it as a corrective to an imprecise diagnosis.) It is 
rather that there is a logical relation between the avowal-type and 
the mental state in question, such that characteristically 
1 
utterance-tokens express that state. 'Of course, you wouldn't 
understand that' is only contingently related to the attitude of 
contempt; it is not part of its meaning that it expresses such an 
attitude, and must be said in a certain tone of voice and with a 
2 
certain facial expression in order to do so. Said with a 
different tone of voice, it could express a patronising attitude or 
(with a smile as well) an avuncular one, perhaps. In contrast, 'I 
believe that p' is logically related to the subject's propositional 
attitude; it characteristically expresses (rather than, say, 
reports) that attitude, and (perhaps consequently) is a criterion 
for it. In saying 'I believe that ••• ' a subject may be expressing 
any number of things, but one could not be said to have understood 
his utterance at all unless one knew that he was expressing his 
belief, and that his utterance was a criterion for his having that 
belief. 
This meaning-requirement will be an essential feature of the 
putative class of merely expressive speech-acts. That it is not 
sufficient to characterise that class is brought out by considering 
the following examples: 
(v) 'What he achieves is something the rest of us can scarcely 
even aspire to': assertion expressing admiration. 
(vi) 'He is a wicked fellow': assertion expressing moral 
disapproval. 
1 
I mean these locutions to be taken in an anodyne way; 
Wittgenstein would presumably have said that the decisive move 
in the conjuring trick had already been made, however 
(PI 308). 
2 
In contrast, avowals are made in a characteristic tone 
(see p. 226). 
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One would not understand such sentences if one did not realise that 
they characteristically (on the limited occasions of their utter-
ance) express the attitudes in question. These and utterances like 
them are criteria for these attitudes, it would seem; but we need to 
be careful in saying this. For maybe 'Go, and take your wretched 
dog with you!' and utterances like it are criteria for disgust. 
And so on. So perhaps our initial demarcation within expressive 
utterances of those which are, and those which are not, logically 
related to that which they express, does not get us very far? Well, 
there are clearly mere symptoms of e.g. admiration; in the case (v), 
the speaker might want to carry his hero's books, hold doors open 
for him, etc. Expressions of disgust as in example (iv) might 
occupy a grey area between symptoms and criteria. This does not 
imply that the class of expressive utterances that constitute some 
of the criteria for a mental state is quite indeterminate and that 
the idea of an avowal does not centrally involve a logical relation 
between an utterance and that which it expresses. 
We can add to this account, however. For the feature of 
avowal which we have been discussing is expressed in feature (iv) of 
the Famous Five. One might term this also the reflexivity condit-
ion; the very utterance of 'I am 0' is itself a criterion for the 
speaker's being 0. The other expressive utterances we have been 
discussing do not 'mirror the fact' which they express in this way; 
it is the reflexive way in which avowals operate as criteria for 
mental states which marks them out therefore. 
(ii) Wittgenstein's account 
What other features will merely expressive speech-acts 
possess? In hope of some elucidation we will turn at last to the 
remarks of the chief proponent of an expressive account of avowals, 
and pursue the course outlined on p. 187. The difficulty of 
Wittgenstein's account is of course notorious; but then what would 
be the point of entertaining a less than notoriously difficult 
account of something as familiar and difficult as the notion of 
avowal? The idea of a 'solution' to the problem of avowals is in a 
certain sense to be derided - perhaps the best that can be hoped is 
that it will corne to seem less inevitable that the alternative to 
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Cartesianism must be a sophisticated form of the behaviourism which 
Wittgenstein was also at pains to repudiate. 
The most well-known illustration of Wittgenstein's expressive 
account is his suggestion that self-ascriptions of pain supplant 
natural, unlearnt pain-behaviour. He enquires how a human being 
learns the meaning of 'pain': 
Here is one possibility: words are connected with the 
primitive, the natural, expressions of the sensation and used 
in their place (PI 244). 
That this tentative suggestion will not do in the case of other 
avowals is brought out by a remark in Zettel however: 
Pain differentiated from other sensations by a characteristic 
1 
expression (Z 483). 
Connected with this suggestion, though, is the idea that avowals of 
e.g. pain might be involuntary and non-intentional linguistic 
behaviour. There is an ambiguity in some of the formulations here, 
and we must sort this out before we ascribe to Wittgenstein this 
interpretation of 'expression'. For instance, Evans talks of 
Wittgenstein encouraging us to view avowals as 'unstructured respon-
ses to situations' ([1982] p. 209n). This might seem to suggest 
that it is explanation merely at a stimulus-response level that is 
applicable to the 1st-person psychological utterances in question; 
that the notion of the subject controlling or intending to make the 
utterance is misplaced. It is clear, however, that such an austere 
picture hardly fits more than a limited range of the class of 
avowals. A more sympathetic interpretation of Evans' phrase is 
indicated, however, when one considers various remarks in the 
Philosophical Investigations and Zettel which suggest that avowals 
are 'reactions' or 'responses' to the mental state (not to an 
(external) situation, as Evans writes). Expectation and intention 
are two examples: 
1 
Though emotions commonly do have 'characteristic 
expression-behaviour' associated with them (Z 488). 
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The statement "I am expecting a bang at any moment" is an 
expression of expectation. This verbal reaction is the movement 
of the pointer, which shows the object of expectation (Z 53). 
I reveal to him (the listener) something of myself when I tell 
him what I was going to do - Not, however, on grounds of self-
observation, but by way of a response (it might also be called 
an intuition) (PI 659). 
But is it not peculiar that there is such a thing as this 
reaction, this confession of intention? Is it not an extremely 
remarkable instrument of language? (Z 39) 
Memory is another example: 
The words with which I express my memory are my memory-reaction 
(PI 343). 
The equation of confessing and 'reacting to' one's intention 
suggests behaviour of a different order to that susceptible to a 
1 
stimulus-response model. 
However, the latter does seem to be invoked in another 
context: 
think of the sensations produced by physically shuddering: 
the words "It makes me shiver" are themselves such a shivering 
reaction; and if I hear and feel them as I utter them, this 
belongs among the rest of those sensations (PI p. 174). 
There are indeed difficulties in pinning down just what an express-
ive account is, since Wittgenstein is concerned to point out the 
range of different kinds of utterances constituted by avowals - from 
the crude response to a stimulus, to the assertoric speech-act. And 
it is those utterances in the middle of this continuum that are 
1 
There is talk of 'confessing' what one thought or dreamt 
on PI p. 222; which suggests a very limited class of 
past-tense avowals. 
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going to prove the most intractable. Wittgenstein asks whether the 
words 'I am afraid' are a description of a state of mind: 
I say 'I am afraid'; someone else asks me: 'What was that? A 
cry of fear; or do you want to tell me how you feel; or is it a 
reflection on your present state?' - Could I always give him a 
clear answer? Could I never give him one? 
A cry is not a description. But there are transitions. And 
the words 'I am afraid' may approximate, more or less, to being 
a cry. They may come quite close to this and also be far 
removed from it (PI pp. 187 and 189). 
Now 'a cry of fear' is clearly not an assertion; and if 'I am 
afraid' is uttered after reflection on one's present state, it may 
plausibly be said to constitute a self-ascription made on a 
behavioural basis. (Perhaps the object of fear is unconscious; at 
any rate I will have to think 'Look at how I have been behaving I 
must be afraid of something'. Anxiety very commonly is 
self-ascribed in this way.) The problem-case is 'I am afraid' when 
it is properly described as 'telling someone how I feel'. The 
paradox of describing an utterance simultaneously as expressive and 
as intended to be informative is implicit in the following 
quotation, in which Wittgenstein then goes on to revel in the 
paradox!: 
When it is said in a funeral oration 'We mourn our 'this is 
surely supposed to be an expression of mourning; not to tell 
anything to those present. But in a prayer at the grave these 
words would in a way be used to tell someone something. 
But here is a problem: a cry which cannot be called a 
description, which is more primitive than any description, for 
all that serves as a description of the inner life (PI p. 189). 
It is clearly time to set sail from the shores of Wittgen-
steinian paradox; but before we consult the very meagre navigational 
aids and weigh anchor, a few comments on the three kinds of case 
just discussed are in order. That category of avowals which 
'approximate' to being cries, etc. - that are involuntary or at 
least more like reactions than intentional actions - will not be 
large. It would be more usual for the 22-carat expressive utterance 
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to take the form of an elliptical exclamation or ejaculation -
'Great!' instead of 'I'm really enjoying this!', etc. But the 
expressive theorist is really going to have to insist that when I 
tell someone how I feel, or report my mental state, my utterance is 
here also genuinely and purely expressive. The non-pernicious 
alternative to such a line would be to extend the class of asser-
toric behavioural self-ascriptions, in the following way. The 
basis, it may be said, of a large class of self-ascriptions beyond 
the narrow class of genuinely expressive avowals, is not anything 
Cartesianly introspected but simply one's disposition, if asked, to 
sincerely avow that very state. Well, there will be difficulties in 
characterising this disposition - would I have to specify conditions 
which prevented my sincerely responding to any questioning for 
instance? (Would it simply be a matter of being prevented here, 
rather than choosing?) But this dispositional approach in any case 
puts the cart before the horse; I don't say 'I am in pain' because I 
recognise I'm disposed to say it, but because I'm in pain! It is 
thus a rather desperate assertoric alternative. 
The way to acceptance of the expressive thesis will be eased 
if one comes to recognise that controlled behaviour may be just as 
expressive as uncontrolled behaviour. The assumption that it isn't, 
is analogous to that viewpoint in aesthetics which sees truest 
self-expression as consisting in self-abandonment. (A viewpoint 
criticised in the present writer's Bill Evans - The Village Vanguard 
Sessions [1986].) Adherence to this viewpoint will result in 
failure to perceive much avant-garde artistic endeavour for what it 
is - the purest self-indulgence. 
Finally, it should be noted that, at the other end of the 
spectrum, the range of behaviourally self-ascribed tokens of 
avowal-types is small. Some avowal-types, such as 'I am in pain', 
have no such tokens. In a few other cases, there is genuine ambig-
uity between avowal and non-avowal tokens - e.g. 'I am depressed' 
when it merely expresses a melancholic mood and when it aspires to 
the status of a clinical judgement (in the latter case, 'depressed' 
will have a technical sense). 
We will return later to the notion of 'expression', because it 
is a key one in the resolution of the problem of avowals. What will 
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now be discussed is two kinds of criticism of a non-assertoric 
thesis. First, one directed at Wittgenstein's expressive account -
the charge that it is in fact behaviourist. Second, the troubling 
question of the existence of truth-value links between avowals and 
their other-personal transformations. In the course of the latter 
discussion, the varieties of non-assertoric thesis, and the 
characteristics of the thesis which are doing the anti-Cartesian 
work, will come more clearly into focus. 
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4.7) Problems Faced by the Non-Assertoric Thesis 
(i) 'Covert Behaviourism' 
What then of the charge of behaviourism? C. Grant Luckhardt's 
article 'Wittgenstein and Behaviourism' ([1983] pp. 318-38) is very 
clear on this matter. Luckhardt thinks that it is his account of 
avowals rather than of their 3rd-personal transformations which 
Wittgenstein fears will lead to the charge that he is a 'behaviour-
ist in disguise' ( ibid. p. 330). For if 'I am in pain' is merely 
expressive, and does not involve reference to a (private) object, 
then it may be thought that 'pain' itself has been 'cancelled out' 
and all that remains is the behaviour. 
Well, this is a problem and a famous one, and it inspires some 
of Wittgenstein's most subtle persuasion. In fact, he does not see 
the problem as arising particularly from the analysis of avowals; 
rather from the general attack on the privacy of experience (see 
e.g. PI 293). But the expressive thesis of avowals is part of the 
resultant anti-Cartesian package, and it is worth examining the 
worry about behaviourism a little further. Luckhardt is right to 
emphasise that the conclusion of the 'beetle in the box' episode is 
a conditional: 
if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on 
the model of 'object and designation' [ then] the object drops 
out of consideration as irrelevant (PI 293 - my emphasis). 
It is this point that Wittgenstein repeatedly presses against the 
objection that he is a covert behaviourist; viz. that it is only on 
his account that pain is 'relevant' to the language we use, and that 
the behaviourist and the Cartesian have a common inability to make 
it so. How? Wittgenstein first insists that there could be no 
greater difference than that between pain-behaviour accompanied by 
pain and pain-behaviour without it: 
••• "And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the 
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sensation itself is a nothing" - Not at all. It is not a 
something, but not a nothing either! The conclusion was only 
that a nothing would serve just as well as a something about 
which nothing could be said (PI 304). 
To the behaviourist, pain is simply pain-behaviour; the sensation 
itself is 'a nothing'. But it will not be made to figure in a 
public language by being made to refer to a private object, as the 
Cartesian wishes; it is only by being logically connected to its 
expression that pain can be a topic of public discourse, and it is 
this connection which the Cartesian is in effect denying. The 
passage just quoted immediately precedes a comment which is often 
cited in connection with the expressive account of avowals: 
The paradox [that pain is neither a 'something' nor a 'nothing'] 
disappears only if we make a radical break with the idea that 
language always functions in one way, always serves the same 
purpose: to convey thoughts - which may be about houses, pains, 
1 
good and evil, or anything else you please ( ibid. 304 ). 
Wittgenstein later expands on the 'idea' with which we must make a 
radical break: 
••• you regard it as too much a matter of course that one can 
tell anything to anyone. That is to say: we are so much 
accustomed to communication through language, in conversation, 
that it looks to us as if the whole point of communication lay 
in this: someone else grasps the sense of my words - which is 
something mental: he as it were takes it into his own mind. If 
he then does something further with it as well, that is no part 
of the immediate purpose of language. 
One would like to say "Telling brings it about that he knows 
that I am in pain; it produces this mental phenomenon; 
everything else is inessential to the tellingR • As for what 
this queer phenomenon of knowledge is - there is time enough for 
that ••• (PI 363). 
1 
cf. ibid. 317. 
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A familiar dialectic is in operation here - viz. that just 
because two possibilities are exclusive does not imply that they are 
exhaustive. 'Pain' in 'I am in pain' does not refer to a private 
object (a 'something'), but this does not mean it refers simply to 
pain-behaviour (leaving pain itself as a 'nothing'). There is 
another possibility undermining these two; that the utterance is 
expressive, that pain is expressed but not referred to by means of 
it. So it is not that the expressive account provokes a charge of 
behaviourism which needs to be countered, as Luckhardt maintains; 
but rather that the expressive account is part of a response to that 
charge. Having said this, the interpretation of the last two 
passages quoted is far from straightforward! Clearly, they both 
point to the hold which the descriptive model has on our thinking 
about language. Wittgenstein is concerned to point out the 
importance of other modes of speech-act; in the case of 'I am in 
pain', expression and response (assistance, sympathy etc.) rather 
than the mere transmission and receipt of information. On many 
occasions when I am in pain, I do not (perhaps cannot) tell someone 
else that I am; I just express it. And they just react - rather 
than, say, inferring that they ought to respond in certain ways. 
This, it seems to me, is at least part of the point of the cryptic 
1 
para. 363. 
If pain is not a private object, nor simply pain-behaviour, 
what is it? Insofar as this question does not mislead (see PI 308), 
one can say the following. Pain is not logically independent of 
behaviour, in two senses: 
(i) on particular occasions, certain verbal and non-verbal 
behaviour will constitute criteria for the ascription of 
pain. 
(ii) in general, one could not ascribe pain and other mental 
states to things which did not behave like human beings. 
The latter view is a sort of 'truth in behaviourism' expressed by 
Wittgenstein in order to contrast with cruder manifestations of that 
1 
See also pp. 225-26. 
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outlook: 
"But doesn't what you say come to this: that there is no pain, 
for example, without pain-behaviour?" - It comes to this: only 
of a living human being and what resembles (behaves like) a 
living human being can one say: it has sensations; it sees; is 
blind; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious (PI 281). 
Also: 
But do I also say in my own case that I am saying something to 
myself, because I am behaving in such-and-such a way? I do not 
say it from observation of my behaviour. But it only makes 
sense because I do behave in this way ( ibid. 357). 
As Luckhardt indicates, it is Wittgenstein's view that reports of 
mental states are made through reports of behaviour: 
"I noticed he was out of humour". Is this a report about his 
behaviour or about his state of mind? ("The sky looks 
threatening n : is this about the present, or the future?) Both; 
not side-by-side, however, but about the one via the other 
1 ( ibid. p. 179). 
But to comment any further on this highly suggestive passage would 
be to anticipate a projected work on the Arbitrariness of the 
Mental/Physical Distinction. 
(ii) Truth-value links (I): How could avowals subserve inferences? 
The most serious problem faced by the non-assertoric thesis, 
however, is the following: how can a sentence used to effect a 
non-assertoric utterance liaise with assertions (with which, one 
would like to say, it has 'truth-value links'), and in particular 
1 
cf. ibid. p. 223: '"What is internal is hidden from us" -
The future is hidden from us. But does the astronomer think 
like this when he calculates an eclipse of the sun?' 
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subserve inferences? The 'simple-minded' picture of the role of 
tense, whereby the making of the same statement at different times 
is facilitated, generates an objection that might be dismissed with 
a Wittgensteinian snort: 
"But surely 'I believed' must tell of the same thing in the 
past as 'I believe' in the present!" - Surely~ must mean 
just the same in relation to -1, as~ means in relation to I! 
This means nothing at all (PI p. 190). 
(That is, roughly: the '.(' sign converts 1 into a smaller rational 
number - but it doesn't do the same to -1, nothing like. 'I' con-
verts ' ••• believed' into a self-description when completed with a 
'that' - clause. But it doesn't do the same to ' ••• believe'.) 
Anscombe gave a similar snort when interrogated by the present 
writer over truth-value links between Ist- and 3rd-person statements 
(as related in Elizabeth Anscombe und der Bangor Kreis; see p. 237). 
She in effect pointed out that co-reference is the ('natural') 
explanation not the datum. Now the same is true with respect to the 
relation of avowals to their 3rd-personal and differently-tensed 
transforms. The datum here may be different though - not inter-
substitution salva veri tate, since that description presupposes the 
falsity of the non-assertoric thesis, but rather either some full 
and tedious description of the phenomenon, or maybe inter-
substitution 'preserving appropriateness of sincere utterance'. The 
kind of riposte expressed here - that 'compositionality alone 
doesn't take care of content' - is a familiar Wittgensteinian one, 
occurring also for instance in the discussion of 'It's 5 o'clock on 
the sun' (PI 350). But is it good enough in the present context? 
The more particular objection relating to inference is 
discussed in Blackburn ([1984] pp. 189-196), in the context of a 
defence of quasi-realism. (It originates with an article by Geach 
[1964], which utilises a point by Frege.) The argument Blackburn 
1 
states is this, relevantly amended. 'I am in pain' may occur 
unasserted, in contexts making up larger sentences. Yet it must 
1 
Blackburn is concerned with an expressive account of 
moral judgements rather than of avowals. 
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mean the same both embedded and on its own. This is because 'I am 
in pain' must subserve inferences, and if there were no identity of 
meaning a fallacy of equivocation would be committed. Consider the 
following: 
I am in pain 
If I am in pain I deserve sympathy 
So: I deserve sympathy. 
Anyone asserting the second, hypothetical premise is not expressing 
pain. Yet, so it is said, the meaning must be the same for the 
occurrence of 'I am in pain' as the first premise and as embedded in 
the second. This cannot be secured, and fallaciousness avoided, if 
'I am in pain' is, in non-embedded occurrences, purely expressive. 
Well, there is a problem for the non-assertoric theorist in 
the vicinity, but this is not it - as is in fact apparent from 
Blackburn's subsequent discussion. The problem of equivocation is a 
quite general one which will arise for any inference with a 
conditional premise, unless one separates force and propositional 
content. Thus, the equivocation would arise too for an assertoric 
account of 'I am in pain', since anyone asserting the second, 
hypothetical premise is not asserting 'I am in pain' either. 
In fact it was this problem amongst others which prompted 
Frege to introduce the distinction between force and content. Let's 
start with the assertoric account of 'I am in pain'; the argument 
may then be represented thus (where '~' is the sign for assertoric 
force) : 
Hp) 
J:(p -> Q) 
HQ) 
Since the ,~, sign does not represent any part of the meaning of 
either '~(P)' or '~(P ~ Q)', there is no equivocation in meaning 
between the two occurrences of 'P'. 
Likewise there will be no equivocation if there is a similar 
separation in the expressive account (where , , , . is the sign for 
'expressive force'): 
! (P) 
Hp -) Q) 
HQ) 
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There is no problem of equivocation unique to the expressive 
account, then, it seems - but other difficulties do arise! One 
might, for instance, wonder how a non-assertion could figure as the 
premise of an argument. Or (relatedly) there is the Geach point 
that Blackburn goes on to discuss in connection with the quasi-
realist account of moral judgement - viz. it seems that the ante-
cedent of a conditional needs to be able to stand as an assertion. 
For how could a mere expression of pain have an implication? 
(iii) Truth-value links (II): The Haldane Objection 
Fortunately, there is no need here to go into the issue of the 
conditional form which Blackburn discusses at some length. For even 
if the question were resolved in favour of the expressive account, 
there is a more serious objection, which I term the Haldane 
Objection, applicable specifically to an expressive account of 
avowals which makes use of the force/content distinction to surmount 
1 
the equivocation problem. This is as follows: 'By introducing 
an expressive force operator '!', and applying it to avowals in 
place of an assertoric force operator, the central problem has just 
been pushed one step back. In seeking to defuse the truth-value 
links problem by asserting a common propositional content between 
different occurrences of nI am in painn, the Trojan still needs to 
give an account of that content, with its apparently inescapably 
Cartesian truth-condition'. 
The Haldane Objection opens up a dilemma which shows that 
after all there is a problem of equivocation unique to expressive 
accounts. For the non-assertoric theorist must either assert a 
common propositional content between expressive and non-expressive 
1 
It was suggested to me by John Haldane. 
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uses (in which case he faces the Objection) or else he must go for a 
more radical option in which the original problem will re-appear. 
The proponent of this latter option will say of the former: 
It assumes that corresponding to the characteristic expression 
of 'I am in pain' there is a thought to be had - that I am in 
pain. (It is just that it cannot be asserted. But in fact it 
is an implication of the non-assertoric thesis that correspond-
ing to the truly self-conscious expression of 'I am in pain' 
(rather than any possible behavioural self-ascription) there is 
no thought to be had. Consequently 'I am in pain', though 
expressive, does not have 'expressive force' - nor any other 
kind of force. 
It is indeed an attractive idea to transcend the Haldane Objection 
in this way (though not, presumably, to those wedded to the idea of 
a systematic theory of meaning). But doesn't it open up again the 
problem stated at the outset that Blackburn raises - the problem of 
equivocation - and in just the same terms? 
Well, it is open for the radical Trojan to reply as follows: 
The use of 'I am in pain' in the first premise is clearly not 
expressive. But there is no behavioural self-ascription here, so how 
can it be assertoric either? Well, the argument is not one I ever 
seriously make use of; but if I am called upon to spell it out, I 
can represent the first premise as an assertion, verifiable in a way 
in which it never seriously is verified - behaviourally. I don't 
ever seriously go through the steps outlined in the argument but the 
charade of doing so could involve the charade of observing my own 
behaviour to check whether I am indeed in pain. And the argument 
could be represented in the Fregean manner (p. 200) to avoid 
equivocation. Thus the sense of unreality and triviality about the 
1 
objection is maintained in the response to it. (The Geach 
1 
P.M.S. Hacker seems to have a similar point in mind in 
his revised thoughts on truth-value links objections. He 
writes that 'these ••• objections are exemplary cases of being 
so mesmerised by forms of words that one becomes oblivious to 
their use ••• one forgets to examine the point of employing 
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point about the conditional is catered for too, incidentally.) 
This is not of course to say that the argument with 'I am in 
pain' is at all defective as an argument. There are innumerable 
trivial arguments where the epistemic possibility of someone recog-
nising the truth of the premises but not that of the conclusion is 
not open. One might contend that in such cases, since the argument 
cannot be intended as a piece of persuasion, it is hard to say what 
use it has. Why then should one insist that the constituent 
premises should have their normal use or force? Why not fix on some 
arbitrary use that satisfies the requirements of logic? ('Avowal' 
is a term of pragmatics, applying to sentence-tokens and not types.) 
The picture of avowals that provoked this response - that they 
are structured but without force - will now be explored in some de-
tail. But the reader should bear in mind that if the above response 
fails to satisfy, all is not lost for the expressive account - since 
it will subsequently be questioned whether an expressive account 
need be non-assertoric at all. 
the resultant sentences' ([1986] p. 303 - see Hamilton [1987 -
forthcoming]). 
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4.8) Do we need a Non-Assertoric Thesis anyway? 
(i) 'Non-force theses' 
The presentation of the Haldane Objection (p. 201) has put us 
in a position to distinguish the three essential varieties of non-
assertoric thesis. Firstly, as has already been mentioned, there is 
the distinction between theses of structured and unstructured utter-
ance. It is now clear, however, that there is a further distinction 
between two kinds of structure - that proposing a common proposit-
ional content between avowals and non-avowals, and that denying it. 
The Haldane Objection leads us to view the second option more 
favourably than the first. It looks as if we do not want to view 
'expression' as a kind of force attaching to a propositional 
content; but can we deny that this is what it is, without thereby 
denying the possibility of structure altogether? Two possibilities 
present themselves at this point: 
(i) avowals are non-assertoric and purely expressive; they 
possess a structure but no force component. 
(ii) avowals are, whilst expressive, also assertoric; but they 
are however non-cognitive. 
The second account, assertoric but non-cognitive, constitutes an 
attempt to resolve the problem of authority by extracting what is of 
value in the non-assertoric thesis (including its emphasis on 
expression) whilst by-passing its difficulties. In the case of 
non-assertoric variant (i), even, these difficulties are formidable. 
Whilst some of the difficulties will apply to any version of (i), we 
should distinguish two version at the outset: 
(i)' avowals do not possess force; nor does anything else. 
(i)" avowals constitute an enclave of force-less speech-acts in 
a general field of force. 
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These are really more properly called 'non-force' rather than 
non-assertoric theses - though (i)', the radical non-force thesis, 
has as its effective target the notion of assertion, installed in 
its place as the paradigm type of force. It is possible that the 
latter thesis is that espoused by Wittgenstein in the Investigations 
- paras. 22-24, and also in those paragraphs we have already 
1 
discussed on p. 196. 
The radical non-force thesis takes us beyond the question of 
avowals into a central question in the philosophy of language which 
it is not possible to discuss in the present context, except to say 
the following. The thesis maintains that there is no unified notion 
of 'assertion' - it cannot be characterised in terms of necessary 
and sufficient conditions nor in any other terms that would make it 
a profitable notion to employ. Rather, the class of 'assertions' is 
fragmentary with no interesting features in common. Now, this 
thesis does not have as an implication that the authority of avowals 
is no longer a puzzling phenomenon. It needs to be made clear that 
the advantage of a non-assertoric thesis is that it rules out (or at 
least makes ludicrously inapposite) a Cartesian explanation of that 
authority, without doing away with the need for an alternative 
explanation. The pertinent point here is this: it is the 
fragmentary notion of authority, which goes with the fragmentary 
notion of assertion, that is of central importance. And this, it 
seems, is available without recourse to the radical non-force thesis 
(and arguably, but this is to anticipate, without recourse even to a 
non-assertoric thesis at all). 
Less upset to received ideas is caused by the less radical 
thesis (i)", and it is to this that we now turn, in doing so 
expanding on the points just made. The 'fragmentary' notion of 
authority allows for, in fact requires, the idea of an authority not 
based on expertise, being in the best position to judge, assessment 
1 
It is true that, in criticising Frege, Wittgenstein's 
remarks are directed as much at the former's residual 
psychologism about meaning as at the notion of force 
(assertoric force in particular) per se. Durnrnett discusses 
the matter sensibly in his [1981] pp. 359-62. 
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of evidence, etc. But such an idea, if it can be made out, is also 
available for an enclave of force-less speech-acts (avowals and 
others) in a general field of force. That is, the very same idea of 
authority required by the radical thesis (i)', is also available for 
avowals, under thesis (i)". And this, if demonstrable, will 
satisfy the key requirement for any satisfactory account of avowals 
- that their authority does not involve expert knowledge. (Their 
authority will not only need to be described, however, but also 
explained.) Discussion of the 'enclave' thesis (i)" will be 
facilitated by an analogy pleasing to cricket-lovers (though 
imperfect). When an umpire in cricket gives a batsman out, or 
(better, since the former kind of decision is signalled non-
verbally) cautions a bowler for running on to the pitch in his 
follow-through, his speech-act is not available to be made by 
someone else. The judgement is normative or constitutive within the 
game, though criticisable by others at least insofar as they may 
question whether it was warranted by the physical basis on which it 
was made. (Not criticisable in the sense that players may reject 
the decision, of course.) It may be reported by others, who may 
also report its physical basis (the bowler persistently ran onto 
such-and-such an area of the wicket). But they cannot actually say, 
'I'm warning you for running on to the pitch', and achieve the same 
kind of speech-act as the umpire achieves (i.e. delivering a 
warning). This is not because the utterance possesses a proposit-
ional content inaccessible to anyone else, but because the speaker, 
when he is the umpire, has a certain institutional role, such that 
the utterance of those words by him creates a particular institut-
ional fact. 
J.L. Austin, in his [1962], made a distinction between 
performatives and constatives. He then discovered that the 
constatives were performatives too - that one did something by 
making a constative utterance also. The present suggestion is that 
whilst 'constatives' are performative, some utterances are purely 
performative. Examples would be: 'I'm warning you for running on to 
the pitch', 'I thee wed', 'I name this ship the "Lollipop"' - and 'I 
am in pain'. These utterances do not exhibit the normal components 
of propositional content and force. They effect speech-acts not 
available to be effected by anyone else in the situation in 
question; not because they possess some propositional content truly 
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1 
accessible only to the speaker, but because only the speaker 
has the institutional role that enables him to make the speech-act 
and thereby determine (or help to determine) the institutional fact 
in question (that the player was cautioned, that the ship was named 
'Lollipop', that the couple were married - and that my pain was 
avowed). On the view presently being considered, then, 'only I have 
the authority to avow my mental states' (with all that that entails 
in terms of the Famous Five) is comparable to 'only the umpire has 
the authority to caution the players'. 
This description of avowals as 'pure performatives' analogous 
to e.g. umpiring decisions, opens up the possibility that their 
authority may be explained. What we would be looking for would be 
an explanation of the advantages of the practice, along the lines of 
the 'sociological' explanation of the advantages of having an umpire 
in a competitive sport. However, two problems with our analogy 
surface before we may consider such an explanation. 
Firstly, it will have to be insisted, by the proponent of 
thesis (i) whether radical or not, that 'no force' does not mean 'no 
structure'. And this indeed is plausible. In rejecting force for 
'performatives' we are indeed posing problems regarding their 
integration into a systematic theory of meaning; but as far as less 
parochial requirements of structure are concerned, there seems 
little problem. The Generality Constraint may be satisfied given 
that an understanding of the individual components of the 
performative may be exhibited in other kinds of sentence, purely 
performative and otherwise. The embedding-objection may be parried 
along the lines already suggested, by means of a Wittgensteinian 
snort and by means of the 'charade' response (pp. 199-203). 
Secondly, the analogy between an umpire's decision, and my 
avowals as examples of expressions of authority lacking in 
linguistic force, is imperfect of course. One reason is that 
avowals, unlike umpiring decisions, can be 'defeated' (we may 
discover the subject was insincere, to take the principal instance). 
(An analogy with tennis where the tournament referee (Capt. Mike 
1 
The Cartesian view, for our purposes. 
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Gibson) can over-rule the umpire, was considered by the present 
writer but rejected because of the appalling commercialisation of 
the game and its pollution by chiefly American vulgarity.) A second 
and more important reason, is that the 'institutional setting' is 
much more explicit in the case of sporting compared with avowing 
practices. Finally, and possibly fatally, umpiring judgements are 
not groundless, but based on observable facts which the umpire is in 
the best position to note. In this crucial respect then, the kind 
of authority expressed differs. 
(ii) A non-cognitive thesis on its own 
The problems of embedding (if the Wittgenstein snort and 
associated responses fail to impress) and the dubious extent to 
which non-assertoric status per se (rather than any non-expert 
notion of authority attached to it) is actually required for the 
resolution of the problem of avowals, may encourage us to distance 
ourselves yet further from Trojan orthodoxy, and embrace the 
non-cognitive thesis of avowals alone. (This is, insofar as these 
crude labels mean anything any more, a non-Trojan position.) It 
should be clear (though it has gone so far undiscussed) that the 
non-cognitive thesis of avowals is a consequence of the 
non-assertoric thesis. What we are now asking is 'can they be 
separated?' Can the non-cognitive thesis be maintained compatibly 
with at least an agnosticism about the assertoric status of avowals? 
Wittgenstein's own support for the non-assertoric thesis has been 
questioned; and though many of the doubts cast on his sympathy for 
that line of approach can be dispelled by careful formulation of the 
different varieties of non-assertoric thesis, commentators have been 
right to view his commitment to the non-cognitive thesis as less 
debatable. There is less doubt in the case of the latter partly 
because the thesis is easier to understand. 
The endorsement of the non-cognitive thesis in Wittgenstein's 
writings is clear. One might expect nuances analogous to those 
apparent in his expression of what seemed to be a non-assertoric 
thesis; viz. that there is a range of cases, that on occasion it 
might make sense for me to say that I know I am in pain (when it is 
correct to say that I am describing rather than expressing my pain). 
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But in fact 'I know that I am in pain' is ruled out as having no use 
1 
at all. This view goes back at least as far as the Blue Book 
(and, pace Hacker, the evidence of its being denied in the 
2 
Philosophical Remarks is quite unclear). There, it becomes 
clear why it is easier to ascribe the non-cognitive thesis to 
Wittgenstein; his presentation is unequivocal, and employs a 
familiar distinction between grammatical and empirical propositions 
(or here, 'metaphysical' and 'experimental'): 
••• when in a metaphysical sense I say 'I must always know when 
I have pain', this simply makes the word 'know' redundant; and 
instead of 'I know that I have pain', I can simply say 'I have 
pain' ( ibid. p. 55). 
In the Investigations, the non-cognitive thesis is, in a 
famous passage, explicitly linked with the relocation of the Other 
Minds problem as the 'Non-Other Minds Problems' (to use R.S. Buck's 
inelegant but handy phrase). Wittgenstein denies that sensations 
are in any sense 'private': 
If we are using the word 'to know' as it is normally used (and 
how else are we to use it?) then other people very often know 
when I am in pain - Yes, but all the same not with the certainty 
with which I know it myself! - It can't be said of me at all 
(except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it 
supposed to mean - except perhaps that I am in pain? ibid. 
para. 246). 
As Geoff Phillips has implied in discussion, commentators have quite 
failed to explain what the 'joke' could be here, and indeed we must 
set aside the curious parenthetical qualification as an example of 
the author's peculiar sense of humour, and simply say that 'I know I 
3 
am in pain' has no use, on the Wittgensteinian view. The 
1 
Indeed, Wittgenstein writes that 'even when someone says 
('I am frightened') as a piece of information, he does not 
learn it from his sensations' (PI p. 174). 
2 
See his [1972], p. 254, and PR 66. 
3 
This latter point will not however carry weight until it 
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assault on Cartesianism here is proceeding on two fronts - or 
rather, the assault on the cognitive account of avowals is facil-
itating the dissolution of the Other Minds problem, which otherwise 
would be intractable. There is no superior 1st-personal knowledge 
the standards of which 3rd-personal knowledge fails, to its 
detriment, to reach: 
Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations only from 
my behaviour - for I cannot be said to learn of them. I have 
them ( ibid. para. 246). 
The Blue Book distinction is implicit in the next paragraph: 
'Only you can know if you had that intention'. One might tell 
someone this when one was explaining the meaning of the word 
'intention' to him. For then it means: that is how we use it. 
(And here 'know' means that the expression of uncertainty is 
senseless.) (ibid. p. 224) 
'Only you can know' is a 'grammatical proposition', then; such 
expressions have a constitutive role in the 'language-game', and 
should be treated accordingly: 
'He alone knows his motives' - that is an expression of the fact 
that we ask him what his motives are ( ibid. p. 224). 
('Desires' would have been a better example than 'motives' here, 
since whether the subject has authority on the latter is more 
questionable.) 
The non-cognitive thesis is, in the Investigations, not only 
linked expressly with the resolution or relocation of the 'Other 
Minds' problem, but is also clearly connected with that account of 
knowledge which receives its fullest expression in On Certainty. In 
the Investigations, after dismissing as 'philosopher's nonsense' 'I 
know what I want, wish, believe, feel .•• ', Wittgenstein writes: 
is shown that it is a genuinely semantic and not purely 
pragmatic feature. 
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'I know ••. • may mean 'I do not doubt , but does not mean 
that the words 'I doubt ••• ' are senseless, that doubt is 
logically excluded ( ibid. p. 221). 
In contrast to the Cartesian, and to the Moore criticised in On 
Certainty, who each aspires to the foundation of empirical knowledge 
in self-evident truths, Wittgenstein maintains that knowledge 
implies at least the logical possibility of doubt and is inseparably 
connected to the notion of evidence - not to self-evidence (e.g. OC 
504). It is a familiar dialectic in which the non-cognitive thesis 
is embedded - the famous '"exclusive" doesn't imply "exhaustive"'. 
Just because I cannot doubt whether I am in pain, does not mean I 
must know that I am in pain - rather, there is no cognitive status 
here at all. We may round off this homely exposition with a famous 
and telling metaphor: 
It is correct to say 'I know what you are thinking' and wrong to 
say 'I know what I am thinking'. 
(A whole cloud of philosophy condensed into a drop of grammar) 
(PI p. 222). 
(iii) Even a non-cognitive thesis is unnecessary 
Let us assume the non-cognitive thesis can be held in 
isolation from its non-assertoric counterpart. What would be the 
advantage of so doing? Well, the thesis is less extreme, and yet 
delivers all the advantages of the non-assertoric thesis without 
many of the bothersome complications of the latter. These 
advantages can be summed up thus: the theses encourage a 
non-Cartesian account of the authority of avowals. The question now 
arises: is the non-cognitive thesis itself actually necessary for 
such an account? We can adumbrate two accounts which suggest not. 
First, it may be argued that the subject may be said to know that 
e.g. he is in pain, provided that the avowal is not seen as an 
expression of that knowledge, as the product of some cognitive 
process. The question of the subject's knowledge is not one that 
arises - it is not asserted as a denial of someone else's claim that 
he doesn't know, for instance. His knowledge may, however, be 
expressed by means of some such peculiar utterance as 'I know I am 
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in pain'. How someone may come to make such an utterance may be 
quite opaque. But the important point is that the authoritative 
utterance 'I am in pain' is not an expression of my knowledge that I 
am in pain, in the way that my utterance of e.g. 'The Famous Five 
characterise avowals' is an expression of my knowledge of the 
essential rightness of our general approach, say. A better account 
says that there are two sorts of knowledge - that which involves 
some sort of cognitive achievement and that which doesn't (in some 
way yet to be described). We may thus say what we like (all the 
things which it seems natural to say) about the subject's knowledge 
- provided we appreciate that the kind of knowledge he has is of the 
sort involving no cognitive achievement. This better account we 
will investigate shortly. 
We have considered proposals (i) and (ii) of p. 204: the 
non-force thesis and the non-cognitive thesis. All that is left of 
these proposals now is the idea that the authority of avowals is 
somehow analogous to that of certain kinds of institutionally-
conferred authority. We have already on pp. 207-8 had reason to 
question the appropriateness of this kind of analogy; and the 
business of providing an explanation of the authority of avowals, 
along the lines of the 'sociological' explanations in the other 
cases, has yet to be embarked on. Without such an explanation, of 
course, the view canvassed would stand condemned as the convention-
alist view of p. 147. The difficulty of providing any such explan-
ation, however, is a symptom of the fact that the analogy itself is 
desperately unconvincing - for reasons already given. The disanal-
ogies there indicated are reinforced by a gut reaction that this 
explanation of the authority of avowals could not be 'deep' enough; 
is my authority really only comparable to that of some official? 
This reaction may have a Cartesian provenance; but it need not. 
The state of play at present is as follows, then. First, 
doubt has been cast on the necessity both of a non-assertoric, and 
of a more limited, non-cognitive account, for any successful 
resolution of the problem of avowals. Second, the authority of 
avowals does not seem to be profitably compared with the different 
kinds of institutionally-conferred authority. Thus an impasse has 
been arrived at. The tentative or negative tone of the preceding 
discussion will now be atoned for by the attempt to unify the 
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accounts of the cognitive and the authoritative status of avowals 
around the concept of a subject of experience. Our ship, having set 
sail from the shores of Wittgensteinian paradox on p. 192 with 
meagre navigational aids and since then having floundered in choppy 
seas before becoming becalmed, should now be set on course - with 
the account of expression being rendered less paradoxical. 
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4.9) Resolution (I): Knowledge and Authority 
(i) Subject and expression 
The 'unified account' is suggested by the following consider-
ations. We need to explain why the sincere avowal guarantees the 
truth of the corresponding 3rd-person ascription. 'Why should the 
1st-person utterance be accorded a special weight denied to the 3rd-
person utterance?' it is asked. Well, to ask this is to assume one 
is (in an important sense) comparing like with like. But it is not 
as if one is comparing 'one person's view' with 'another's'; that 
would be to confuse a description of a phenomenon ('He is in pain') 
with something that is part of the phenomenon itself (the avowal). 
To take the Wittgensteinian idea of 'expression' seriously is to see 
that the avowal is logically connected with the pain, or the mood, 
or whatever. If there were no expression, there would be no sub-
jects of experience; all would be mere observers (whether of their 
own 'mental states' (so-called) or of those of others). 'Experience' 
goes with 'expression' as 'observation' goes with 'description'. As 
Evans writes in connection with perceptual experience: 
[The subject's] internal state cannot in any sense become an 
object to him (He is in it) ( ibid. p. 227). 
In comparing 'I am in pain' with 'He is in pain' and asking why one 
is accorded special weight and the other not, one is, as it were, 
attempting to contrast two pieces of observation and asking why one 
should be privileged, and forgetting about a different sort of 
relation to that of observer and object, viz. that of the subject to 
1 
the state he is in. The vertiginous effects of thinking about 
1 
The absurdity of treating one's own avowable states as 
objects of observation is brought out by Wittgenstein in the 
Investigations: 
If you observe your own grief, which senses do you use to 
observe it? A particular sense; one that feels grief? 
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the latter relation should not lead us to reduce it to a special 
case of the former; rather, it is sui generis. Along with this 
relation goes the idea of a subject giving expression to the state 
he is in, in contrast merely to acquiring knowledge of it. Before 
dealing with 'expression', however, we must first say something 
about the subject's knowledge. 
(ii) The 'thin' sense of 'knowledge' 
When we put the notion of a subject of experience at the 
centre of our account in the way just adumbrated there will be two 
options available regarding the cognitive status of avowals - which, 
in our new 'unified' account, we are now treating in tandem with 
their authoritative status. The first option is to deny that the 
notion of knowledge (and consequently that of authority) has appli-
cation with regard to my own avowable states - this amounts, of 
course, to the non-cognitive thesis. The alternative option is that 
suggested by the second, superior account of p. 212 - to distinguish 
between different kinds of knowledge (and now, authority) and main-
tain that the kind of knowledge I have of my own avowable states is 
of that kind involving no cognitive achievement. Before elaborating 
on these options, something needs to be said about the connection 
with authority. The connection is simply this: 'authority' is a 
cognitive notion, and it makes no sense to separate the grounds for 
its application from the grounds for the application of 'know-
1 
ledge'. Consequently, our already familiar first option, the 
non-cognitive thesis, should be supplemented with a 'non-
authoritative thesis' of avowals. It makes no sense to talk of 
avowals as 'authoritative' when they are viewed as non-cognitive. 
Then do you feel it differently when you are observing it? 
And what is the grief that you are observing - is it one which 
is there only while it is being observed? 'Observing' does 
not produce what is observed ( ibid. p. 187). 
1 
We are talking of authority in the sense of 'authority 
on' (some subject) rather than political authority, of course; 
which is not to deny important connections between these two 
senses. 
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We should rather stick simply at the level of neutral description 
(the 'Famous Five') in the manner in which the 'unified account' 
began - when it was said that what needed explanation was why the 
sincere avowal guaranteed the truth of the corresponding 3rd-person 
ascription. In contrast the second option, which is now favoured, 
in fact charts a 'middle way' which avoids the polarisation between 
Cartesianism and the residual Trojanism of the non-cognitive (and 
now, non-authoritative) account. As in many such middle ways, the 
desired effect is achieved by invoking a 'thin' sense of some key-
concept or concepts - in this case, 'knowledge' and 'authority' (cf. 
the 'thin' sense of 'truth' in the realism - anti-realism debate). 
This sense will, in all probability, be applicable uniquely to one's 
knowledge of, and authority regarding, one's own avowable states. 
It is the knowledge the subject has, not of objects, but of states 
of himself. As was insisted above, the relation between the subject 
and the state he is in is sui generis and not a special case of that 
between observer and object; what is presently being canvassed is 
the idea that the knowledge the subject has of his avowable states 
is sui generis and not a special case of knowledge he has of 
objects. The triteness of the preceding remarks may be alleviated, 
in two ways. First, we must understand something of what the 
central aspects of the concept of knowledge in general are, in order 
that we may see what the 'thin' sense lacks. Second, we must see 
how the facts about self-knowledge mesh into the account of a 
'thin' sense of 'knowledge'. 
It is important to make clear how the preceding two tasks are 
related to the central question of explaining the Famous Five (to 
put the matter neutrally). They are related as follows: The claim 
that avowable states are knowable in a 'thin' sense by the subject 
has the same dialectical role as the claim that avowals are non-
assertoric, or that they are non-cognitive. These claims rule out 
the wrong kind of explanation of the Famous Five (the Cartesian 
kind). None of them allows for the 'natural' kind of explanation in 
terms of cognitive achievement, privileged access, etc. But they do 
not thereby constitute an alternative explanation. The latter is 
something additional, and the only alternative explanation thus far 
considered is the attempt to draw together the authority of avowals 
and various kinds of institutionally-conferred authority. This did 
not work. Now, in conjunction with the account of avowable states 
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as knowable in a 'thin' sense, is proposed the explanation of the 
Famous Five in terms of the idea of a subject of experience giving 
expression to those states. This explanation is 'conceptual' in 
contrast to the 'pragmatic' explanation of the institutional 
account. The new 'cognitive / expressive' account is one which fits 
in better with our intuitions on the matter - and terminates that 
process whereby Trojanism has been stripped of all features thought 
to be required for the avoidance of Cartesian illusion but not in 
fact so required. (A process which began in Chapter 2 with the 
doubt cast on the 'no-reference' view of 'I'.) The end-product is 
one not essentially Trojan at all, of course; though as with many of 
the deepest controversies in philosophy, perhaps, the original 
labels increasingly seem to lack profitable application as the 
dispute becomes further removed from what is left of any well-
grounded division of opinion. 
How, then, is this 'thin' sense of knowledge, applicable to 
cases of knowledge of one's own avowable states, to be character-
ised? We need to note the existence of two central aspects of the 
concept of knowledge. First, there is the aspect of 'pedigree' -
which enters essentially into any analysis of what it is for X to 
know that p. This of course is the aspect on which there is a heavy 
concentration in the literature, in which causal and other accounts 
vie with justificatory ones, each seeming to lack that 'vital in-
1 
gredient' necessary to provide a water-tight characterization. 
Second, there is the aspect of 'performance' - which enters 
importantly into any account of what is involved in avowing 'I know 
that p'. This aspect is an important part of the pragmatics of 
knowledge-claims over and above the purely semantic analysis of 
conditions for 3rd-personal ascription of knowledge. For in saying 
'I know that p', an essential part of what I am doing is 'giving a 
guarantee'. I am assuring my listener of my confidence in what I am 
saying. This is the 'performative aspect' of knowledge-claims, the 
kind of force attached to, or comprising, the act of avowal. 
In the case of self-knowledge regarding avowable states, there 
is only the aspect of 'performance'. There is no need for an aspect 
1 
See Nozick [1981] pp. 169-71. 
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of 'pedigree'; there are no third and ensuing conditions to be 
secured before we have a case of genuine knowledge. That is - if I 
know that X is joyful, and I know that X believes that he is joyful, 
then I know that X knows that he is joyful. The 'third condition' 
(that X is justified in believing ••• , that X is appropriately 
causally linked to the fact that ••• , or whatever) has no place 
here. Now, it clearly makes no sense for us to suppose that X may 
offer a justification for his belief that he is joyful; but we may 
suppose an appropriate linkage of the sort advocated by causal 
theorists. However, such a causal linkage will not be a condition 
for distinguishing between cases of belief and cases of knowledge, 
since there is no such distinction to be made here. 
So, where the sense of 'knowledge' is 'thin', only the two 
conditions (p and X believes that p) suffice for its application. 
Now, we have performed a little of our second task of alleviating 
the triteness of p. 216; showing how the facts about self-knowledge 
mesh into the account of a 'thin' sense of 'knowledge'. What needs 
to be added is simply that what has been said is another way of 
saying that self-knowledge of avowable states is 'immediate', 
'non-inferential', 'non-observational'. 
It is in the inter-connection of a 'thin' cognitive thesis of 
avowals and an account of their role as expressions of a subject's 
experience that the way forward lies to a resolution of our central 
problem. The aim of the latter account is simply to explain the 
Famous Five in a non-Cartesian way - which is, it has been argued, 
thus to explain the authority of avowals, in a 'thin' sense of 
'authority'. But it should be noted that it is arguably a matter of 
one's predilections whether one believes it is authority that is 
being explained (and whether one believes avowals are cognitive). 
The role of the 'thin' cognitive thesis is partly to show that a 
non-Cartesian explanation of the Famous Five in terms of 'express-
ion' need not be counter-intuitive with respect to the cognitive 
status of avowals - that it need not go against our feeling that I 
can and do know whether I am in pain, etc. But it is arguable that 
an 'expressive' explanation of the Famous Five, of the sort about to 
be outlined, is compatible with a non-cognitive thesis. Be that as 
it may, it has been argued that the non-cognitive thesis is not 
merely counter-intuitive but also unnecessary; an over-reaction 
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against a certain model of self-knowledge in terms of 'privileged 
access', 'best possible vantage-point' - it is the latter model 
which is objectionable. The 'thin' cognitive account is of course 
quite unacceptable to the Cartesian because (to him) insufficient. 
(iii) Arguing against an 'observational' account of self-knowledge 
Let us expand on the explanation adumbrated on p. 214. Avow-
able states, it was urged, are not objects to a subject of exper-
ience; he experiences them, but does not observe them. Avowals, 
consequently, are not reports of observation but expressions of 
1 
experience. Some perhaps may be satisfied with the plainness 
of this dichotomy, but surely it is in reality hard enough to 
2 
understand, never mind to attempt to argue for. Enlightenment 
can proceed from two policies. First, by attempting to argue 
against an 'observational' account of self-knowledge. Second, and 
more importantly, by attempting to outline the notion of 'express-
ion' in such a way that the naturalness of its application to 
avowable states (in contrast to that of observation) is perceived. 
The arguments involved in the first policy seem to display varying 
degrees of crudeness - partly because we are still dealing with as 
yet unrefined notions. An initial argument could be termed that of 
'unacceptable attenuation of the subject'. If I can observe my own 
avowable states, what is the status of this observing subject? What 
properties does it possess? Presumably not the properties of being 
in pain, being sad, etc., that it is observing. The subject, then, 
would be attenuated to a propertyless point, a mere insubstantial 
perspective. Two complaints might be made here. First, even if we 
accept the argument's presumption, does it furnish a reductio ad 
absurdum? And secondly, is the presumption correct - must 
1 
Putative avowals which tend towards the descriptive will 
simultaneously tend to depart from the exhibition of the 
Famous Five. 
2 
The dichotomy is hardly novel; it is that, for instance, 
in Ryle's Concept of Mind, which goes under the heading 
'Sensation and Observation' (pp. 190-231). But it is there 
inadequately developed and argued for. 
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observation of pain by a subject exclude self-predication of pain by 
that subject? I won't dwell on the first point - it is one congen-
ial to Trojanism, which is after all very much interested in the 
attenuation of the subject. The second point indicates that really 
the 'unacceptable attenuation' argument is a corollary depending for 
its effectiveness on a prior argument - that experiencing (being in) 
an avowable state is incompatible with observing that state. The 
kind of argument we're looking for here would be analogous to that 
offered by Von Wright in his [1971] to the effect that agency ex-
cludes observation of the causes of one's own basic actions. This, 
however, is a line of enquiry on which I will say no more - since 
the second of the policies above seems more promising. 
221 
4.10) Resolution (II): 'Expression' (II) 
(i) Taylor's account 
Let us then proceed on the second task, by examining, in 
positive fashion, the contrasting notion to that of observation 
'expression'. We can begin by stepping back a little and locating 
this notion in the wider context of a philosophy of mind of 
Wittgensteinian cast. It has been observed at several points that 
Wittgenstein re-Iocated the Other Minds problem in a 'Problem of 
Non-Other Minds'. We can now improve on this statement by saying 
that adopting a Cartesian stance will inevitably result in 
intractable difficulties in one area or the other; and that the 
development of certain superficially disparate ideas in the 
Investigations may offer a common solution to each sort of problem. 
The connection may be put laconically as follows: 'seeing - as' is 
not inferring just as expressing is not reporting. The essentially 
public nature of avowable states alike rules out an inferential 
model of our knowledge of other minds and an observational model of 
our knowledge of our own minds. Of course, just as there are some 
kinds of sceptic whom the notion of a 'criterion' fails to satisfy, 
so it would be foolish to claim that the notion of 'expression' will 
achieve general approval; but by attempting to demonstrate its 
centrality, one will at least be showing the essential unity of the 
problems of knowledge of self and of others, and of the only 
adequate sorts of response to them. 
How might this result be achieved? Use will need to be made 
of ideas in Charles Taylor's estimable [1979] - an article which 
contributes to his salutary efforts to demonstrate the impoverishing 
effects of the causal paradigm on theories in the philosophy of 
mind. On pp. 73-78, Taylor offers various conditions constraining 
'expression' in the sense in which action could be an expression of 
desire. But his account seems to have a more general application at 
least to the range of paradigm-avowals as expressions of avowable 
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1 
states in the required strong sense. It runs as follows: 
(i) the kind of manifestation which is an expression must at 
least offer a 'physiognomic reading'; it must make something 
manifest 'in an embodiment' - that is, 'directly, not 
leaning on an inference' ( ibid. pp. 73-4). 
Thus X may be manifest in Y, where X is not identical to Y, and yet 
Y not be an expression of X. For instance, the chalk dust on your 
lapels makes manifest the fact that you've been near a blackboard, 
probably writing on it, perhaps that you're a teacher. But it 
doesn't express any of these things; since I infer to them from the 
chalk dust. In contrast, I do not infer from your facial expression 
2 
to the joy which it expresses. If your hand trembles I may 
infer, on the basis of my experience of you, that you are agitated 
this will be a symptom as opposed to the criterion in the joy 
example; of this and other tricky issues in the Taylor account, see 
below. 
However, some cases of 'physiognomic reading' in the above 
sense are not cases of expression in the required (strong) sense, 
nor maybe in any sense. Taylor gives the example of reading its 
impending fall in an upright construction. I can characterise my 
grounds for the former only in terms logically connected with it, 
e.g. 'instability'; here, then, is a genuine 'physiognomic reading', 
yet we would not want to say that the unstable construction 
expresses its impending fall. Two further conditions are required, 
then, the first fairly straightforward: 
(ii) In mere physiognomic reading, the X we read in Y can be 
observed on its own. In cases of genuine expression, what 
is expressed can be manifest only in that or some other 
expression. 
1 
Taylor mentions the possibility of viewing linguistic 
behaviour as expressive in a strong sense, but does not 
elaborate on this and in particular does not discuss avowals. 
2 
Some may demur. But the very great difficulties of 
arguing for an inferential account here should be well-known. 
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I can do more than read the impending fall in the appearance of the 
construction; I can, aside from a physiognomic reading, see it when 
it actually collapses. However, the joy you see in my face, or to 
take a different example, the sadness the music expresses, could be 
manifested alternatively only in some other expression - I might 
dance for joy, that particular mood might also be expressed in some 
other doleful work. The third condition is less straightforward: 
(iii) the expressive object does not simply reveal what it 
expresses (as in mere physiognomic reading), but 'says' or 
'communicates' it - where this is not just a metaphor for 
the agent's saying or communicating something with it. 
Taylor gives two different kinds of example to illustrate this 
dichotomy. First, artistic; I may read a friend's tiredness or 
tension from an example of his sketches with which I am familiar, 
yet it is not this, but rather, say, a 'serene vision of things' 
1 
which the sketch truly expresses. Second, and more 
pertinently, the example of communicating friendliness, in two 
different ways: (a) by means of an open, welcoming smile, (b) in 
conditions of mutual marauding on the frontier, by my refraining 
from attacking your compound. In the first case, the smile 
expressing friendliness and openness is not just a matter of the 
agent's making it with the intention of communicating those things -
the smile itself communicates friendliness, rather than just 
allowing the agent's friendliness to be seen, which is all that the 
behaviour in the second example does. Taylor writes: 
••• the smile's link to manifesting openness is anterior to the 
framing of all intentions to communicate anything. [It] plays a 
crucial role ontogenetically in our being able to enter into 
communication in the first place. Its expressing friendliness 
cannot thus just be a matter of its being deployed with that 
intent; although of course a smile may go dead, become a 
1 
Why is it that tension can be 'read' from the sketch but 
only 'inferred' in the example of the friend's trembling hands 
earlier (p. 222)? We'll return to this matter after the 
exposition. 
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grimace, or look sinister, if the intent is absent ( ibid. 
p. 78). 
He concludes by noting that just as what it is for an expressive 
object Y to express X cannot be reduced to its offering a physio-
gnomic reading of X, nor to its being created / uttered with the 
intent to communicate X, so it cannot be reduced to the sum of these 
things. I may work all night, so as to look tired, so as to get you 
to treat me better - but this doesn't make my tired expression into 
an expression of tiredness in the required, strong sense. 
Well, this account of expression does seem to be on the right 
lines for present purposes. It is rough, and, as has on occasion 
been noted, needs clarifying - a task which will be imperfectly 
carried out here. Nevertheless, it is hoped that the advocacy of 
the treatment of avowals as expressive in Taylor's sense will be 
sufficient to persuade the reader that it is this fact which 
explains the Famous Five. Let us return to the extract on the 
friendly smile quoted above. We are finally in a position to tie 
together several ideas that have hitherto been too aimlessly 
1 
floated. The key seems to be that it is not that avowals are 
not uttered with the intention to communicate joy, pain, sadness, 
etc., but that characterising their role in such terms is insuffic-
ient. They may indeed be uttered with such an intention, as in the 
case where, say, I choose to let the medical practitioner know that 
I'm getting fed up with the discomfort occasioned by his ministrat-
ions by saying (improbably) 'I am in pain' (or, more likely, 'That 
hurts'). But the effectiveness of such utterances is parasitic on 
their more fundamental role as expressions of avowable states 
anterior to the framing of any intention to communicate. 
This fact is connected with the positive presumptive aspect of 
avowals. Let us elaborate on this aspect. It may be suggested that 
it is not the mere utterance of 'I am in pain' that is authoritat-
ive, but the sincere utterance. It was in fact this suggestion that 
prompted the attempted resolution of p. 156, and we can now see why 
1 
In the discussion of Wittgenstein's expressive account -
pp. 189-94. 
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that was wrong. For what we have is not conditional authority (we 
make the proviso that the subject must be sincere) but prima facie 
authority defeasible in a certain way. That is, the provisos 
(sincerity, understanding, lack of self-deception etc.) on the 
avowal for it to guarantee the 3rd-person ascription are 'positive 
presumptive' - we assume they are met unless it is shown otherwise. 
And with regard to sincerity, what we are presuming is the absence 
of an intention (the intention to deceive). This is not to say that 
the intention to communicate, because it is not tested for, is 
therefore absent; simply that its presence has nothing essentially 
to do with why we regard an avowal as authoritative. The reason why 
the provisos of an avowal are positively presumptive is connected 
with the explanation of the authority of avowals itself; the common 
source for these features lies in the role of avowals as expressive 
antecedents of communication-intention. 
What account of avowals is yielded by Taylor's three condit-
ions on expression? First, we don't infer from the linguistic 
behaviour of avowal to the avowable state. This is clearly correct. 
(It is connected to the point about positive presumption; I do not 
check, before my 3rd-personal ascription to an avowing subject, that 
the provisos are satisfied). Second, that which an avowal expresses 
can be manifest only in an avowal or in some other piece of 
expressive, non-linguistic behaviour. Finally, the avowal itself 
'says' or 'communicates' that which it expresses in a manner over 
and above that of the agent saying or communicating something with 
it. 
(ii) Amending Taylor's account 
This having been said, it may be questioned whether the avowal 
offers a 'physiognomic reading', even though condition (i) is 
satisfied in terms of non-inference. It may seem absurd to say that 
I 'read' off your pain from the 'physiognomy' of your utterance 'I 
am in pain'. But perhaps the term 'reading' misleads us here; all 
that is meant is that the expressive object presents us with a 
characteristic appearance which we see or recognize as an expression 
of pain, or whatever. And the characteristic tone of 'I am in pain' 
or 'I'm depressed' may well do just that, although this is combined 
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with the sense of the utterance in our recognition of the state. 
Avowals are peculiarly prone to have this aspect of tone which will 
be of significance too in explaining how they fulfil Taylor's 
condition (iii). The very words themselves must 'say' or 'commun-
icate' something over and above the agent's saying or communicating 
something with them. It must be no accident that two senses of 
'expression' come together here; the idea of an avowal as 'express-
ive' of a state and the idea of 'expression' as meaning 'with 
feeling'. The way we communicate in speech how we are feeling (in 
the widest sense of 'feeling') has something essentially to do with 
the feeling or tone that is apparent in our words. As was noted in 
the Wittgenstein passage already discussed, it is an inadequate 
model to think simply in terms of a subject intending to convey a 
thought by means of words, for the words themselves communicate his 
1 
state by means of their tone. 
It may be helpful to amend Taylor's account, and in fact 
simplify it, since his case for a distinction between objects which 
pass condition (i) but fail condition (ii) looks unconvincing. It 
is not clear that his example of the 'reading' of an impending fall 
in a building is non-inferential, since even where no inference is 
made, the grounds may yet be inferential. Problems of tense 
complicate this example, and we may take a simpler one. The molten 
steel's hotness is manifest in its seething, bluish appearance (I am 
viewing from a distance). I make no inference here from the 
appearance to the hotness; yet it seems that I could spell out a 
'non-tautological' generalisation which would imply that we do have 
a 'physiognomic reading' here in Taylor's sense. ('Certain metals, 
when very hot, present a seething, bluish appearance, say.) There 
will thus be two senses of 'looks 0': 
(i) where looks ~ = presents an appearance reliably 
inductively associated with (passing 
independent tests for) being 0 [the 
steel case] 
(ii) where looks 0 f n » [expression] 
1 
See above pp. 196-97. 
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Rather than having three conditions which genuine cases of 
expression must satisfy, it seems better to have one condition for 
which Taylor's conditions (ii) and (iii) provide supplementary 
features. This condition is: 
A manifestation counts as an expression of a state in a certain 
context just when the question 'Why does the state have that 
kind of manifestation?' is foolish or has no answer. 
This formulation provides a test for the so-called 'logical 
connection' present in genuine cases of expression, and absent in 
those cases where there is an (inductive) generalisation to answer 
the question above. It also gets us round the problem of cases 
where no inference is actually made, yet where one could be 
furnished. The question 'Why does the state have that kind of 
manifestation?' is deliberately general. For it could presumably be 
asked, in the case of a subject in pain, 'Why does this state 
manifest itself in the odd bit of pain-behaviour (wincing, say) 
rather than in another way (by means of an avowal)?' - and an answer 
would be: 'stoicism'. 
Let us say the subject's anxiety is manifested not in an 
anxious appearance, but in displacement activity. He picks a 
quarrel with a friend over something quite trivial, say. The 
question 'Why does the state of anxiety have that kind of 
manifestation?' is not foolish or unanswerable - since there is an 
inductive generalisation to answer it, of the form 'People, when 
anxious, often engage in apparently pointless or unmotivated 
behaviour as a means of masking the source of worry instead of 
effectively dealing with it'. One could make the discovery that 
anxiety can have such behaviour as a consequence; but one could not 
discover that pain could have as a consequence the subject writhing 
on the ground clutching his leg, say. 
(iii) Defeasibility of mental-episode ascriptions 
Before discussing the effect of using the new formulation of 
'expression', it is worth saying something about a paradox adverted 
to when it was said above that our question is 'deliberately 
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general'. This point needs to be re-expressed - and the notion of a 
mental 'episode' clarified (involving some further correction of 
Rorty's ideas quoted on p. 163). The 'paradox' is the following: 
(A) If a state is an episode, a subject can pass in and out of 
it without affecting the possibility of any longer-term, 
dispositional states obtaining. 
(B) Ascriptions of mental episodes can be defeated in the light 
of subsequent behaviour. 
Rorty, in the passage from his [1970] quoted above (p. 163), has 
glided over the distinction here. He wrote (to re-formulate without 
altering his drift) that ascriptions of dispositions 'are implicit 
predictions of future behaviour, predictions which may be falsif-
ied'. In contrast, ascriptions of mental episodes may be falsified 
by later behaviour; someone displays pain-behaviour but later admits 
that he was shamming, tells us why, etc. How then are episodes 
compatible with any range of future behaviour? The question is 
evidently more subtle than was first supposed - and principle (A) is 
clearly in need of refinement. For present purposes however (and 
readers should know by now what this phrase means!), it is enough 
to indicate that episodic ascriptions are compatible with any range 
of future behaviour in that they are not predictions about it -
though it is wrong to imply on the basis of this, as Rorty does, 
that they cannot be falsified by it. (If he had thought about it, 
he would have been more careful in what he said.) An expressive 
episode is presumed to be sincere - and so when I say 'He is in 
pain', I am not making a prediction that the subject will not 
subsequently disavow his apparent pain and admit he was shamming. 
This point is partly that already emphasized - the 'positive 
presumptive' aspect of avowals. It should be noted that any mental 
episode may be 'expressed' - but in some cases the expression is 
limited to linguistic behaviour (e.g. the cases of mental images, 
after-images, certain kinds of noises in the head, etc. etc.). And 
thus far, clearly, the linguistic expression is by means of 
'paradigm' avowals - we will come on to 'qualified' avowals shortly. 
The converse of the latter presumption is the fact that 
behaviour is expressive only relative to a context. If this were 
229 
not so, ascriptions of mental episodes could not be defeated. 
Consider the two interpretations of our question above (p. 227): 
(1) Why does the subject express his state that way (on this 
occasion)? 
(2) Why is that kind of behaviour ever an expression of that 
kind of state? 
The second question provides the formulation required for our test 
of 'expression', its foolishness, in the case of expressive 
behaviour, is consistent with a particular piece of apparently 
expressive behaviour not being an expression of anything (but being 
stimulated, shammed, suggested under hypnosis). This is because 
behaviour (E) (below) expresses a state relative to a context or 
span of behaviour (G) - which may not, at the time of the 
behavioural episode, be fully disclosed: 
G 
1 
E 
~ 
G 
2 
~ _____ ---------v~------~J 
G 
Say the subject is in pain - then G expresses that state, and so do 
particular episodes such as E. But suppose the subject is not in 
pain - then neither G nor some apparently pain-expressing episode E 
in fact express pain. Perhaps the point is being laboured - but, to 
conclude, what is defeated is the claim that E is an expression of 
pain. (We would not say 'that's an expression of pain, but he's not 
in pain'.) 
(iv) Consequences of the amended account of 'expression' 
The upshot of the proposed amendment of Taylor's account is 
that it is simplified. There seems no reason to suppose that there 
are 'physiognomic readings' of non-expressive manifestations of 
states, and we are provided instead with a straightforward 
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distinction between expressive manifestations which are 'read' 
physiognomically and non-expressive manifestations which are 'read' 
(if you like) inferentially. The points about positive presumption 
and the role of avowals as expressive antecedents of communication-
intention remain as stated. It is not possible in the space 
available at present to clarify much further the distinction between 
manifestation of a state by its mere causal consequences, and 
expressive manifestation. There is a grey area here which may cause 
concern. As has been noted, Taylor's comments seem inconsistent. 
He says that I may, on the basis of my experience of you, infer from 
the fact that your hand is trembling to the fact that you are 
agitated. But then he claims that I may gain a physiognomic reading 
of a friend's tiredness or tension from a sketch of his (without 
this being what the sketch genuinely expresses). Well, we've 
dropped the distinction between expression and mere physiognomic 
reading, and so it looks now as if the latter example belongs with 
the former on the inferential side of the dichotomy. But anxiety or 
tension is itself a tricky example for present purposes. Some 
people exhibit a flustered appearance which betokens no real inner 
anxiety (it is more like an act to help them get what they want, 
say), whilst the outwardly calm appearance of others belies the 
churning emotions inside. (The resemblance to the manifestations of 
pain in the whinger and the stoic is superficial here.) We thus 
find it hard to say what is 'read' physiognomically and what 
inferred when it comes to states of anxiety in others. But in 
proportion as this difficulty seems intractable, so we must regard 
anxiety as a dispositional, non-avowable state - like depression. 
All genuinely avowable states must express themselves in manifest-
ations to which our question has a foolish answer or none at all -
and also, in most cases, be inferrable from manifestations to which 
the question does have a sensible answer. It is in the nature of 
avowable states to be expressed - that is our central contention. 
The expressive in fact seems to occupy a middle ground between 
the mere symptom and the fully intentional communication of a state. 
We are unhappy to regard a state as being 'expressed' by something 
that just happens to the agent as a result of his being in it, and 
instead see the state as 'revealed' or 'betrayed'. But equally (as 
the problem of avowals testifies) we do not like to view the delib-
erated verbal report as an expression either. The mediation of the 
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manifestation by communication-intention to the exclusion of the 
'communication' the words themselves achieve by means of their tone 
seems to rule out some avowal-like statements as examples of genuine 
expression. (Hence the 'non-avowal' uses of certain avowals.) 
(v) Dealing with 'qualified' avowals 
It will not have escaped attention that following the highly 
selective accounts of different kinds of avowal on pp. 148-79, the 
problem of avowal has been discussed without any attempt to differ-
entiate in the same way. In fact, such is the multifarious nature 
of the class of avowals that a proper attempt to relate the preced-
ing resolution to its idiosyncrasies is quite beyond the scope of 
the present work. Instead, a gesture in this direction involving 
further generalisation will be attempted. 
Distinction has already been made, in the class of avowable 
states, between those which are episodic and which issue in 
'paradigm' avowals, and those which tend towards the dispositional, 
non-avowable psychological states and which issue in 'qualified' 
avowals. 
Clearly, the preceding account of what it means to say that 
avowals are expressive, works best for 'paradigm' avowals. It is a 
difficult question how far it should be applied to the 'qualified' 
avowals at the other end of the continuum. For the expression of 
intentional states must be viewed as being constrained by the 
operation of some principle (or principles) of rationality - which 
generates the well-known sort of holism mentioned above. This fact 
must lead one to question the value of saying that 'qualified' 
avowals are expressive in anything like the same way as are 
'paradigm' avowals. 
It might be thought, then, that 'qualified' avowals are 
somewhat of an embarrassment to the present project. But in fact 
certain features limiting the way they exhibit the classic Famous 
Five have already been discussed - amounting in fact to a modicum of 
corrigibility (see pp. 152-56). So perhaps the fact that 'qualif-
ied' avowals are not straightforwardly expressive, should come as no 
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surprise. Let us examine this latter feature more closely, though. 
There seem to be three options here - none particularly attractive, 
it must be said: 
(i) There is both linguistic and non-linguistic expression of 
intentional states. 
(ii) There is linguistic expression of intentional states (viz. 
'qualified' avowals) but the non-linguistic behaviour is not 
genuinely expressive. 
(iii) Neither linguistic or non-linguistic behaviour can genuinely 
express intentional states. 
The first thesis would be endorsed by Charles Taylor, who in 
his [1979] is concerned, inter alia, with showing that 'the natural 
expression of wanting is trying to get'. The idea that there is 
natural expression of a state does in fact seem to go hand-in-hand 
with the idea that the relevant avowal is expressive too - which 
makes thesis (ii) such an uncomfortable one. If one believes, say, 
that the dog's digging for the bone is a natural expression of his 
wanting the bone, then one will be favourably disposed to thesis 
(i). However, as was indicated above, the existence of holistic 
constraints on one's interpretation of human behaviour leads one to 
say that wanting is only conditionally given expression by some 
appropriate action. Only if I believe that drinking that glass of 
water will satisfy my desire for liquid refreshment, will my desire 
'find expression' in my drinking it. This fact opens the possibility 
of a sensible answer in this case to our question 'Why does the 
state have that kind of manifestation?' (Viz. 'Because subjects 
reason that drinking water will quench their thirst'.) This in turn 
seems to create a divergence between the expressive avowal ('I am 
thirsty' - no sensible answer to our question) and the non-
expressive behaviour. (It is because the avowal seems to pass the 
test for expression that thesis (iii) is the least plausible.) 
The problem of 'qualified' avowals is not going to affect the 
plausibility of the expressive resolution to any marked degree, and 
so the question will not be treated in the depth it requires. 
However, it is worth saying that there is room for manoeuvre over 
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the expressive / non-expressive status of '''qualified'' avowal 
behaviour'. For whether the behaviour passes the test for express-
ion depends on how it is described. Is there not some formulation 
that will ensure the answer to our question is foolish? E.g. 'The 
state of being thirsty manifests itself in the subject trying to get 
drinkable, non-toxic liquid'. 
The expressive resolution of the problem of avowals consti-
tutes a conceptual explanation (as opposed to an institutional one -
see p. 207 above). However, it is not the only possible such 
explanation for the features of 'qualified' avowals. If the latter 
are ultimately judged to fail the test for expression, they need not 
thereby be seen as reports. Rather, one may say the following. The 
reason why, in deciding whether p, I am also deciding whether I 
believe that p, is that, as suggested, my beliefs are not simply 
'given' as are sensations and (in a certain range of cases) moods; 
it may not be a determinate matter whether, at some time t, I 
believe that p (and similarly for other propositional attitudes). 
The avowal of belief may best be seen as a decision rather than as a 
report - or as the reiteration of a decision in some cases. (The 
metaphor 'making up one's mind' is one to be taken seriously.) 
3rd-personal belief-ascription depends on the disposition to verbal 
expression by the subject in a way that pain-ascription does not; 
the avowal of belief is an integral part of the process of belief-
formation in a way that the avowal of pain is not in the 'process' 
of 'pain-formation'. 
(vi) Avowals and 'pseudo'-avowals 
Could there be a subject of experience that did not make 
avowals (that is, authoritative utterances expressing states of 
itself)? Only if solipsism were correct. For if avowals were 
authoritative because of some 'look within', there would have to be 
the coherent possibility that such introspection never yielded 
anything in the way of publicly-observable behaviour. They would 
then be 'pseudo'-avowals - mere reports on mental states, their 
attachment to which would be contingent (i.e. mental states would 
not need to be avowable or 'pseudo'-avowable). But the idea of a 
subject of experience which made only 'pseudo'-avowals in this 
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caricatural way is a nonsense. Its detachment from its own exper-
ience would be more profound even than its detachment (via the 
inferential model of 3rd-personal ascription) from the experience of 
others. If a subject is prone to states of consciousness he must be 
regarded as having the capacity to express those states; and their 
linguistic expression will be by means of avowals. 
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ELIZABETH ANSCOMBE UND DER BANGOR KREIS 
An account of a conversation between the author and Professor 
Anscornbe. 
10 July 1983 The foyer, Neuadd Rathbone, Coleg Prifysgol Gogledd 
Cymru, Bangor, Gwynedd. 
GEMA 
Lunch-time: those present - G.E.M. Anscornbe and 
A.J. Hamilton (Miss Anscornbe is no longer wearing a 
name-tag pinned on to the back of her shirt). 
I want a pint of beer 
* * * 
The bar, as above. It is rather noisy. 
AJH I think that a lot of people don't seem to have fully 
understood your paper, 'The First Person', or at least the 
positive account you give of self-consciousness. 
GEMA 
AJH 
GEMA 
AJH 
GEMA 
AJH 
Oh, only Jenny Teichman has told me she didn't understand 
it ••• maybe that's because she knows me as a friend 
Jimmy Altham wrote a paper on it, you know, it's in 
the collection, Intention and Intentionality. 
Yes, I've looked at that. 
What will you have? 
Yes, I have read it. 
No, what will you have to drink? 
Oh, a grapefruit juice please ••• that's very kind of you, 
Professor Anscornbe ••• 
AJH 
GEMA 
AJH 
GEMA 
AJH 
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* * * 
In the foyer, as above. 
Do you still believe that 'I' is not a referring 
expression? 
Oh yes. 
Perhaps I could ask you first about the consequences of 
your view. I have heard it said that it becomes a problem 
what happens to the truth-value links between 1st-person 
utterances in the present tense, and other utterances. 
For instance, if someone says, 'I am in pain', someone 
else can say of him 'He is in pain' ••• Some people say 
that reference just consists in there being these 
truth-value links. 
Well if that's so, 'I' does refer! ••• I think it would 
be better to ask, how can one infer from a sentence con-
taining a non-referring expression to one containing, in 
the relevant place, a referring one ••• I'm thinking here 
of the stuff by Davidson ••• I can infer from 'I stabbed 
him with a knife' to 'I stabbed him', but how is this 
done? ••• Tony Kenny started this off in his book Action, 
Emotion and Will ••. 
[The content of Miss Anscombe's remarks tails off into 
indeterminacy as her interlocutor loses the drift.] 
••• perhaps we ought to have lunch now ••. 
* * * 
The refectory, as above: those present - G.E.M. 
Anscombe, P.T. Geach and A.J. Hamilton. 
In your article, you give explanations of the meaning of 
'I' which you find unsatisfactory, because of their 
circularity. I'm thinking of '''I'' is the word each one 
GEMA 
AJH 
GEMA 
AJH 
GEMA 
AJH 
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uses knowingly and intentionally to refer to himself'. I 
realise this is circular, but could it not serve as an 
introductory explanation? I mean, it's not totally 
uninformative. 
Well ••• imagine this story. A character is looking for 
the heir to a fortune. He's given some information about 
him, he then finds out when he was born (this could be a 
laborious process), then where he lives, and so on. He 
goes to the house, knocks on the door, but the person he's 
looking for, John Smith let's say, isn't in. Then it 
dawns on him, 'this is ~ house! It is myself who is 
John Smith, the heir!' ••• One could write a novel about 
this, a Borges sort of novel ••• What would it be like to 
arrive at the realisation that this person, so fully 
described, but whom I haven't actually met, is myself! 
Extraordinary! ••• I remember, when we were visiting ---
they had houses with numbers in two streets ••• you know, 
there was a garden on one side, and that was the usual 
entrance, and a garden on the other ••• mail might be 
addressed to the number and street on the other side, and 
returned marked 'Undelivered' ••• You know the 'Thou Art 
the Man' stories ••• 
No ••• 
Oh, like Naboth's vineyard. The king takes it away from 
him ••• The king consults the prophet, who tells him a 
story about the man who stole the sheep ••• The king says, 
'This man must be brought to justice! It is terrible! 
How might we find him?' And the prophet says, 'Thou are 
the man' ••• 
But you still feel that the circularity of the account of 
'I' you gave is a decisive objection? 
Well, what does John Smith now know when he realises 'It's 
me who's the John Smith who ••• '? 
Maybe the conditions on the use of 'I' can't be spelled 
GEMA 
AJH 
GEMA 
PTG 
GEMA 
PTG 
AJH 
GEMA 
AJH 
GEMA 
AJH 
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out. Maybe there's nothing there that can be spelled out. 
Maybe. 
Do you think that 'I' is dispensable from the language, 
that we could say just the same things we presently say, 
without it? 
Oh, of course! Latin has no 1st-person pronoun in 
common use, just a 1st-person inflection of the verb 
It's always useful to look at other languages you know -
people writing in this area don't do this ••• because 
usually they only know one language ••• Descartes says 
'Cogito ergo sum', not 'Ego cogito ergo ego sum' ••• Then 
1 
he says 'Quid est iste ego cogitans?' ••• is that it? 
Peter dear, does Descartes say 'Quid est iste ego 
cogitans?'? 
Is it [long quotation]? 
Oh no, it's not that at all. 
Well, I don't know dear ••• 
I only know one language ••• 
••• So you hold that 'amo' doesn't serve to identify 
anyone? 
No. 
Doesn't ••• urn ••• 'amat' identify someone? 
No. 
Hmmm ••• Strawson says in The Bounds of Sense that when I 
2 
use 'I', I identify myself for others. 
'What is this thinking I?' - Ed. 
2 
The relevant remark is in fact in Individuals p. 100 - Ed. 
GEMA 
AJH 
GEMA 
AJH 
GEMA 
AJH 
GEMA 
1 
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It's not by means of ~ that I identify myself to others, 
but merely by speaking ••• Imagine a lot of deep holes, 
and I fall down one of them ••• I cry 'Help!' Someone 
asks 'Who's there?' "It's I', I say. Well, it's not 'I' 
that's doing the identifying rather, the tone of 
voice, accent, etc. 
I asked you earlier about the dispensability of 'I'. In 
the Philosophical Remarks, Wittgenstein talks of 'alter-
native techniques of representation', which do not employ 
the 1st-person pronoun ••• 'There is pain here', etc. 
Yes. 
Others have talked of dispensing with 'I' and preserving 
the expressive power of the language, of saying just what 
we can say now, using 'I'. Wittgenstein goes on to say of 
the alternative techniques of representation, that they 
preserve what is 'essential to the facts' ••• what do you 
make of this notion - it seems very Tractarian ••• 
Yes, it would be ••• You'd need to look at something 
later, the Philosophical Grammar ••• 
Oh ••• 
David Bell claims that in passages like the one from 
the Remarks, Wittgenstein is espousing a kind of solipsism 
rather like Strawson's 'No-ownership view' in 
Individuals. 
I don't think the no-ownership view is solipsism ••• There 
is that passage about the 'visual room' in the Investi-
1 
gations. The 'visual room' is one that has no 
owner ••• the idea of the 'geometric eye' [Anscombe points 
to between her eyes] is implicit here ••• I never under-
stood this passage until I came to write 'The Intention-
ality of Sensation' ••• about non-existent objects of 
Sections 398-400 - Ed. 
PTG 
GEMA 
AJH 
GEMA 
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perception, like in that experiment when they flash up FIN 
and RED alternately very rapidly and you seem to see 
FRIEND, but it isn't really there ••• what kinds of object 
are these? ••• 
Would you like coffee, dear? 
Oh, yes please ••• 
There is a continuing strain of solipsism in Wittgen-
stein's work, though, isn't there? He does say in a 
passage in the Lectures edited by Alice Ambrose, that what 
the solipsist wants is not a language where the ego has a 
monopoly, but where it drops out of the picture. 
Well, of course, in the Tractatus, he does say that 
solipsism ultimately coincides with realism, you can 
develop it that way [TLP 5.64 - Ed.]. 
AJH I find it strange that while Wittgenstein devotes much 
discussion in the Investigations to the alleged 'mental 
objects', which are idle, which must drop out of the 
picture, he doesn't seem to discuss the subject any more 
in the same way, in the way he does in the middle period 
writings. Why is it that there is so little discussion of 
the self in the Investigations? 
GEMA 
AJH 
GEMA 
[with exasperation] How could a man whose native language 
has no expression for the self possibly discuss it! 
You really must stop using this expression! 
[obsequiously] Er, yes, ••• urn ••• I should really have 
said 'the 1st-person'. 
The 'I'. 
PTG Iid like the keys dear. I must go and do some work this 
afternoon. 
[GEMA gives the keys to PTG and he departs] 
GEMA 
AJH 
GEMA 
AJH 
GEMA 
AJH 
GEMA 
AJH 
GEMA 
AJH 
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Yes, so must I Anyway, I did object to the way 
McGuinness, in the Tractatus, translated 'das Ich' as 'the 
self' • 
* * * 
In the foyer: those present - G.E.M. Anscombe and 
A.J. Hamilton. Immediately after the above. 
I wasn't very clear about your discussion of 'A'- and 
'I'-users in 'The First Person'. 
No, I'm not happy with it. A lot of what I wrote on it 
didn't appear in the published article. 
Is the idea that with 'A', it's just like 'I' except that 
identification makes sense? 
Well, my aim here was this. People say 'I' is a name. 
Then let's treat it like one and call it 'A'. 'A' is the 
name everyone uses [intentionally? - Ed.] to refer to 
himself. Everyone has 'A' stamped on his wrist. Then, 
imagine someone is wounded in the leg. He has to 
Trace a path ••• 
Yes, trace a path from the wound to the mark on his wrist. 
Then he can say 'A' is wounded. The trouble is, how could 
someone, for instance, trace a path from his wound to the 
'A' stamped on his wrist without knowing 'this is my 
body'? 
They would have to be self-conscious, anyway, then? 
Conscious, at least. Remember that example of the bird 
'dropping a wing' ••• Pretending, but not knowing its 
pretending. Anyway, I do recommend you follow up this 
line of thought. Maybe it leads somewhere, maybe not. 
A kind of language for Baldy ••• 
GEMA 
AJH 
GEMA 
AJH 
243 
Oh yes, William James is so good, isn't he! 
I particularly liked the bit where he writes 'X, alias 
"Baldy'" ••• 
Yes! ••• Well, thank you. Goodbye. 
Yes, thank you very much, Professor Anscombe. 
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